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Introduction 
Abstract: This introduction sets out the objectives, topic, method and 
structure of this thesis. I describe philosophical folk psychology and the 
roles that it is presumed to play in action choice, interpersonal 
understanding and reason giving. Philosophical folk psychology – 
particularly when expressed as belief-desire psychology – is suggested by 
some as a way to describe all three of these phenomena under a single model. 
I argue, however, that this comes at the cost of a number of unwarranted 
commitments which give rise to philosophical problems. I introduce a 
handful of influential thinkers who have advanced folk psychological 
positions and also some contemporary examples of philosophers addressing 
problems arising directly from it. I then introduce the diagnostic-therapeutic 
intent of this thesis, grounded in a reading of Wittgenstein’s approach to 
philosophy through the later work of Gordon Baker. Thereafter I set out the 
two-part structure of the thesis and briefly outline the chapters. 
The human being is the best picture of the human soul. 
Wittgenstein, Culture and Value 
MS 131 801 
0.1 Research Questions and Objectives 
For millennia, western philosophy engaged with questions of action, and action choice, 
interpersonal understanding – the ability that most people, most of the time, have to 
explain and predict other people’s actions – and reason-giving – how individuals account 
for their own actions and action-choices. In pursuit of answers to these, a single idea has 
become prevalent since the so-called cognitive revolution in the philosophy of mind and 
in psychology (Gardner 1987; Miller 2003) that marked the abandonment of behaviourism 
(particularly in the United States) at the beginning of the 1960s. This is the idea that actions 
can be correctly explained in terms of the actor’s possession of specific causal 
propositional attitudes, especially beliefs and desires. This so-called common-sense or 
                                                
1 Cf. Philosophical Investigations II, iv, 25: “The human body is the best picture of the human soul.” 
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folk psychology2 is presumed to reflect the way that non-philosophers and non-
psychologists understand and explain action.  
In this thesis, I am seeking to challenge the warrant that the proponents of philosophical 
folk psychology have for their commitments. I will justify this challenge by: 
1. Elucidating the features of psychological explanation in contemporary cognitive and 
social psychology and  
2. Examining several ways in which beliefs and desires are used in everyday, non-
philosophical settings.  
Among the questions I pose in the present thesis is whether or not the assumptions and 
commitments of classic philosophical folk psychology, of the kind described in section 0.2 
below, are warranted. 
I contend that if philosophers pay attention to alternative ways of viewing the three 
phenomena (action and action-choice, interpersonal understanding and reason-giving), then 
many philosophical problems associated with philosophical folk psychology (section 0.3) 
need not arise. Support for this contention arises from answers to these guiding questions: 
GQ1. What roles do attributions of specific beliefs and desires play in the way that 
contemporary cognitive psychology investigates action choice? And what 
role do they play in the models of interpersonal understanding developed by 
contemporary social psychology? 
GQ2. What roles do attributions of specific beliefs and desires play in everyday 
discourse? Particularly, are they principally used as part of causal 
explanations and, if not, what other purposes do they serve? 
Underpinning the first guiding question is the contention that scientific investigations are 
concerned with causal accounts of their target phenomena (established in Chapter 1). If 
“belief” and “desire” pick out the causes of action as suggested by philosophical folk 
psychology, we would expect them to feature in the causal-explanatory models developed 
by cognitive psychologists. Likewise, if philosophical folk psychology accurately described 
the basis of interpersonal understanding we would expect these terms, their cognates, or the 
                                                
2 “Folk psychology” was originally a pejorative term used by opponents of the idea that the folk view was essentially correct, 
but has been appropriated by its proponents. Accordingly, I use it here without negative connotations. 
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concepts underlying “belief” and “desire” to feature prominently in the models of 
interpersonal understanding developed by social psychology.  
To date, very few (if any) philosophers have challenged philosophical folk psychology 
through an elucidation of how psychologists treat the phenomena. Where such 
considerations have appeared, philosophical effort has concentrated on a reconciliation of 
scientific models with the default view in philosophy – see Haselager (1997) and the 
discussion of the interface problem in section 0.3 of this introduction.  Philosophers 
struggle with this and other conceptual issues arising from “belief” and “desire” as terms 
that essentially pick out causes of action. In the first part of this thesis I discuss how the 
causes of action and our understanding of those causes are explained by science.  
The second guiding question has also been neglected. Another assumption of philosophical 
folk psychology is that the “folk”3 understand propositional attitude terms such as “belief” 
and “desire” as picking out mental states that stand in a causal relationship to action and 
action choice. The second part of this thesis addresses whether this is necessarily the way 
that such terms are used and understood. What other purposes might claims of specific 
beliefs and desires or descriptions of others involving the terms “belief” and “desire” fulfil? 
How closely do everyday uses of “belief” and “desire” map onto the similarly named 
concepts of philosophical folk psychology? 
The objectives of this thesis are: 
1) To clarify whether the terms “belief” and “desire” pick out the causes of action in a 
way that is central to philosophical folk psychology.  
2) To examine how interpersonal understanding is investigated by scientists and how 
this contrasts with philosophical folk psychology. 
3) To ask whether reason-giving should be regarded and as implying the same 
commitments to the causal efficacy of beliefs and desires and to their central role in 
interpersonal understanding assumed by philosophical folk psychology.  
4) To suggest that if this clarification and the offered alternatives are embraced, then 
many of the philosophical problems arising from philosophical folk psychology can 
be avoided.  
                                                
3 Presumably meaning everyday language-users freed from philosophical constraints. 
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0.2 Classic Philosophical Folk Psychology 
Philosophical folk psychology is built on a number of assumptions, including: 
A1) Individuals are caused to choose and to perform particular actions by the 
propositional attitudes, especially specific beliefs and desires, that they hold. 
A2) People not engaged in philosophical reflection or psychological investigations (the 
“folk”) understand, explain and predict their own and other people’s actions with 
reference to the propositional attitudes – again, especially beliefs and desires – that 
they either infer to be held by the actor, or find themselves to hold by introspection.  
A3) People give reasons for their own actions and choices based on the introspection 
of their own propositional attitudes, especially beliefs and desires (reason giving). 
A4) These capacities are underpinned by knowledge of a causal relationship between 
beliefs and desires and actions or action choice. 
In this list, A1 deals expressly with action and action-choice, A2 with interpersonal 
understanding4 and A3 with reason giving. Thanks to the causal relationship implied in 
the fourth assumption, belief-desire psychology offers a unified account of all three 
capacities. The causal relationship is enshrined in the belief-desire law (Bermúdez 2009: 
43) that underpins philosophical folk psychology. Horgan and Woodward (1991: 149) offer 
a heavily qualified version: 
If someone desires that p, and this desire is not overridden by other desires, and 
he believes that an action of kind K will bring it about that p, and he believes 
that such an action is within his power, and he does not believe that some other 
kind of action is within his power and is a preferable way to bring about that p, 
then ceteris paribus, the desire and the beliefs will cause him to perform an 
action of kind K. 
 
Although this formulation states the central role of beliefs and desires and the causal 
relationship in which these are presumed to stand to behaviour, it is perhaps unsurprising 
that it is usually abbreviated to something like: 
                                                
4 I use this “theory-neutral” term for this social ability in preference to “theory of mind” or “mind-reading”. 
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BELIEF-DESIRE LAW: 
An agent who desires to bring about a particular state of affairs (P) and who 
believes that performing a specific action (Φ) will bring about P will, ceteris 
paribus, tend to Φ. 
This form is the belief-desire law for the purposes of the present thesis. The ceteris paribus 
clause is meant to capture all of the vagaries spelled out in the version from Horgan and 
Woodward (1991). If one wanted to be uncharitable one might be tempted to parody their 
description of the law as “people will do whatever they believe will fulfil their desires – 
except when they don’t”. However, Horgan and Woodward make explicit that the kinds of 
variables constituting their exceptions are likely to be further beliefs and desires that take 
precedence. The causal roles of beliefs and desires are preserved, even when people act in 
ways that are at odds with – or in outright contradiction of – their declared beliefs and 
desires.  
Philosophers employ belief-desire psychology, based on the four assumptions and the belief 
desire law, to formulate answers to a number of questions related to action: 
1. How do we explain the individual’s choice of particular actions in preference to the 
innumerable courses of action that might be available in many circumstances? 
2. How does interpersonal understanding work? What strategies, abilities, perceptions, 
intuitions, etcetera are engaged when most people5, most of the time find other’s 
action choices explicable and, to a large degree, predictable?   
3. How are the answers to both of these questions related to the way that individuals 
account for their own actions and action choices?  
4. In what way are the answers to questions A-C related? 
Each of these questions overlaps with the empirical investigations of psychology.  
If “folk psychology”, signified nothing more than the everyday recognition of human and 
non-human agents as creatures with minds who are able to acquire and process 
information about their situation and for whom information-processing operations lead to 
the selection of actions, as suggested by Fletcher (1995), it would be hard to question. That 
most of us appreciate agents (our peers and many non-human animals) as significantly 
                                                
5 One exception being those people on the more socially disadvantaged reaches of the autistic spectrum. 
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different from other medium-sized objects in our environment seems uncontroversial6. In 
fact, if anything, we are prone to over-attribute agency, as shown through countless 
replications and refinements of the effect first investigated by Heider and Simmel (1944) 
and recently reviewed by Keil and Newman (2015) (See Chapters 3 and 4 for more on this 
phenomenon). 
Philosophical folk psychology, however, goes further. It assigns causal force to the 
presumed referents of the terms “belief” and “desire”. It defines information acquisition and 
processing as synonymous with “belief” and “desires” as picking out motivating states. It 
accepts the belief-desire law as the process underlying action choice and “the folk” are 
assumed to have known this all along7. I contend that these assumptions and commitments 
are held without warrant other than their status as the orthodox (default) account of action, 
interpersonal understanding and reason giving. 
In their defence of philosophical folk psychology against potential challenge from cognitive 
science and cognitive psychology Horgan and Woodward (1991: 149) define it as: 
A network of principles which constitutes a sort of common-sense theory about 
how to explain human behaviour. These principles provide a central role to 
certain propositional attitudes, particularly beliefs and desires.  
According to Ratcliffe and Hutto (2007: 2) the “received wisdom” of philosophical folk 
psychology:  
Encapsulates two key assumptions: (1) that making sense of actions requires 
interpreting them in terms of reasons composed of various propositional 
attitudes (at a bare minimum – beliefs and desires) and (2) that this activity is 
primarily concerned with providing predictions and explanations of actions. 
To these two, Ratcliffe and Hutto add a third assumption, namely that such a folk 
psychology is taken to be the “central, core ability that underlies all interpersonal 
understanding and interaction, rather than just one among many ingredients of social 
ability” (ibid.). From this the philosopher deduces that the explanatory success of the 
                                                
6 Once again, this ability seems to be inhibited in some autistic subjects. 
7 As we shall see, there is some dispute as to how this knowledge is acquired. 
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strategy must depend on its being true (Fodor 1993) and that because it is true we are 
justified in using it to construct philosophically robust accounts of action. 
Stich and Nichols (2003) suggest that the question “what is folk psychology” engenders two 
possible answers. The first is that folk-psychology is little more than the collection of 
everyday platitudes about mental states and actions (and their relations) that we all “take 
for granted”. This is encapsulated in this quotation from David Lewis: 
Collect all the platitudes you can think of regarding the causal relations of 
mental states, sensory stimuli, and motor responses. Perhaps we can think of 
them as having the form: 
When someone is in so-and-so combination of mental states and receives 
sensory stimuli of so-and-so kind, he tends with so-and so probability to be 
caused thereby to go into so-and-so mental states and produce so-and-so motor 
responses.  
… Include only platitudes that are common knowledge among us – everyone 
knows them, everyone knows that everyone else knows them, and so on. For 
the meanings of our words are common knowledge, and I am going to claim 
that names of mental states derive their meaning from these platitudes.  
(Lewis 1980: 212) 
This description, although somewhat vague (“so-and-so mental states”), leads directly to 
the belief-desire law. As Stich and Nichols describe it, “…we might think of folk 
psychology as a set of generalizations that systematizes the platitudes in a perspicuous way. 
A systematization of that sort might also make it more natural to describe folk psychology 
as a theory” (Stich and Nichols 2003: 240).  
The second possible answer to the question “what is folk psychology” suggested by Stich 
and Nichols focuses on interpersonal understanding and on the way that the assumptions 
and the belief-desire law facilitate the everyday prediction of action. Stich and Nichols 
suggest that with circumstantial information individuals are rather good not only at 
predicting and explaining behaviour but also at attributing mental states to other people. If 
you asked person A “what does person B believe about this situation” and then asked person 
B “what do you believe about this situation” then, so long as person A was able to observe 
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what person A could perceive about the situation, or had other knowledge of Person B’s 
information about the situation, then Person B’s account of their beliefs is likely to coincide 
with Person A’s ascription of beliefs to Person B. 
For Churchland (1988: 97) too, philosophical folk psychology is a development of a number 
of observations about human facility with interpersonal understanding. He writes: 
Consider the considerable capacity that normal humans have for explaining and 
predicting the behaviour of their fellow humans. We can even explain and 
predict the psychological states of other humans. We explain their behaviour in 
terms of their beliefs and desires, and their pains, hopes and fears. We explain 
their sadness in terms of their disappointment, their intentions in terms of their 
desires, and their beliefs in terms of their perceptions and inferences. 
For this to be possible, Churchland contends, each of us must “…be in command of a rather 
substantial set of laws or generalizations connecting the various mental states with (1) other 
mental states, with (2) external circumstances and with (3) overt behaviours,” (Ibid.). This 
entails that such “theoretic” capability is facilitated by “hundreds” of common-sense 
generalisations such as “persons tend to feel pain at points of recent bodily damage”, 
“persons denied fluids for some time tend to feel thirst” and (a restatement of the belief-
desire law) “Persons who want that P, and believe that Q would be sufficient to bring about 
P, and have no conflicting wants or preferred strategies, will try to bring it about that Q,” 
(Ibid: 98). 
Disagreement as to whether the skills inherent in folk-psychological prediction and 
explanation of action constitute a widely held theory (or “folk theory”) of action, as 
described by Churchland or are achieved by other, non-theoretic means has given rise to the 
divergence of two schools of thought in folk psychology (Stich and Nichols 2008). On the 
one hand, folk-psychological aptitude is said to rest on the possession and empirical 
development of a theory, analogous to a scientific theory and its refinement (Gopnik and 
Meltzoff 1997; Waismeyer et al. 2014) – so called “theory-theory”. Others, frustrated by 
doubts about the provenance of an innate theory and whether its development can be likened 
to scientific investigation (an additional putative innate capacity) suggest that folk 
psychological proficiency rests on an ability to simulate the mental processes of others 
(Goldman 2006; Gordon 2008). This simulation theory suggests that we are able to run an 
“off-line simulation” of other people’s beliefs and desires and so predict what they do by 
A Therapeutic Elimination… 
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hypothesising how we might act in a similar situation. We only need to imagine ourselves 
with similar motivations (desires) and information (beliefs). Likewise, the post-hoc 
explanation of another person’s behaviour is a matter of describing what we would have 
needed to believe and desire in order for it to be rational that we would act in the way that 
we have witnessed. 
There are a number of variations on simulation theory (described by Gordon, 2008) and 
many hybrid positions that draw from theory-theory and from simulation-based accounts in 
varying measures (Stich and Nichols 2008: 390). All depend upon the four assumptions and 
on the belief-desire law as a correct account of the causal relation between beliefs and 
desires and action. The dispute is over how the facility to ascribe beliefs and desires is 
acquired and developed8 and not over whether such ascriptions form the basis of 
interpersonal understanding or whether the ascribed states are the genuine causes of action. 
People with interpersonal skills are assumed to have these assumptions and the belief-desire 
law encoded in their brains as a matter of course. These are information-rich accounts of a 
near-universal human capability (Stich and Nichols 2003: 241).  
However, if the assumptions are not true, and the belief-desire law not binding, then 
discussion of whether theory or simulation grounds folk-psychology is moot.  
The platitude-based account of folk psychology or of the belief-desire law is intuitively 
plausible. Lewis, once again states their significance: 
The concepts of belief, desire, and meaning are common property. The theory 
that implicitly defines them had better be common property too. It must amount 
to nothing more than a mass of platitudes of common sense, though these may 
be reorganized in perspicuous and unfamiliar ways.  
(Lewis 1974: 335) 
Lewis (2006), lays out the causal relationship between the elements of philosophical folk 
psychology and the performance of actions in equally bold terms: 
Folk psychology concerns the causal relations of mental states, perceptual 
stimuli and behavioural responses. It says how mental states, singly or in 
                                                
8 In Chapter 4, section 4.7 of the present thesis I introduce a third approach: Hutto’s Narrative Practice Hypothesis (Hutto 
2008b). 
A Therapeutic Elimination… 
Mark Curtis, UEA June, 2016  12 
combination, are apt for causing behaviour; and it says how mental states are 
apt to change under the impact of perceptual stimuli and other mental states. 
Thus it associates with each mental state a typical causal role. … Whenever M 
is a folk-psychological name for a mental state, folk psychology will say that M 
typically occupies a certain causal role: call this the M-role. Then we analyse M 
as meaning ‘the state that typically occupies the M-role. Folk psychology 
implicitly defines the term M, and we have only to make that definition explicit. 
 (Lewis 2006: 56, emphasis added,) 
The final sentence of this quotation epitomises the essential commitment to the causal 
meaning of “belief” and “desire” that marks philosophical folk psychology. 
Having this analysed M (or “belief”, for example) according to the causal role defined by 
its position in folk psychology, Lewis can achieve a token identity account of the role of 
mental states such as beliefs and desires in the production of action: 
Mental state M = the occupant of the M-role (by analysis), 
Physical state P = the occupant of the M-role (by science), 
Therefore M=P 
(Lewis 2006: 59). 
Lewis argues that the causal roles identified by his analysis continue to hold so long as the 
philosopher of folk psychology correctly assigns the proper mental state to its appropriate 
causal role9.  
The contentious step is to grant causal efficacy to the states identified by the terms “belief” 
and “desire”. This is the principal source of the disputable position that is the focus of the 
present thesis, as articulated by Bermúdez (2005: 54): 
The generalisations of commonsense psychology are, quite simply, causal 
generalisations and the explanations and predictions offered by commonsense 
psychology are causal explanations that should be understood in the way that 
                                                
9 A declaration of an essentialist commitment. 
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causal explanations have been classically understood – namely, as involving the 
subsumption of two events under a general causal law10. 
Among the most vociferous proponents of classic philosophical folk psychology is Jerry 
Fodor (1975, 1987, 1999) who argues not only that the belief-desire picture is central to 
questions of action choice and interpersonal understanding, but also that the causal 
relationship captured by the assumptions and the belief-desire law directly reflects the 
functional organisation of the human brain. Computational processes take place over 
tokens encoded in the brain. Representations betokening information (beliefs) combine 
with representations of motivations (desires) to stimulate motor responses (actions) at the 
neurological level. This is the essence of the Representational Theory of Mind (Fodor 
1987; Von Eckardt 2012) that, for Fodor, describes the basis of all human cognitive 
processes. The presumed isomorphism between the kinds of action-description (predictions 
and explanation) offered by “the folk” and the computational operations of brain-circuits 
gives rise to the theory that neural representations are related to one another in sentence-
like combinations in a Language of Thought (Fodor 1975, 2008). This suggests that the 
computational processes of the brain manipulate symbols that encode the ideas, perceptions 
and other cognitive contents in systematic ways to generate outputs, including actions. In 
common with natural language, the relationship between these signs and what they signify 
is arbitrary11.   
Fodor is scathing in his rejection of any suggestion that the belief-desire picture might not 
be true. He once wrote that should the belief-desire picture prove to be erroneous it would 
be “…beyond comparison the greatest intellectual catastrophe in the history of our species” 
(Fodor 1987: xii). In more temperate language he describes the relation between beliefs and 
desires and action choice thus:  
                                                
10 In Chapter 1, Section 1.1, I question whether subsumption under laws accurately describes the project of psychology. 
11 In contrast to the embodied or enactive approaches that we will encounter in Chapter 7. 
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The natural home of the propositional attitudes is in ‘common sense’ (or 
‘belief/desire’) psychological explanation. If you ask the Man on the Clapham 
Omnibus what precisely he is doing there, he will tell you a story along the 
following lines: ‘I wanted to get home (to work/to Auntie’s) and I have reason 
to believe that there, or somewhere near there, is where this omnibus is going’. 
Fodor (1991a: 23) 
This restates the central commitment of the belief-desire law. Fodor maintains that that this 
kind of reason-giving is a variety of causal explanation (Ibid.). His first justification for this 
commitment is to point out that counterfactuals are readily available: had the Man not 
believed that the Clapham Omnibus was headed to his desired destination, he would not 
have been on board at all. More directly, the causal efficacy of beliefs and desires is 
mandated because their tokens (to get home, to work or to his Auntie’s) would be 
instantiated in the computational machinery of his brain. Thereafter, it is a straightforward 
matter of empirical anatomy to identify a mechanism12 whereby these tokenings play a part 
in neurochemical processes leading to muscle contractions and so to movements. Fodor 
(1991a) describes himself as a realist about mental representations (tokened as neurological 
states) and maintains that the isomorphism between propositional attitudes and their 
instantiating brain states permits him to be a realist about the causal effects of 
propositional attitudes. 
Perhaps the most influential account of folk psychology is that offered by Donald Davidson 
(2001). Alvarez (2010), having first noted the significance of these questions of agency 
throughout the history of Western philosophy, writes: 
… Donald Davidson’s work from the 1960s and 1970s is seminal. In particular, 
Davidson’s conception of reasons, or something close to it, became the orthodoxy 
and remains so to this day. Following Davidson, most philosophers today maintain 
that a person’s reason for acting is a combination of a belief and a desire. 
Davidson’s approach, known as “anomalous monism” (Bermúdez 2005: 45; Davidson 
2001: 214), depends on the observation that although the physical instantiation of the mental 
states “belief” and “desire” (typically) is the sole location of causal effectiveness (hence 
                                                
12 An entirely physical mechanism. 
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monism), mental states give rise to one another: each is caused by antecedent states. 
Davidson’s monism is anomalous in that it permits mental states to have causal effects. We 
build our understanding of mental states, Davidson argues, from this network of causal 
relationships, augmented by notions of rationality (with the belief-desire law at its core), 
consistency and coherence. Bermúdez (2005: 43) describes Davidson’s view: “The process 
of interpretation is essentially a process of rational reconstruction aiming to maximise the 
rationality of the agent whose behaviour is being reconstructed.” We presume that agents 
act consistently with their true beliefs and a set of goals or desires and are justified in 
understanding that their actions result from the relationship between them. Davidson writes: 
Any effort at increasing the accuracy and power of a theory of behaviour forces 
us to bring more and more of the whole system of the agent’s beliefs and 
motives directly into account. But in inferring these systems from the evidence, 
we necessarily impose conditions of coherence, rationality and consistency. 
(Davidson 2001: 231) 
Thus a conception of what it is to be normatively rational determines an understanding of 
the roles beliefs and desires play in our mental lives. In contrast, scientific explanations at 
the sub-personal level are descriptive rather than normative (Bermúdez 2005: 43) and so 
construct claims of a different kind. Davidson goes on: 
These conditions have no echo in physical theory, which is why we can look 
for no more than rough correlations between psychological and physical 
phenomena.  
In the very next paragraph, Davidson establishes a manifesto for philosophical folk 
psychology: 
Consider our common-sense scheme for describing and explaining actions. […] 
we can explain why someone acted as he did by mentioning a desire, value, 
purpose, goal or aim the person had, and a belief connecting the desire with the 
action to be explained. 
(Ibid.) 
It is through Davidson that so much contemporary philosophy and the other disciplines that 
depend on the philosophical view for the way that they express the concepts of action and 
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agency, have largely accepted the notion that a reason, when described in a particular way, 
can also designate the cause of an action. This can be done, the Davidsonian philosopher 
would maintain without embracing dualism, so long as we keep in mind the distinction 
between the normative requirements of rationality and the descriptive objectives of 
scientific enquiry.  
The worry that Davidson’s “reasons” would have to be instantiated in a physical system 
isomorphic with the grammar of reasons – part of the basis for Fodor’s Language of 
Thought Hypothesis (Fodor 2008) – motivates an alternative view of the relation between 
reasons and causes, at least with respect to interpersonal understanding. The intentional 
stance, proposed by Dennett (1989), attempts to sidestep causal worries by remaining 
agnostic about the relationship between beliefs and desires and the causes of behaviour. 
Dennett suggests that negotiating the physical and social world while maintaining our 
individual sense of agency is a matter of taking the stance that we, and others, act in ways 
that are motivated by our desires and informed by our beliefs.  
The intentional stance, in which one treats the system whose behaviour is to be 
predicted as a rational agent; one attributes to the system the beliefs and desires 
it ought to have, given its place in the world and its purpose, and then predicts 
that it will act to further its goals in the light of its beliefs.  
(Dennett 1988 emphasis added) 
This noncommittal stance over whether the entities of the belief-desire law pick out the 
causes of behaviour – raises Fodor’s question: if it’s not true, how does it work? Dennett 
suggests one way of understanding how the intentional stance works: 
Evolution has designed human beings to be rational, to believe what they ought 
to believe and want what they ought to want. The fact that we are the products 
of a long and demanding evolutionary process guarantees that using the 
intentional strategy on us is a safe bet. 
(Dennett 1997: 76) 
Dennett concedes that this explanation is “uninformative”. He admits that there is no known 
description of the mechanism by which the intentional strategy is supposed to work. It is 
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notable that he brings to bear similar normative considerations –  two occurrences of the 
word “ought” – to those suggested by Davidson. 
The intentional stance is a description of the role that beliefs and desires are presumed to 
play in interpersonal – and even intrapersonal13 – understanding. Regardless of whether 
the individual taking the stance is correct when they attribute specific beliefs and desires to 
an actor in identifying the causal antecedents of the act to be described or explained, it is 
presumed that such attributions are the basis of our appreciation of actions.  
Despite its neutrality on the causal efficacy of beliefs and desires, Dennett’s account 
respects the assumption that puts the “folk” in “folk psychology”: that the attribution of 
beliefs and desires is a universal – or near universal – strategy in the understanding and 
explanation of action. Further to this, reason-giving is presumed both to be an example of 
this kind of explanation and to consist, primarily, of the introspective self-attribution of 
beliefs and desires.  
Computational accounts of the workings of the human mind are often collected together 
under the heading of functionalism (Armstrong 1988; Block 2004; Putnam 2002).  
According to Kim (2011: 129), functionalism (specifically machine functionalism) 
superseded [type] identity physicalism – the notion that mental states were to be identified 
with the brain states that instantiated them – within a few years of the reception of Hilary 
Putnam’s paper “The Nature of Mental States14” (Putnam 1980). Taking the example of 
pain, Putnam argued that if the state were to be identified with a specific neurological 
occurrence, this would preclude the recognition that a creature with markedly different 
physiology from that of a human could experience pain. If “pain” signified the discharge of 
a particular set of neurons in a human brain, then we could not say that a creature that lacked 
that set of neurons experienced pain, however much its behaviour in the presence of 
physical harm resembled a pain response, without a change of meaning to the term “pain”. 
On the other hand, we would not want a mental-state term like “pain” to collapse into a set 
of behavioural dispositions as postulated by the logical behaviourism associated with 
Ryle (1949, 2000).  
                                                
13 Self-awareness. 
14 Originally published in 1967 as “Psychological Predicates” in Capitan and Merrill (eds.) Art, Mind and Religion (Pittsburgh 
PA: University of Pittsburgh Press) 
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Instead, Putnam suggests that mental states, including pain, are identified with the “state of 
receiving sensory inputs which play a certain role in the Functional Organisation of the 
organism.” (Putnam 1980: 229). Specifically, the role of referred to by “Pain”: 
Is characterized, at least partially, by the fact that the sense organs responsible 
for the inputs in question are organs whose function is to detect damage to the 
body, or dangerous extremes of temperature, pressure etc., and by the fact that 
the “inputs” themselves, whatever their physical realization, represent a 
condition that the organism assigns a high disvalue to. 
(Ibid.) 
This, then, is a partial functional definition of “pain”. Other mental states can be described 
according to other functional roles.  
According to functionalism, a mental kind is a functional kind, or a causal-
functional kind, since the “function” involved is to fill a certain causal role. 
(Kim 2011: 133) 
Here we can see the origins in a functionalist conception of mind of both the belief-desire 
law and the metaphysical commitments that specific beliefs and desires must combine to 
bring about specific actions. The mental state designated by “belief”, in the context of the 
belief-desire law, is that mental state that causes a person to act in a particular way in 
pursuit of an associated desire. That is its functional definition.  As Stich and Nichols 
(2003: 238) argue, functionalism and philosophical folk psychology are inseparable because 
“According to functionalism, folk psychology is the theory that gives ordinary mental state 
terms their meaning.” (emphasis in original). 
Functionalists seek to explain how we can describe mental activity independently of the 
instantiating material without positing any additional substance of which minds are 
constructed. One way to describe this is that minds are what brains do (in the case of human 
minds). Functional states may be considered autonomous from the material of the neural 
apparatus that instantiates them to the extent that they might be multiply realisable, which 
is to say identical functions could be performed by quite different physical systems – 
perhaps even by man-made machinery. Functionalism allows the description of human 
mind-events to be divided into two sets of facts (Godfrey-Smith 2004); those concerning 
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the functions and those concerning the brain-events that are their instantiation. This does 
not entail separation into two substances. Functionalists do not subscribe to the idea that 
functional mental states are identified with any kind of spooky non-physical, non-spatial 
“stuff” that (somehow) provides the impetus for action. 
All of this is perfectly reasonable – except that for functionalism to be useful it is essential 
that our models correctly identify the functional states. Central to much philosophical 
functionalism – which Bermúdez (2005: 58-61) differentiates from psychological 
functionalism – is an assumption that the belief-desire law is an accurate description of the 
functional (causal) roles of the entities that make it up15. In Chapter 1, I describe the process 
of functional analysis by which scientific psychology seeks to (causally) explain complex 
functions in terms of the simpler functions that systematically combine to perform them. My 
contention is that if the functional roles identified by the belief-desire law and the 
metaphysical commitments were performed by mental states answering to “belief” and 
“desire” then we would find these terms, or the states that they pick out, featuring either as 
the objects of functional analysis or at some stage in that process. Otherwise, the assumption 
of the functional role of belief and desire is unwarranted. 
This thesis does not advocate a return to behaviourism. In common with the cognitive 
and social psychology that I turn to in Chapters 2 and 3, I urge philosophers to be intensely 
interested in the functional processes that underlie behaviour. Behaviourists typically treat 
the realm of the mental as a “black box” whose contents are both impenetrable and 
irrelevant to the investigation of relationships between stimulus and response (Kim 2011: 
84; Skinner 1974: 61). I am content that mental states can be differentiated by their functions 
but question whether “belief” and “desire” clearly designate unique functional states, and, 
consequently, whether the identification of these terms with particular functions is 
warranted.  
0.3 Philosophical Problems Generated by Folk Psychology 
One of the most frequently rehearsed problems with the belief-desire picture is the problem 
of mental causation. As Broome (2013), in the context of the normative prescription of 
behaviour, puts it: 
                                                
15 It might be conceded that the neural tokens are the actual “cause” of the action or action-choice but this makes no difference 
to the presumed isomorphism between functional and causal roles. 
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…when you believe you ought to do something your belief often causes you 
actually to do it. … One part of the mind-body problem is to understand how a 
state of mind can have a physical effect like that. 
(Broome 2013: 1) 
 
Although the mind-body problem is engendered by the belief-desire picture, it will not be 
given any direct consideration in this thesis. It might be completely intractable, in common 
with many metaphysical questions. It might also be something of a pseudo-problem in that 
it emerges only if one assumes that the belief-desire law is binding, that “belief” and 
“desire” (as they appear in that law) pick out the causes of action.  
A structural weakness of the belief-desire picture emerges from one of its strengths. The 
belief-desire law could, conceivably, explain any and every possible action, regardless of 
whether or not the individual subject acts in accordance with their professed beliefs and 
desires. All one needs do to explain anomalous behaviour in this way is to posit a set of 
unspoken beliefs and desires, perhaps even an unconscious set of beliefs and desires. So 
even when somebody finds it hard to account for their own behaviour in belief-desire terms, 
it remains possible to preserve the essential causal efficacy of beliefs and desires – the actor 
is just unaware of them.  
One could imagine an infinite variety of beliefs and desires that could be suggested – on the 
assumption that the belief-desire law pertains – to “explain” any action, regardless of 
whether the actor would recognise these ascribed mental states as their own. People might 
not be all that reliable about their own beliefs and desires, after all16. This is the basis of 
much discussion of akrasia or “weakness of the will” as it is sometimes described 
(Davidson 2001: 21-42). A smoker might openly declare their desire to quit and their belief 
that smoking presents a serious risk to their future health and longevity (and presumably 
also desires to live a long and healthy life). And yet they continue with their habit. This 
leads Wilkes (1991), for example, to argue that philosophical folk psychology, unlike 
scientific psychology, is not equipped to deal with “irrational or non-rational behaviour” 
because the models it develops are normative; they prescribe what the ideal decider ought 
to decide under ideal decision-conditions. Such conditions would, presumably, be the 
                                                
16 Which immediately raises doubts about the value of reason-giving on the belief-desire model. 
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absence of conflicting bodily sensations – such as the addictive physical effects of nicotine 
– or such psychological effects as hyperbolic discounting (Laibson 1997) under which 
long-term risks are discounted in favour of short term gains even when those risks (painful 
sickness and premature death) enormously outweigh any benefits (a warm, fuzzy feeling of 
drawing drug-laden smoke into the lungs). 
Conflicts between action and expressed beliefs and desires are resolvable. We just have to 
tell the unwitting actor that deep down (on some level, subconsciously etc.), they must have 
believed that what they did would get them what they (also unconsciously) wanted. The 
belief-desire law and the assumptions remain intact. This weakens the explanatory value of 
the belief-desire picture because it renders the strategy unfalsifiable (Popper 1992). What 
explains everything in this way, in fact explains nothing since we can always postulate 
additional contingencies that fit the actuality. It would be impossible to distinguish, by 
examination of any specific belief-desire pair that is suggested as an explanation, between 
any genuine causal antecedents of the observed action and a plausible rationalisation.  
There is also considerable debate in the philosophy of action as to whether any law-like 
generalisation can accommodate ceteris paribus clauses: can we regard any statement as a 
law if the force of that law is contingent on unspoken conditions or exceptions? See Fodor 
(1991b) and (Gauker 2003) for alternative views.   
A practical difficulty arises from the presumed role of belief-desire psychology in 
interpersonal understanding. In supporting a version of FP, Gopnik and Seiver (2009) claim 
that: 
Negotiating the social world is an extraordinarily difficult and complex task. 
Would we want to accept this? I suspect that behind Gopnik and Seiver’s statement is the 
thought that explaining how individuals negotiate the social world is “difficult and 
complex”17. For most people – those not on the more socially disabling parts of the autistic 
spectrum, for example – most everyday social transactions and interactions are 
straightforward, automatic18 and even enjoyable. Empirical evidence suggests that a lack of 
interpersonal contact can be seriously detrimental to psychological and even to physical 
health (House et al. 1988). Far from being taxing or requiring the application of an algorithm 
                                                
17 See Chapter 3. 
18 See Chapter 3, Section 3.6 for a discussion of the automaticity of social cognition. 
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based on an ability correctly to ascribe mental states – such as beliefs and desires – to those 
around us, many social inferences seem effortless (Bargh and Ferguson 2000). Contrast this 
with the frequent description of social skills as “mind-reading” (Apperly 2011; Baron-
Cohen 1995; Butterfill 2013; Carruthers 2009; Currie and Sterelny 2006; Goldman 2006). 
The belief-desire picture generates an appearance of complexity where, for most people and 
for most of the time, there is none19.  
I have already mentioned the dispute between different conceptions of how folk-
psychological proficiency is grounded – between simulation theorists and theory-theorists 
(and others). Philosophical folk psychology is reliant on empirical evidence for this dispute. 
It cannot be resolved by conceptual means alone. Chapter 3 of the present thesis, however, 
will show some ways in which scientific psychology accounts for the capacity to predict 
and explain one another’s actions without recourse to guessing, inferring, simulating, or 
otherwise ascribing sets of beliefs and desires to agents.  
Even without attempting to account for anomalous behaviour – those instances when an 
individual acts in a way that is at odds with their declared beliefs – there is a need to 
accommodate individual differences and choices. Take the way that somebody is 
understood, on the belief-desire model, to take a political stand. Suppose two people both 
believe, wholeheartedly, the proposition “slavery is wrong”. Person A declares their 
vehement opposition to slavery and their support for measures to eradicate slave ownership. 
Person B does the same but, additionally, attends protests against the practice. Although the 
moral realist would say that some feature of slavery compels person B to protest, whereas 
the anti-realist would account for their decision to protest by the possession of a belief in 
the wrongness of slavery, both would say that the belief in the proposition “slavery is 
wrong” is among the causes of person B’s decision to march. 
Given that persons A and B share the same attitude to the proposition “slavery is wrong” – 
they believe that it is true – then the belief-desire model has to account for the difference in 
their behaviour. One might try to do this by positing additional, differentiating beliefs or 
desires (e.g., in the effectiveness of demonstrations). It remains possible, however, that two 
people could share identical attitudes and yet act quite differently. Belief-desire psychology 
                                                
19 This is not to downplay everyday instances of social anxiety: however, these tend not to be generated by a failure to 
appreciate the intentions of other people, but rather by concern over how one’s own actions will be perceived (Schlenker & 
Leary 1982).  
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makes no attempt to account for complex affective responses (Zamuner 2015) to a 
proposition (how one feels, for example, about the wrongness of slavery) that can underlie 
these individual differences, without resorting to a proliferation of causally efficacious 
beliefs and desires20. 
At the other end of the spectrum, belief-desire psychology easily accounts for the behaviour 
of a housefly. Stimulated by chemical signatures given off by food, the fly is directed by 
the differential strength of chemical stimuli between its two antennae to find the source, 
settle and feed. Each turn that it makes is determined on the basis that it desires to feed and 
(thanks to its sensory information) believes that the food lies in a particular direction. 
Humans are, according to philosophical folk psychology, just more complicated versions 
of the fly: our beliefs and desires may be more complex, layered and even conflicting. But 
they determine, ultimately, what action we will take. 
A contention of this thesis is that people are both more complicated than flies (i.e., subject 
to many more kinds of influence) and yet not so complicated that we need an almost infinite 
nested series of beliefs and desires to account for what they do.  
One response to the problems generated by philosophical folk psychology is eliminative 
materialism. For more than thirty years this position has most closely been associated with 
Churchland (1981), although its fundamental features can be found in Feyerabend (1963) 
and Rorty (1970). The eliminative materialist suggests that philosophical folk psychology 
attributes a theory to people, but that, in common with “folk physics” and “folk biology”, 
advances in science are likely to prove the folk theory wrong. The appeal of folk psychology 
to philosophers of mind will consequently be undermined by new and better theories in 
neuroscience. Indeed, the theoretic entities of the folk theory of mind – beliefs and desires 
– are likely to be eliminated and supplanted by the more explanatorily complete and 
predictively successful elements of the new theories, such as neurochemical events or 
electrical firings at the level of the individual neuron. Within a few generations, 
Churchland’s 1981 paper suggests, even the everyday “folk” will have no need of the 
language of “belief” and “desire” to compose explanations of their own and others’ actions 
any more than they currently use the language of crystal spheres, vital spirit or phlogiston 
in their respective domains. 
                                                
20 And a further need to account for the order of precedence between conflicting attitudes. 
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Whereas the eliminative materialist might contend that there is no such thing as belief21, – 
i.e., the word “belief” has no actual referent  (Garfield 1988: 4-5; Stich 1983) – in this thesis 
I argue that because “belief” and “desire” do not necessarily pick out the functional roles 
suggested by philosophical folk psychology, philosophical problems are generated when 
we unwittingly use them as if they do. Further, I will demonstrate that there are a great 
many more things (concepts, functions, explanatory roles, demonstrations, defences 
etcetera) that answer to “belief” or “desire” than philosophical folk psychology can 
accommodate. Confusion arises when philosophers, and non-philosophers who rely on the 
clarity expected of philosophical discourse:  
...overlook that the terms ‘belief’ and ‘desire’, as they usually feature in the folk 
psychology debate, turn out to be placeholders that encompass a wide range of 
psychological predicaments which everyday ‘folk’ routinely distinguish with 
ease. 
(Ratcliffe 2008) 
The tendency to use “beliefs” as if the word were defined solely by the causal role of its 
presumed referents crops up in Antony (2015). In a defence of the truth of folk psychology 
she offers an exposition of Simon Blackburn’s22 reconstruction of an argument in support 
of eliminative materialism that both find in Stich (1983): 
1) Functionalism a) defines mental states by their causal role vis-a-vis inputs, 
outputs and other mental states and b) draws these definitions by idealising 
from the platitudes of our everyday practices of mentalistic ascription. 
Moreover, c) functionalism entails that the functional organisation so 
derived must be "realised" in whatever kind of matter composes the 
psychological being in question. 
2) For human beings, psychology is realised in neurophysiology. 
3) According to the most natural idealisation of our practices of belief 
ascription, a belief is the kind of mental state that can be causally responsible 
for both verbal behaviour and non-verbal motor behaviour.  
                                                
21 This is, to some extent, a parody, often presented as a reductio ad absurdum argument against eliminative materialism. 
22 Anthony’s chapter is taken from a collection celebrating the philosophy of Simon Blackburn. 
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4) Therefore, for human beings, there must be, for every belief, a single 
neurophysiological state that plays the role of causing both verbal and non-
verbal behaviour [from (1c), (2) and (3)]. 
5) But there is no such neurophysiological state [empirical evidence] 
6) Therefore, no human beings possess any beliefs. 
Anthony agrees with Blackburn that Stich’s eliminative materialism, as reconstructed here, 
rests on a non sequitur in the move from 3 to 4. It might not be the case that functionalism 
is committed to view that each functional state must be differentiated at a one-to-one ratio 
into realising neurophysiological states. Her dispute with Blackburn rests on the notion that 
he “concedes too much to the eliminativist; he doesn’t challenge the reductivist assumption 
that the empirical test of psychology will lie in the domain of neuroscience,” (Antony 2015: 
17). 
Note however that neither Anthony, nor (on her reading) Blackburn, challenges the 
definition of belief enshrined in step 3. Drawn from the assumptions of belief-desire 
psychology, this is taken as a given. The challenge to the eliminative materialist – like 
Stich’s eliminativism itself – depends on moves that come after this clause is presented 
without contest. 
Broome (2013) is explicitly committed to the causal efficacy of propositional attitudes 
although, as mentioned above, he is aware of the metaphysical “worries” this engenders. 
His work is primarily concerned with a description of the role that rationality plays in moral 
decision making, and the role of the enkratic principle – that a person should intend to 
behave in the way that they believe that they ought to behave. A belief in specific normative 
requirements thus becomes a component in the formulation of an intention to act. The 
enkratic principle is distinct from the belief-desire law, although clearly related: not least in 
the functional role that it ascribes to beliefs. Although Broome announces at the outset that 
he will set the mind-body problem aside by “…focussing on your intention rather than your 
action. The motivation question is about your mind only” (Broome 2013: 1) he is compelled, 
in the very next sentence, to assert that:  
When your belief causes you to intend to act, your intention will in turn 
generally cause you to act, but that is not my concern.  
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Broome thus acknowledges that the causal generalisation gives rise to problems – in this 
case the mind-body problem. Nonetheless, he prefers to leave belief-desire psychology 
intact and work instead on normative aspects of action choice. In the background, the 
unwarranted assumptions remain. 
Thornton (2009) considers the interface problem, as coined by Bermúdez (2005): 
How does commonsense psychological explanation23 interface with the 
explanations of cognition and mental operations given by scientific psychology, 
cognitive science, cognitive neuroscience and the other levels in the explanatory 
hierarchy? 
(Bermúdez 2005: 35) 
In order to regard psychological explanations as autonomous while at the same time being 
committed to physicalism/materialism there must be some point at which explanations at 
the personal level interface with those at the instantiating sub-personal level – assuming, of 
course, that these “explanations” are equally true and equivalent in terms of explanatory 
and predictive utility.  
Thornton’s approach to this is to “question the metaphysical pretentions of nomological 
science” (Thornton 2009: 121 Abstract). The non-nomological nature of psychological 
explanation will be examined in Chapter 1 of the present thesis. However, in trying to 
localise psychological explanation, Thornton is committed to the view that it is a real issue, 
arising from the human agent’s dual nature as both a physical and an intentional system. 
He touches on Dennett’s intentional stance, Davidson’s anomalous monism and Fodor’s 
representationalism. He also draws on the distinction between “manifest” and “scientific” 
images suggested by Sellars (1962) as the origin of this concern. His conclusion is that we 
should call off the search for a global reductive strategy – and thus universal solution to the 
interface problem – in favour of a series of “local” solutions. He writes:  
Provided the apparent need for a global account of the interface between higher 
and lower levels can be eased, there is space for local accounts of how 
                                                
23 “Common-sense psychology” (as encountered in Davidson, above) is preferred by some scholars on the grounds that it 
carries none of the pejorative connotations associated with the term “folk psychology”.  
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descriptions at the level of the whole person can interact with underlying 
cognitive neuroscience. 
(Thornton 2009: 135) 
Campbell (2009) questions whether the normative standard implied in the belief-desire 
law is of use in determining whether an individual is in need of psychotherapeutic 
intervention24. In doing so, he tackles mental causation and suggests that we can regard 
propositional attitudes either as mechanistic causes of behaviour or as control variables – 
entities whose presence might not causally entail the performance of an action but whose 
value might make it more or less likely to occur. Whether or not a person is sensitive to the 
control of their propositional attitudes is, he suggests, a way of differentiating pathologies 
of behaviour without recourse to a normative ideal of rationality:  
If the propositional attitudes function as control variables in this sense, then we 
do have a causally functioning mental life, whether or not the subject is rational. 
Of course, it is true that in the mental life of a broadly rational subject, 
propositional attitudes function as control variables. But it is the fact that we 
have control variables, not the fact that we have rationality, which means that 
we are ‘at the right level’ to talk of beliefs and desires. 
(Campbell 2009: 147) 
Note that for Campbell, whatever way we choose to describe the mode through which they 
bring about their effects, the notion that propositional attitude terms pick out causes of 
behaviour is not questioned 
A more sceptical account that is nonetheless a direct reaction to this prevalent philosophical 
view of the relationship between beliefs and action choice is offered by Bortolotti (2010). 
In seeking to establish that delusions are a variety of belief,25 she begins by engaging with 
the contemporary philosophical literature on the subject in order to establish what features 
qualify a given mental state as a belief. In doing so, she touches on an account of rationality 
that has at its heart the role of “belief”. For instance: 
                                                
24 The notion being that somebody who consistently acts at odds with their own beliefs and desires is in need of an 
intervention. 
25 Which, she points out, is disputed on normative grounds. 
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…I behave irrationally because the belief-like state I have reported fails to be 
consistent with my subsequent behaviour. 
(Bortolotti 2010: 10) 
Despite this observation of the normative picture of the relationship between the possession 
of a given belief and the performance of an action she is sceptical that a satisfactory 
philosophical definition of “belief” is available. For instance: 
Delusions help me make salient and relevant the observation that the states we 
ascribe to ourselves and that we call 'beliefs' are very heterogeneous. They can 
have some typical belief-like features (such as being manifested in action or 
being used in inferences) without satisfying norms of rationality that some 
philosophers have regarded as preconditions for mentality, and more 
specifically, for the possession of beliefs. 
(Bortolotti 2010: 3) 
and 
Two things should be immediately noted about the proliferation of rationality 
constraints. First, one common point to all variations is that rationality is 
supposed to be a necessary condition for belief ascription. If there is no 
rationality, then belief ascription is impossible or illegitimate. Second, the 
implications of the view will vary according to the following factors: how 
rationality is defined, and to what extent the subject's behaviour or belief-like 
state has to diverge from standards of rationality in order for the ascription of 
beliefs to be impossible or illegitimate. … 
It is a real challenge to provide a definition of what beliefs are, let alone an 
account of the necessary and sufficient conditions for believing that something 
is the case. 
 
(Bortolotti 2010: 11) 
Although Bortolotti may be sceptical about the role of beliefs as action-causing or action-
guiding mental states the problem that she is reacting to is of a sort with those emerging 
from the philosophical folk psychology picture. Delusions, so the thought goes, cannot be 
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regarded as beliefs because they fail to exhibit the normatively “rational” function of 
regulating behaviour. She writes  
Notice that the degree to which the reported state is, in fact, a belief does not 
indicate the subject's level of confidence in the believed state of affairs, but the 
extent to which her behaviour can be legitimately characterised by the 
description of beliefs.  
(Bortolotti 2010: 20-21) 
It should be noted that the “problem” whereby “delusions” cannot be regarded as beliefs – 
even as incorrect beliefs – emerges from the picture of beliefs as being essential to a model 
of rationality enshrined in philosophical folk psychology. Bortolotti’s response is a 
traditional analytic philosophy move to alter the definition both of “belief” and of “rational” 
so that delusions can be encompassed under their umbrella. Responses and objections to 
Bortolotti’s thesis have been on similar grounds – usually objecting that her extension of 
definitions is unwarranted or unwelcome; see, for example, Tumulty (2012). 
0.4 Philosophical Pictures, Dogma and the Therapeutic Approach 
Many of the problems arising from philosophical folk psychology arise from its status as 
the default, dogmatic picture of action, interpersonal understanding and reason-giving. The 
fixed viewpoint generated by this picture is an obstacle to a “clear view” or a “perspicuous 
representation” (Baker 2004: 182-83) of the philosophical questions, in the sense 
highlighted by Wittgenstein in the Philosophical Investigations, §122. Instead, philosophers 
construct an image of the issue that Gordon Baker (2004: 32-33) characterises as 
“continuous aspect seeing”. From this position, any appreciation of alternative ways of 
tackling the issue is precluded and problems are generated as artefacts of a point of view 
rather than being features of the matter under consideration. The philosopher who sees this 
picture from their continuous aspect would be unaware of the limitations imposed by their 
rigid and essentialist position. As Morris (2004: 7) puts it; “The person behaves 
intellectually as if his picture represented the only possibility.”  
One species of such difficulties, arising from the use of analogies and metaphors, is 
described by Fischer (2011b: 21): 
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We are under the spell of a philosophical picture when our philosophical 
reflection is guided by certain analogies within language, without our being 
aware of being guided by them 
On this reading, the relevant intuitive conclusions are spontaneously inferred through 
analogical inferences with conceptual metaphors. (Fischer 2011b: 22-28). These analogies 
can become so deeply entrenched that the philosopher fails to notice them as such. This will 
mean that problems or puzzles are generated because features of the model source domain 
of the conceptual metaphor are unwittingly projected onto the target domain. This puts the 
philosopher at risk of deriving inferences through non-intentional reasoning (Fischer 
2011b: 28-35), in which the metaphorical/analogical implications of the picture play a 
significant yet unnoticed part. 
For my purposes, however, I do not need to show that philosophers are misled by 
commitments arising from metaphors such as “the mind is a machine” or “thinking is like 
physical activity”. I suggest only that the philosophical picture is a fixed, dogmatic and 
prejudicial (Morris 2007: 69) view of a topic such that the philosopher risks being unable 
to imagine any other way of seeing the matter. At the same time, just in virtue of its ubiquity 
and fixedness, the picture generates apparent philosophical problems arising from “tacit 
and unwarranted presuppositions at odds with warranted beliefs the philosophers raising the 
problems reflectively hold at the same time” (Fischer 2006). 
In the case of the belief-desire law and the assumptions of philosophical folk psychology 
the risk of being in the sway of a problem-generating philosophical picture arises not from 
unwitting analogical inferences but from unwarranted theorising: 
A significant number of philosophical problems are being raised only due to 
some 'implicit theorising' or, more accurately, due to drifts of thought in which 
we tacitly presuppose substantive philosophical assumptions, without realising 
it.  
(Fischer 2006) 
Wittgenstein frequently points out the dangers of being under the sway of theories that 
amount to philosophical dogma (cf. Kuusela 2008): 
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If I rectify a philosophical mistake and say that this is the way it has always 
been conceived, but this is not the way it is, I must always point out an analogy 
according to which one had been thinking, but which one did not recognise as 
an analogy.  
Wittgenstein, Big Typescript §408  
In more developed form in the Philosophical Investigations, he writes: 
For we can avoid unfairness or vacuity in our assertions only by presenting the 
model as what it is, as an object of comparison – as a sort of yardstick; not as a 
preconception to which reality must correspond (The dogmatism into which we 
fall so easily in doing philosophy.) 
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations §131 
For Gordon Baker, the escape from pictures is the central goal of Wittgenstein’s philosophy:  
‘Our method’ tries to bring to an individual’s consciousness the influence of 
pictures working unconsciously within him. It strives to combat pictures that 
generate perplexities or confusions. 
Baker (2004: 185)  
“Our method” refers to the diagnostic-therapeutic approach that Baker reconstructs from 
his readings of Wittgenstein and of Waismann (1968). My contention, after Baker, is that 
unwarranted commitments give rise to philosophical problems associated with the belief-
desire picture. Philosophers are motivated to address these problems by advancing further 
theories as potential solutions. The objective of the diagnostic-therapeutic method in this 
thesis is to suggest that a wider view of the phenomena can liberate philosophers from the 
background assumptions that generate the problems and give rise to unwarranted 
philosophical theorising (Baker 2004 passim). The goal is “either eliminating these objects 
or altering someone’s attitude to them” (Baker 2004: 183). “These objects” in this context 
being “belief” and “desire” as they appear in causal accounts of action.  
Why should the goal be the elimination of “belief” and “desire” rather than simply the 
modification of philosophical folk psychology in order to accommodate the evidence? 
Many of the philosophical problems generated by folk psychology – including those 
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pursued by the contemporary philosophers in the last section – are generated by the pursuit 
of just such an accommodation. Making a generalised causal claim frequently entails 
setting ordinary terms to metaphysical uses. To avoid perpetuating the dogma, its resulting 
problems and further intellectual disquiet, philosophers should exclude "belief" and "desire" 
from generalisations about the causes of action. This is the "modest eliminativism" to 
which the present thesis is directed. 
According to Baker (2004: 182) this objective for philosophy pervades Wittgenstein’s 
writings. 
When philosophers use a word – “knowledge”, “being”, “object”, “I”, 
“proposition/sentence”, “name” – and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one 
must always ask oneself: is the word actually ever used in this way in the 
language in which it is at home? 
What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday 
use. 
Wittgenstein: Philosophical Investigations §116 
In the present thesis I set out to bring “belief” and “desire” back from their metaphysical 
to their everyday uses.  
Philosophical folk psychology commits the philosopher to the claim that “belief” and 
“desire” pick out the causes of actions. The metaphysical and the everyday meaning have 
parted company. More damagingly, they have done so under the philosopher’s nose. 
Proponents of philosophical folk psychology start from an account of what they assume to 
be the everyday, non-philosophical, understanding of agents and observers (“the folk”) 
before going on to argue for ways that the assumptions they attribute to the “folk” are (more 
or less) correct. Much of the persistence of belief-desire psychology stems from the 
assumption that the familiar use is automatically being respected – this is, after all “folk” 
psychology. Hence the unwarranted commitments that the view entails blend into the 
background.  
The diagnostic-therapeutic method begins with paying attention to what actually happens, 
both in terms of the target phenomena (action choice – interpersonal understanding – 
reason-giving) and the working uses of the ordinary terms (belief and desire) that are 
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appropriated for the construction of philosophical ideas and which acquire unwarranted 
metaphysical commitments in the process. 
This approach need not preclude the use of argument to establish the foundation from which 
the therapeutic project proceeds. Fischer refers to therapeutic approaches in psychotherapy 
to point out that:  
…exemplary psychotherapies like cognitive therapy (J. S. Beck 1995) and 
rational emotive therapy (Ellis 1994) for depression crucially involve argument 
and the assessment of evidence (to establish, for instance, whether the depressed 
patient really is as utterly inept as he thinks or places an unduly biased 
interpretation on his own achievements). 
(Fischer 2011a) 
Argument can bring facts to the attention of a philosopher in the grip of a picture. For 
example: 
a) Alternative ways of viewing the phenomena exist. 
b) Those alternative views are relevant to their concerns. 
c) Those alternatives are free from the unwarranted commitments that generate 
philosophical problems. 
The role of philosophical therapy in this context is as described by Baker: 
The point is [to] persuade the metaphysician to clarify precisely why he is not 
content to stick to this familiar use in this particular context, i.e. on why he feels 
driven to say something different. 
(Baker 2004: 103) 
Horwich (2012: 11) inadvertently but succinctly summarises the therapeutic objective of 
the present thesis: 
The remedy, quite clearly, is not to be mesmerised by the word, but to appreciate 
how distinct uses of it, hence somewhat distinct meanings, may evolve and 
proliferate. 
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Argument in the context of diagnostic-therapeutic philosophy does not set out to replace 
one theory, however unwarranted its assumptions, with another and better theory analogous 
to a scientific paradigm shift (Kuhn 1996). The elimination of the title does not entail, for 
example, the wholesale replacement of philosophical folk psychology with a theory from 
neuroscience,26 as does Churchland (1981). Wittgenstein eschewed any conception of 
philosophy as a process of theory development: 
And we may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything 
hypothetical in our considerations. All explanation must disappear, and 
description alone must take its place. 
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations §109 
If someone were to advance theses in philosophy, it would never be possible to 
debate them, because everyone would agree to them. 
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations §128 
Neither can liberating a philosopher from a philosophical picture that generates problems 
be a matter of refutation: a picture cannot be refuted. It can be clarified, in order to make 
the philosopher in its sway aware of its implications and the degree to which their dogmatic 
commitments might be unwarranted; or the philosopher can be shown that alternative views 
of the phenomena are available, views that do not generate the same problems. 
In selecting this method, I do not suggest that this is the only or even the best way to 
approach philosophy in general or diagnostic-therapeutic philosophy in particular. Neither 
would I want to maintain that Baker’s reading of Wittgenstein or of Waismann is correct. 
Hacker (2007) accuses Baker of misreading Wittgenstein and overlooking Waismann’s 
intentions. Hacker charges his erstwhile collaborator (see Baker and Hacker 2009, 2014) 
with failing to notice that Waismann (1968) is attempting to distance himself from 
Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy rather than to interpret or endorse it (Hacker 2007: 
94). 
Whether or not Hacker’s criticism is justified and whether or not the therapeutic approach 
taken in these pages is one that Wittgenstein would recognise or sanction, this is the 
                                                
26 Nor even from psychology. 
A Therapeutic Elimination… 
Mark Curtis, UEA June, 2016  35 
approach that I choose to pursue. This method is inspired by a reading of Wittgenstein, 
through Baker and (indirectly) Waismann. However, I claim no Wittgensteinian authority 
for my approach or conclusions. 
Each of the five contemporary philosophers mentioned in the previous section wrestles with 
a problem generated by philosophical folk psychology. For Anthony, the problem is 
answering the challenge from eliminative materialism. Broome acknowledges but “sets 
aside” the problem of mental causation. Thornton recognizes that accommodating the truth 
of philosophical folk psychology within scientific approaches is challenging and concludes, 
pace Wilkes (1991)27 that this is a problem best left to science rather than philosophy. 
Campbell wants a better definition of pathological behaviour, without regard to the 
normativity of belief-desire psychology.  Bortolotti seeks definitions of “belief” and 
rationality under which delusions can be accommodated as a class of beliefs in the face of 
a demand that beliefs play a part defining rational action.  
I would not suggest that any of these views are straightforwardly incorrect. All are, 
however, pursuing a solution to a philosophical puzzle or problem that arises from the 
picture constructed by philosophical folk psychology which is underpinned by unwarranted 
commitments. Leaving the ceteris paribus clause of the belief-desire law free to be 
populated by additional beliefs and desires, maintaining that the belief-desire law is 
normative rather than descriptive (Wilkes 1991), modifying the meaning of the terms in 
subtle ways (Davidson 2001) or restricting the scope of the commitment to stance-taking 
(Dennett 1989) each offer only partial escapes. 
The therapeutic approach that I take in this thesis is distinct in an important respect from 
other empirically informed work with diagnostic intent. For example, building on Fischer’s 
(2011) work on the role of intuitions in generating philosophical problems, Fischer and 
Engelhardt (2016) and Fischer et al. (2015) have used empirical and experimental 
investigations of their own, coupled with published empirical findings from psychology,28 
to develop a naturalised metaphilosophy. The focus of their work is on developing 
debunking explanations of (mainly paradoxical) intuitions which generate philosophical 
problems. The investigations that these researchers have undertaken – together with work 
                                                
27 Who would prefer that philosophers regard their version of Folk Psychology as normative and so not susceptible to scientific 
examination. 
28 Such as Alter et. al. (2007), Evans (2010) and Giora (2003). 
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on the restrictionist programme in experimental philosophy (Weinberg et al. 2012) – 
indicate that philosophers often have no warrant to accept intuitions that create problems, 
especially by clashing with their background beliefs or with each other. The only way that 
philosophers can inoculate themselves against the lure of pernicious intuitions is to 
understand how they come about.  
Where the present thesis is distinct is that my engagement with cognitive and social 
psychology, is not intended to explain anything. This is also the case where I employ 
empirical examples from everyday discourse in part two of the thesis.  My intention is to 
show, firstly, that an alternative way to causally explain action behaviour and interpersonal 
understanding is available and, secondly, that many instances of the use of “belief” and 
“desire” – even in the case of reason giving – do not imply causal explanations. As an 
empirically-informed diagnostic-therapeutic approach, the therapeutic aim of this thesis 
is, as suggested by Baker (2004) to guide the philosopher of mind and action to question 
the prevalent philosophical picture and to ask whether many of the philosophical problems 
that they seek to unravel might be features of that picture. If successful, the philosopher of 
mind and action who has relied on philosophical folk-psychology will be in a position to 
recognise the contrast between the metaphysical and everyday uses of terms in 
philosophical folk psychology as a significant source of these problems.  
As seen in sections 0.2 and 0.3, above, these commitments are widely held. My contention 
is that they are held largely without warrant. We might be justified in holding these default 
positions even in the absence of prior grounding, so long as they do not directly contradict 
common sense (Williams 2001: 36). To make this contrast explicit: 
The Prior Grounding Requirement … insists that one’s beliefs be based on 
adequate grounds. But there is another possibility. This is that personal 
justification is more like innocence in a court of law: presumptive but in need 
of defence in the face of contrary evidence. On this view, personal justification 
has what Robert Brandom29 calls a “default and challenge” structure: 
entitlement to one’s beliefs is the default position; but entitlement is always 
                                                
29 Robert Brandom, Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing and Discursive Commitment (Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1994) at 177. 
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vulnerable to undermining by evidence that one’s epistemic performance is not 
up to par. 
(Williams 2001: 25)  
Where empirical evidence or other directly relevant information is available that challenges 
the default position, the holder’s entitlement to that position is weakened. In Williams’ 
words, the default and challenge model of personal justification “replaces the Prior 
Grounding Requirement with a Defence commitment. Knowledgeable beliefs must be 
defensible, but not necessarily derived from evidence” (ibid). Nevertheless, an evidence-
based challenge to one’s default position can be answered only with evidence in its favour 
or of the reliability of the methods from which the position was derived. 
To challenge the default view – philosophical folk psychology – I will firstly present 
evidence from cognitive psychology that action choice is not always a matter of doing 
whatever one believes will bring about the fulfilment of a desire. Models of interpersonal 
understanding (attribution theory) from social psychology will question whether the belief-
desire law is the basis on which “the folk” explain and predict action. In part two I will 
examine uses of the terms “belief” and “desire” – including apparent reason-giving 
(excuses) – that do not rely on these terms referring to causal categories of mental state. 
I contend that these constitute evidence that the commitments to metaphysical uses within 
philosophical folk psychology – i.e., “belief” and “desires” as picking out the causes of 
action –  is part of the fixed way of seeing that leads philosophers, unwittingly, to misuse 
these expressions (Baker 2004: 94). This use is symptomatic of a philosophical prejudice. 
“A central feature of a philosophical prejudice is what I will call a ‘perverse’ attitude toward 
evidence and argument”, according to Morris (2007: 69). This is also a core feature of my 
conception of a philosophical picture. The “perverse attitude” to evidence (especially) 
manifests in the philosopher seeing evidence that challenges their default position as a 
further philosophical problem which must be accommodated within the picture – if 
necessary by the formulation of a supplementary theory. 
Despite my appeal to the diagnostic-therapeutic method of Wittgenstein, via Baker, I am 
not proposing an elimination of “belief” and “desire” from causal accounts of action on the 
grounds that “reasons are not causes”. Greenwood (1991: 1) describes that position thus: 
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A central thesis of many neo-Wittgensteinian accounts was that folk-
psychological references to intentional psychological states are not causal 
explanatory (Louch 1966; Peters 1958). According to such accounts, a folk-
psychological explanation is a logically distinct kind of explanation, one that 
renders them “intelligible” in the light of rules and reasons. 
Greenwood’s contention is that such a view would be of no interest to the scientist, who is 
concerned with constructing causal accounts (see Chapter 1).  
Bermúdez (2005: 55) illustrates where this position is situated in relation to other 
philosophical accounts of psychology by means of the argument tree, reproduced on the 
next page. Following the left hand side of the tree leads the philosopher inexorably to 
functionalism (see above): 
Although at first sight I might appear to take the first available fork to the right, there is a 
significant difference between my position and the so-called neo-Wittgensteinian view. I 
am making no ontological claim about the nature of reasons or causes – even if the extent 
of the claim is only that the two are distinct. I do, particularly in the second part of this 
thesis, suggest that everyday uses of “belief” and “desire” do not entail making a causal 
claim. 
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More explicitly, I reject the question from which the first bifurcation in Bermudez’ diagram 
proceeds: I challenge whether philosophical folk psychology offers any form of 
“explanation”, causal or otherwise. 
 
  
Yes No 
Neo-Wittgensteinian denial 
that reasons are causes 
Is commonsense psychological explanation a form of causal explanation? 
Do the causal explanations of commonsense psychology depend upon the existence 
of causal laws? 
Yes No 
Counterfactual theory 
of causal explanation 
Do the causal laws presupposed by commonsense psychological explanations hold at the  
personal level or at the subpersonal level? 
 At the personal level At the subpersonal level 
Functionalism Anomalous monism 
Figure 0.1: The relationship between theories in the philosophy of psychology. 
(Bermúdez 2005: 55). 
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0.5 Synopsis of Parts and Chapters 
From the two guiding questions (section 0.1) and the diagnostic-therapeutic approach 
(section 0.4), the present thesis divides naturally into two parts. The first will describe the 
approaches to action choice and interpersonal understanding taken by cognitive psychology 
and social psychology. The second will set out to show some of the ways in which the terms 
“belief” and “desire” are applied when free of the commitments of philosophical folk 
psychology (everyday uses, in Wittgenstein’s sense).  
Part One (Chapters 1-3), builds on the contention that if philosophical folk psychology 
constituted an accurate account of the causes behind action choice and interpersonal 
understanding then, given that scientific psychology is committed to providing genuine, 
causal explanations for psychological phenomena, we would expect to find something 
resembling the belief-desire law and the concepts of “belief” and “desire” at the heart of 
scientific explanations in action-choice and interpersonal understanding. 
Chapter 1 of the thesis, immediately following this introduction, establishes the contention 
that psychological sciences do seek genuine, causal explanations for its target phenomena 
– including action/action choice and interpersonal understanding. On the way, I will argue 
that in the domain of psychology “genuine causal explanations” means something distinct 
from subsumption under a law (including the belief-desire law).  
Chapter 2 then turns to the way that contemporary cognitive psychology describes the 
causes of action and action choice. Cognitive psychology, in taking account of numerous 
predictable and systematic biases and cognitive illusions, has developed models of action 
and action choice in which the causal roles are not filled by beliefs and desires; these models 
have a number of features at odds with philosophical folk psychology. 
Chapter 3 is concerned with theories of interpersonal understanding in contemporary 
social psychology.  Addressing how individuals account for their own actions and the 
actions of others, the field of attribution theory employs models that do not involve the 
ascription of specific beliefs and desires, in direct contradiction of a key contention of 
philosophical folk psychology. 
In both of these chapters, unconscious biases of reasoning and cognitive illusions feature 
prominently, as do the uses of heuristics. Proponents present the belief-desire law as both 
a descriptive account of human decision-making, interpersonal understanding and reason 
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giving and as a normative standard of rational action. When scientific psychology 
uncovers systematic divergences from this picture, their investigations of the processes and 
mechanisms by which these emerge shed light on the nature of the target phenomena.  
Part Two of the thesis (Chapters 4-6) is concerned with the way that the terms “belief” and 
“desire” are used in everyday discourse. Although guided by some so-called “ordinary 
language”30 approaches to philosophical reflection, the answer to the second guiding 
question emerges directly from examination of examples of the use of “belief” and “desire”.  
Chapter 4 offers an examination of how “belief” and “desire” feature in the construction 
of narratives. Along the way I discuss narrative psychology and narrative 
psychotherapy in order to draw attention to the powerful role that narratives play in the 
construction of deeply held convictions – even when these convictions have negative 
behavioural effects. I suggest that we might judge the plausibility of a relation between an 
individual’s specific beliefs and desires and their subsequent actions on the basis of how 
closely a narrative that features such terms resembles culturally established archetypes – a 
possible source of the persuasiveness of the belief-desire picture of action and of its 
metaphysical assumptions. The suggestion that the propensity to ascribe beliefs and desires 
in action explanations, and the concomitant presumed relationship between propositional 
attitudes and action is a cultural artefact is supported by historical and anthropological 
evidence. Although the telling of stories seems to be a human universal, narratives without 
cognates of “belief” and “desire” in the functional roles defined by the belief-desire law are 
to be found in the ancient world and in some present-day cultures. In short, narratives 
involving belief and desire ascriptions are not the only way that action is described in 
everyday discourse and when used in the construction of narratives, these terms do not 
usually pick out the causes of actions. 
Chapter 5 is concerned with the ways that people make excuses for actions and seek to 
justify those actions in cases where they are challenged or face potential censure. Using 
everyday examples and examples from the formal setting of legal procedure, the chapter 
develops, after Austin (1979a) in A Plea for Excuses, the excuse/justification distinction 
                                                
30 This term has gained a certain notoriety, both through over use and misunderstanding. To the extent that this approach is 
an “ordinary language” one, I do not mean to suggest that “everyday” uses of a term are authoritative as to its meaning. 
Instead, I suggest that close attention to the function and purpose with which a term is being deployed in a given circumstance 
can help shed light on potential misunderstanding about how it works and consequent “puzzling” aspects of its use.   
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and suggests that excuses, properly understood, do not constitute a claim about the causes 
of an action, even on those occasions that “belief” and “desire” feature. I argue that excuses 
that do advert to an individual’s claimed beliefs and desires are neither offered as causal 
explanations of actions nor evaluated as to the causal efficacy of such states. I point out that 
safeguards have been put in place in the formal treatment of such excuses in the (English) 
legal setting to avoid the pitfalls of causal assumptions.  
Chapter 6 looks at a further example of a type of discourse in which one of the essential 
terms of philosophical folk psychology, “belief”, features without any commitment to its 
being a cause of action: hedging. The chapter begins by defining a hedge or a hedging-
phrase and establishing that affixing “I believe that…” to a statement frequently serves this 
function. It is then proposed that although it is possible to read hedges featuring the phrase 
“I believe that…” as referring to the attitudes of the utterer, this can be accommodated 
without any commitment to the causal role of a particular belief, desire or pair of such 
attitudes within a network of causes. Once again, the state picked out by the phrase “I 
believe that…” is not a causal one. 
The conclusion of the thesis, Chapter 7, examines some implications to be drawn from the 
foregoing. As well as taking the inferences from each chapter in turn, I suggest that once 
freed from the need to shape any competing ideas into the dogma of the belief-desire picture, 
the field is open for some new approaches to the questions of action choice and interpersonal 
understanding, as well as to the philosophical understanding of rationality more generally. 
Philosophers so motivated will find the elimination of the terms “belief” and “desire” from 
causal accounts in the philosophy of action, interpersonal understanding and reason-giving 
key to avoiding chasing solutions to illusory problems. Then we will have been successful 
in bringing back these terms from their metaphysical to their everyday use. 
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Part One: 
“Belief” and “Desire” 
in 
Psychology 
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1 Chapter One: 
Causal Explanation in Psychology 
Abstract: Part of the therapeutic aim of this thesis is to undermine the 
conviction that actions are causally explained with reference to beliefs and 
desires. In pursuit of this aim, subsequent chapters (2 &3) will show how 
psychologists explain actions without recourse to propositional attitudes. 
For this to have force, it must first be established that psychology is 
concerned with genuine causal explanations: that is the objective of this 
chapter. I will contend that scientific psychology does not try to establish 
laws or law-like regularities that govern action-behaviour; even if they did, 
describing a regularity would not constitute a causal explanation but, rather, 
an explanandum to be investigated. Psychological disciplines investigate 
the mechanisms that bring about regularities through a process of 
functional analysis. This term will be explained and described, together with 
examples of functional analysis at work.  
… the essence of the mind being equally unknown to us with that of external 
bodies, it must be equally impossible to form any notion of its powers and 
qualities otherwise than from careful and exact experiments, and the 
observation of particular effects, which result from its different circumstances 
and situations.  
David Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature, (1740/1985: 44)   
1.1 The Nature of Psychological Explanation  
If the terms “belief” and “desire”, as applied in philosophical folk psychology, successfully 
picked out the genuine causes of actions, or were used as causal terms when individuals 
seek to explain or predict their own or others’ actions, we would expect psychologists to 
formulate genuine causal explanations in which these terms, or the belief-desire law, play 
a central role. In Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis I will suggest that many cognitive and social 
psychologists offer explanations of the phenomena of action choice and interpersonal 
understanding, central to philosophical folk psychology, without recourse to these terms or 
the belief-desire law. This suggests that that belief and desire are not essential to 
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psychological explanations of action-choice or interpersonal understanding: other 
explanations are available.  Before the significance of those observations can be understood, 
however, it is necessary to establish that scientific psychology is committed to genuine 
causal explanations of its target phenomena and to establish the form that these explanations 
take. The questions that this chapter deals with are: 
1) What does it mean for scientific psychology to explain? 
2) How are these explanations constructed? 
In developing the answers to these questions, I will draw attention to a number of features 
of scientific psychology, including: 
a) Cognitive and Social psychology seeks genuine explanations31 for psychological 
phenomena and for the relationships between psychology and behaviour. 
b) Such genuine explanations do not depend on the subsumption of psychological 
states and behaviour under laws or theories that invoke law-like regularities. 
c) Scientific psychology proceeds by establishing process models.  
d) These models are developed at ever more finely grained levels of explanation by 
means of functional analysis. 
As a manifesto for scientific investigation in psychology, the quotation from David Hume 
at the opening of this chapter remains pertinent. Psychology is an empirical investigation 
into how humans process perceptions, memory, emotions, bodily feelings, language, and 
related elements of cognition both consciously and at the sub-personal level. Its inquiries 
begin by observing, for example, regularities between psychological states and consequent 
behaviour or consequent psychological states. The experimenter will control as independent 
variables the stimuli or other circumstantial conditions that evoke the particular 
psychological state. Alternatively, in the case of the observational (as opposed to 
experimental)32 investigations, the researcher will observe and record variations in 
behaviour or self-reported psychological states (garnered by means of questionnaires, for 
example) under variable environmental conditions. These outputs are the dependent 
variables of the investigation. 
                                                
31 As distinct from merely predictive and data-fitting “as-if” explanations. See 2.2 below for an exposition of this distinction. 
32 For simplicity, this thesis is primarily concerned with experimental investigations. 
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This outline of the investigatory method, however, leaves open an account of the 
explanatory strategy employed by the psychologist as scientist. Such an account is the 
subject of this chapter.   
The dominant investigatory paradigm in contemporary scientific psychology is an 
information processing model (Davey 2008: 259-62). Leaving aside the question of the 
extent to which the operation of the human mind resemble those of a digital computer (a 
frequently cited analogy)33, this approach treats cognitive inputs (perceptions, memories 
etc.) as information over which processes of acquisition, storage and transformation are 
performed. These processes give rise to outputs which might be expressed as further 
cognitions, behaviours or even verbal reports. The goal of scientific psychology is to 
describe those operations in terms of detailed process models. An accurate process model 
would be proposed both to explain the observed regularities and to predict future outcomes 
under given cognitive conditions (although see below, regarding how explanation and 
prediction come apart). Thus, and importantly for the discussion to follow, the objective of 
psychological explanation goes beyond the mere recording of regularities and into 
describing how those regularities arise.  
In the fundamental natural sciences, like physics and chemistry, identifying the laws – 
perhaps even the laws of nature that govern the circumstances under which a phenomenon 
occurs (as distinct from those under which it does not) might be sufficient to explain an 
individual occurrence of that phenomenon. Prediction, in the case of a law-governed 
scientific model, would be a matter of stating the governing laws, together with a description 
(real or hypothetical) of the prevailing conditions. Such laws might be described as 
universally quantified material conditionals (Oaksford and Chater 2010: 6). If psychology 
were to explain in much the same way as the fundamental natural sciences, then the 
objective of scientific psychology would be to discover the right set of laws and to define 
which psychological phenomena they govern. In the middle years of the 20th century, this 
view of psychology had its adherents. For example: 
                                                
33 In the sense that I use it here, “information processing” is neutral with regard to this question and well-rehearsed 
philosophical discussions regarding the nature of “representations”.  
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If psychology is to become a natural science, it will have to formulate and use 
some set of causal laws that are at least consistent with the causal laws of the 
other natural sciences.  
(H. M. Johnson 1939) 
Although Johnson went on to argue that the laws of psychology need not be reduced to 
physical (or biochemical) laws, the relation between laws and observed regularities and the 
assumption that a law-like regularity must be put forward in order to facilitate the prediction 
of psychological phenomena has been present in much of psychology’s history. It might be 
argued that the formulation of theories deploying law-like regularities between stimulus and 
response drove the turn to behaviourism that dominated (especially) North American 
psychology during the middle years of the 20th century until the so-called “cognitive 
revolution” of the 1960s.  Consequently, it has also been a persistent picture in the 
philosophy of psychology.  
This is the picture that Cummins (1983, 2006) challenges. He suggests that regarding 
psychological explanations as depending on a “covering law model” – of the kind proposed 
by Hempel and Oppenheim (1948) – is to mistake the explanandum of a psychological 
observation for the explanans. Observed regularities between stimulus and behaviour, 
between psychological states and behaviour or between psychological states and further 
elicited psychological states are effects that remain to be explained. Indeed, offering an 
“explanation” of a series of regular occurrences, or an individual occurrence that is 
consistent with that regularity, by appealing to a “law” is to do nothing more than to restate 
the regularity.  
For example, imagine an experiment under which a psychologist asked subjects to identify, 
by species name, a sequence of images of animals. For the duration of the task, which 
requires them to speak the name of the species aloud as soon as they have identified it, the 
subjects wear a set of audio headphones. In the first run of the experiment, the subjects 
perform the task while “white noise”34 is played through their headphones. In the second 
run, they are asked to perform a similar task while listening to the voice of an actor narrating 
                                                
34 A sound similar to that of radio “static” in which all audible frequencies are played simultaneously at similar amplitude. 
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a story. A measurement of their response time (the delay between the image being shown 
on the screen and their correctly identifying the species) is recorded.  
Suppose that analysis of the response-time data suggests that, on average, subjects take 
longer to retrieve species names while listening to the story than while the white noise is 
being played35. The experimenter might be tempted to record his findings as: 
L(i): Exposure to sound of the human speaking voice tends to increase memory-
retrieval response time compared with exposure to non-verbal sounds of similar 
amplitude36. 
Subsequent replications of the experiment produce consistent results. The “law” described 
at L(i) seems to hold. I would contend, however, that we would be reluctant to say that L(i) 
explains the observed regularity. In essence, it merely restates it, as Cummins and Bechtel 
and Wright (2009) would insist. Claiming that, statistically, people tend to retrieve 
knowledge from memory more slowly when they are listening to speech sounds than when 
they are listening to something else would be an interesting effect (if true) and would be 
worthy of further investigation. However, it explains nothing. As an effect it would be a 
new explanandum, a phenomenon in need of explanation. 
A psychological regularity like that at L(i) stands in need of more finely grained 
examination in order to uncover its underlying structure and the mechanisms that bring it 
about. The experimenter might begin by asking whether the effect occurs only when the 
subject is exposed to the spoken word as coherent narratives. Does it persist if the sound is 
a repeated sentence, a repeated word or even a sequence of non-verbal speech sounds? And 
in the latter case, does the kind of sound – consonant or vowel, plosive or sibilant – make 
any difference? What about the sounds of speech in languages that the subject does not 
understand? The experimenter would also want to vary the dependent variable – that is, the 
information than the subject is asked to recall, not only by asking them to retrieve 
information other than species names of animals but other data instead – types of vehicle, 
or tool, or to match names to famous faces but also to describe textures, the cue for which 
is acquired through the haptic modality, to investigate whether the effect is limited to an 
effect of auditory stimuli on visually cued memory retrieval. These are just some examples. 
                                                
35 I have not based this example on any real experiment so this “result” is purely speculative 
36 Loudness. 
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The objective of redesigning and refining these experiments is to uncover the structure of 
the explanandum and thereby to get ever closer to an explanans. This would not be another 
law-like regularity but an analysis of the functional relationships underpinning L(i). This 
brief description, which, in reality, might comprise years of investigation and countless 
experimental findings, is a crude characterisation of the process of functional analysis. 
Cummins (2006: 96) describes this process thus: 
Functional analysis consists in analysing a disposition into a number of less 
problematic dispositions such that programmed manifestation of these 
analysing dispositions amounts to a manifestation of the analysed disposition. 
The “analysed disposition” described here is the regularity – such as that at L(i) – to be 
explained. “Less problematic dispositions” are those regularities which occur at ever more 
simple, subpersonal levels of psychological explanation. By “programmed manifestation” 
Cummins is pointing out that a satisfactory analysis does not merely break the overall 
disposition into a dissociated set of smaller functions but also seeks to describe how these 
functions interact, their systematic relationships by means of which their individual effects 
and effects on each other bring about the “analysed disposition”. 
Bermúdez (2005: 63-69) suggests that the ultimate goal of subpersonal functional analysis 
is to arrive at a set of functions which are one-to-one reducible to the underlying physical 
(neurological, neurochemical and neuro-electrical) events. It is a conceptual matter whether 
this endpoint is, in principle, achievable. Less controversial is the contention that functional 
analysis allows the scientific psychologist to go beyond “what happens when…” 
descriptions and to describe how the effects that are to be explained come about. An 
example from a more tangible, mechanical domain might make this idea clearer. 
If one were to ask how a pump works – or even how a particular pump works – the 
questioner would be unlikely to accept the statement “fluid enters at one point and leaves at 
another under greater pressure” as an explanation.37 The question was not “what does the 
pump do” (which could be rendered as “what is its gross function”) but “how does it work” 
or, to put the same question another way “what are its components and how do these 
combine with each other in order to perform the work of the whole as a pump?”  
                                                
37 Note, however, that this is exactly the form of “explanation” offered by L(i). 
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We might want to know how the pump is powered, what it is made of, its capacities and 
other dimensions. To go further, we would need to disassemble it into its components. We 
could then begin to identify how its operation brings about its overall effect (analysed 
disposition). If we want to know, in the case of an individual pump, how it functions qua 
pump, we are going to have to take a screwdriver to it! 
Once we have dismantled enough pumps we might begin to notice some regularities at the 
level of our decomposition. Some pumps have rotary impellers; some have reciprocating 
pistons. Some are powered by an electric motor, others by internal combustion engines or 
even steam power. To answer our “how does it work” question, however, we might not 
need to know, necessarily, how the reciprocation of pistons or the rotation of an impeller 
imparts pressure to a stream of fluid. Although we could analyse the component operation 
to the level of fluid dynamics, explanations of how a particular pump works could become 
satisfactory before we reach this point. Describing the input and output valves, the way that 
the impeller or pistons are driven - including the method of transferring the drive to these 
components and regulating their speed – is likely to be a satisfactory answer to the question 
of how the pump works – or how this specific type of pump works – for the mechanic, if 
not for the theoretical physicist. 
Thus “how does it work” questions can be satisfied at different levels of explanation. The 
mechanic might ask the question because they want to be able to repair a faulty pump. 
Reduction to the underlying principles of physics is not necessary to this endeavour. Neither 
would the gross “disposition” of the pump give a clue of how to begin a repair, unless we 
want to risk a situation in which a mechanic orders a new set of piston seals to repair a faulty 
impeller-driven pump. 
In the case of psychology, the acceptable level of explanation is likely to be quite different 
for the clinical psychologist (who needs to know how things should work in order to effect 
a “repair”), the investigative, theoretical psychologist (who wants to understand the 
mechanisms that give rise to regularly observed dispositions), the neuroscientist (who wants 
to know how these operations are instantiated in neurological structures) and the biochemist 
(who wants to understand the reactions and chemical kinetics that go on below the level of 
the individual nerve cell). None of these, however, will be satisfied with the kind of 
regularity described at L(i) any more than a pump mechanic will be satisfied with “low 
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pressure fluid in: higher pressure fluid out”. All would demand a functional analysis to 
answer the question “how does it work?” 
1.2 “As If” versus Genuine Explanations and Explanation versus Prediction  
Gross dispositional descriptions might closely fit the data collected by many observations. 
All of the (working) pumps you examine might exhibit the “low pressure in, higher pressure 
out” regularity to different degrees. Plotting these findings on a graph would clearly show 
that there is a correlation between the presence of a pump and a pressure differential on 
either side. Likewise, plotting the results from the hypothetical psychological experiment 
described above would show a statistically significant correlation between the type of 
auditory stimulus and subjects’ response times. There might be significant outliers, but 
these could be disregarded without doing damage to the key finding, as described at L(i). 
Psychological studies might generate any number of these statistically significant 
correlations but, as we have seen, these are not to be safely regarded as explanations. Any 
such finding could be described using the phrase “as if”. The statistical outcome is “as if” 
people have more difficulty remembering the names of animals when listening to speech. 
However, a good deal more functional analysis is required if we are to justify this “as if” 
hypothesis by means of sequences of causes and effects. When the mechanic functionally 
analyses a pump they are seeking a series of causal relations which, working together 
(“programmed” in Cummins’ word) cause the fluid to leave the device at a higher pressure 
than it had on entering it. When the psychologist seeks to break an observed phenomenon 
down into its component functions by means of functional analysis they are looking for the 
causes of the observed data. Here I am using “causes” in a perfectly ordinary, everyday 
sense. One need not hold a view on the metaphysics of causation to understand the 
straightforward sense in which psychologists seek to understand causes. Their goal is to 
describe the mechanisms through which phenomena arise, rather than restating or 
repackaging those phenomena or by constructing hypothetical “as if” statements which, 
although they fit past data, remain to be explained in terms of the causal history that ensures 
their conformance. 
Frequently we find “explanation” and “prediction” used together as if they are simply two 
sides of the same process, differentiated only by their temporal relationship to the observed 
phenomenon: explanations are offered after the event, predictions are temporally prior. A 
single law-like relationship, like that at L(i) is frequently presumed to be capable of serving 
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as either explanation or prediction. The “law” predicts that future findings will be in 
accordance with it (in this hypothetical case, “people will respond to visual stimuli more 
slowly when listening to speech”) as well as explaining why an individual result conforms 
to the law by means of a statement like “this is explained by the established fact that people 
have more trouble remembering the names of animals when listening to speech.” It is, after 
all, a law. 
This picture is, however, scientifically inaccurate. A statement of a law-like regularity 
predicts almost nothing about what will happen if the parameters of a given experimental 
investigation are altered – for example, in ways similar to those described above. Scientists 
might want to make testable predictions about what will happen in these circumstances; 
doing so, however, will entail the proposal of an additional hypothesis. When the results 
support the hypothesis or radically falsify it, the scientist has additional information with 
which to continue testing their hypothesis or is aware that a new hypothesis is required. The 
essential asymmetry between explanations and predictions in science lies in the fact that 
explanations – whether they support or reject a given hypothesis – always come equipped 
with information that is not available at the time the prediction, or hypothesis formation, is 
made. This information is usually in the form of new experimental or observational data.   
The psychological literature is replete with examples of the use of functional analysis in the 
development of genuine explanations from which I draw two illustrations. The first is David 
Marr’s analysis of the computational functions of the human visual system (Marr 2010). 
The second is the historical development of the dominant contemporary account of 
semantic memory; the spreading activation model.  
1.3 Functional Analysis in Practice: Marr’s Vision 
David Marr’s 1982 work Vision is a seminal example of functional analysis. He begins by 
setting out the territory for his investigation and something of the conceptual landscape by 
offering a definition of the target phenomenon: 
…vision is the process of discovering from images what is present in the world 
and where it is. 
Vision is therefore, first and foremost, an information-processing task, 
(Marr 2010: 3 emphasis added)  
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He is at pains to point out, however, that understanding the process is only part of the task 
of understanding the means by which visual information is made available to cognition. 
Equally important is understanding how visual information is represented in the cognitive 
apparatus of the “seeing” creature. 
The study of vision must therefore include not only the study of how to extract 
from images the various aspects of the world that are useful to us, but also an 
enquiry into the nature of the internal representations by which we capture this 
information and thus make it available as a basis for decisions about our 
thoughts and actions.38 
(Ibid.) 
His “quite general” definition of a representation, of what it means for image information 
to be captured and stored and for that information to be available for and subjected to 
transformations, is another example of his computational model. 
A representation is a formal system for making explicit certain entities or types 
of information, together with a specification of how the system does this. And 
I shall call the result of using a representation to describe a given entity a 
description of the entity in that representation. 
(Ibid. 20) 
Marr argues against the impression that this “computational” (information processing) 
focus is tantamount to reducing human experience to the architecture of a traditional 
computer. Computation, as a process, is not the sole domain of the human-made artefact 
that we call a computer. Explaining that human experience can be described in terms of the 
sequence of computational processes that give rise to it is not the same as “reducing” 
experience to the operations of a “mere computer”, Marr argues that:  
To understand a computer, one has to study that computer. To understand an 
information-processing task, one has to study that information-processing task. 
                                                
38 Some of this language is philosophically contentious; not least the phrase “internal representations”, which raises the 
issues both of the internal/external division and of the nature of mental representation. Such concerns can be set aside, 
however, as they have no bearing on the analysis of Marr’s method. 
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To understand fully a particular machine carrying out a particular information-
processing task, one has to do both things. Neither will suffice alone. 
(Marr 2010: 5) 
This observation informs much of Marr’s approach to understanding vision. It is not 
sufficient to posit a representational theory or to describe a computational process unless 
these can be reconciled with what is known about the physical, neurological apparatus in 
which they are instantiated. At the same time, no explanatory description of any of these 
processes – representational, computational, neurological – can be regarded as safe unless 
it is compatible with the ordinary experience of visual phenomena. 
Marr breaks his analysis of visual processing into three levels: the computational, under 
which the tasks to be performed by the visual system are themselves broken down into a 
series of mathematical functions that must be performed; the algorithmic level, which asks 
how the computational functions are implemented – what, for example, are the 
representations involved and what are the algorithms for the transformation of acquired 
images into usable information and finally the implementational level which seeks to 
describe how computational and algorithmic levels are instantiated in the material of the 
human visual system – retinas, nerves and brains, for example (Bermúdez 2010: 48). 
As an example of Marr’s analysis of the computational task he begins by separating out the 
four factors “responsible for the intensity values in an image” (Marr 2010: 41) which he 
identifies as the object’s (and the captured image’s) geometry, reflectances (of the visible 
surfaces), illumination and (the subject’s) viewpoint. This allows him to postulate how the 
processes of the visual system are able to differentiate between changes in the values of 
each of these factors. Within each of these the most fundamental change in intensity to be 
detected by the visual system is a “zero-crossing” (Ibid. 54) where the value of the intensity 
of a stimulus39 passes from positive to negative or vice versa. This provides “a natural way 
to move from an analogue or continuous representation … to a discrete, symbolic 
representation.” (Ibid. 67). It also allows Marr to give a computational account for one of 
the fundamentals of visual acquisition: edge detection. Marr avoids mention of “edges” for 
as long as possible because of the word’s physical connotations beyond the consideration 
of image construction (Ibid. 68) Objects have “edges”; in the case of images there are only 
                                                
39 In common with any mathematical function. 
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variations in intensity and “zero-crossings” between adjacent but discernible changes in 
intensity. An individual image can be broken down into a series of zero-crossings, as shown 
in this example (Ibid. 69):  
Fig: 1.1: Marr’s demonstration of how a complex shaded image can be rendered as 
a series of “zero crossings”.  
Zero-crossings are the first of a series of “primitive” computational tasks that Marr 
identifies, which taken together help the visual system to build up a primal sketch of the 
scene (Marr 2010: 37).  Primal sketch information is processed with information about local 
surface orientation, distance from viewer, discontinuities in depth and discontinuities in 
surface orientation to produce a 2!"-D sketch which Marr claims “makes explicit the 
orientation and rough depth of the visible surfaces, and contours of discontinuities in these 
quantities in a viewer-centered coordinate frame” (Ibid.). 
Throughout, Marr is guided by his central concern with computational theory. This is 
essential to his functional understanding of the visual system because “the nature of the 
computations that underlie perception depends more upon the computational problems that 
have to be solved than upon the particular hardware in which their solutions are 
implemented” (Marr 2010: 27). 
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Not that this concern with the mathematically expressed fundamentals of vision leave him 
with an esoteric investigation far removed from visual experience. Among the 
“computational problems” that he must account for are the findings of many 
contemporaneous experiments on the visual systems of real people. Likewise, he is 
fascinated by the effects of optical illusions – especially illusions of shading, such as this: 
Fig. 1.2 Marr’s illustration of subjective contours (Marr 2010: 51) 
Throughout the work, Marr offers a description of the experimental and observational 
investigations that inform his analysis. Each of these takes an individual function and breaks 
it into its computational processes.  
Marr offers a detailed defence of his approach in Chapter 7 of the book, including an 
imaginary “conversation” with an interlocutor whose questions are drawn from his 
experience of lecturing on his ideas. Among them, he is asked whether his “different levels” 
of explanation are really independent40. He responds:  
Not really, though the computational theory of a process is rather independent 
of the algorithm or implementation levels, since it is determined solely by the 
information-processing task to be solved. The algorithm depends heavily on the 
computational theory, of course, but it also depends on the characteristics of the 
hardware in which it is to be implemented. For instance, biological hardware 
might support parallel algorithms more readily than serial ones, whereas the 
reverse is probably true of today’s digital electronic technology.  
                                                
40 One might substitute “autonomous”. 
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(Marr 2010: 337) 
More than thirty years after Marr’s (posthumous) publication, many of his conclusions have 
been superseded and a number of the computational problems that he identified are still to 
be satisfactorily described (Gazzaniga et al. 2009: 217-25). Nonetheless, Marr’s approach, 
of breaking the description of the visual system down into a series of computational 
functions, treating each individually and postulating ways that they causally interact, 
informed by experimental results and the findings of cognitive neuroscience, remains the 
paradigmatic way that the visual system is investigated.  
Marr’s computational approach to vision, which distinguishes the overall task 
of vision from the algorithms for its solution and from its neurophysiological 
implementation, exemplifies one predominant contemporary approach to 
perception in cognitive science. 
(O' Callaghan 2012: 83) 
Information is represented on multiple scales. Although early visual input can 
specify simple features, object perception involves intermediate stages of 
representation in which features are assembled into parts. Objects are not 
determined by their parts; they are defined by relations between parts. An arrow 
and the letter Y contain the same parts but differ in their arrangement. 
(Gazzaniga et al. 2009: 225) 
Although the precise computational processes instantiating this assembly and 
differentiation remain to be described, the method by which they will be uncovered is likely 
to follow Marr’s approach. This method is central not only to vision research but to most 
other areas of psychological investigation.  
1.4 Spreading Activation in Semantic Memory  
Explaining the operation of the human memory in information-processing terms requires a 
theory that encompasses all of the familiar experiences of memory, including forgetting, or 
the felling of having some name, word or fact “on the tip of the tongue”. Additionally, 
psychologists have encountered less familiar effects, such as priming: i.e., that it easier and 
faster for a subject to recall facts when some connected information has been made salient 
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prior to the test41 (Baddeley et al. 2009: 81-82; Neely 1977). The priming effect suggests a 
way into the investigation of memory: by varying the nature and presentation of primes 
researchers have a quantifiable tool with which to investigate the computational processes 
involved in retrieval. Priming effects and many other features are consistent with the idea 
that semantic memory is associative and that retrieval from memory operates across a 
spreading activation network. 
Theorists describe the long-term42 human memory system as comprising two parts: episodic 
memory (Tulving 2002), of which autobiographical memory is a part,43 is concerned with 
storing and retrieving information about events that the subject experiences. This will 
include memories of the elements of subjective experience – what the individual saw, 
smelled, felt and even the emotions that prevailed at the recalled moment. Semantic 
memory does not encode this subjective experience. It is concerned with the storage and 
retrieval of knowledge about the world; knowledge of facts, categories, meanings, signs 
and symbols.   It is also where rules for the use of words and symbols and learned knowledge 
of problem-solving techniques are stored. As Baddeley et al. (2009: 114) describe it, 
semantic memory, as the name suggests, also facilitates the linguistic ability to deploy 
words in meaning-appropriate ways.  
[Semantic memory] is a mental thesaurus, organised knowledge a person 
possesses about words and other verbal symbols, their meanings and referents, 
about relations among them, and about rules, formulas and algorithms for the 
manipulation of these symbols, concepts and relations. 
(Tulving 1972: 386) 
Imagine hearing your grandfather telling you stories about his life as a young man; the work 
he did, the places he visited, the people he knew and even details such as the way that he 
dressed. For your grandfather, these reminiscences are drawn from episodic memory – as, 
for you, will be the memory of your grandfather telling you these stories. The information 
that he related would, however, become part of your semantic memory. It becomes, for you, 
                                                
41 Or more difficult in the case of “negative priming”. 
42 As distinct from short-term or working memory. 
43 Some theorists prefer to regard autobiographical memory either as a separate system or as a distinct subsystem 
(Baddeley, 2009). 
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a series of facts the retrieval of which “lacks this sense of conscious recollection of the past” 
(Tulving 1972: 387). 
Qualitative differences would not entail that the two categories of memory depend on 
distinct systems. Empirical evidence, however, suggests that they do. For example, brain-
damaged people with retrograde amnesia – loss of memories from before the trauma 
frequently have deficits of episodic memory: they cannot remember specific events from 
their past. At the same, their semantic memory remains largely intact (Spiers et al. 2001; 
Wood et al. 2014).44 They may not remember the sights, sounds, smells and emotions of 
their wedding day, for example, but they still understand what the word “wedding” means 
and are likely to recall the date and place at which the ceremony took place. To take our 
grandfather example, such amnesia would mean being unable to remember the occasion on 
which your grandfather told you stories from his youth while still remembering what he 
told you. That the deficits resulting from damage to particular areas of the brain are 
differentiated in this way strongly suggests that different neural systems are involved in the 
storage and/or retrieval of semantic and episodic memories. 
Note, however, that information drawn either from episodic or semantic memory might be 
labelled “beliefs”. Your grandfather might “believe” that he once wore a top hat (from his 
episodic memory: you, having been told this, would “believe” that your grandfather once 
wore a top hat – from your semantic memory. That psychology indicates that different 
systems are involved in the coding, storage and retrieval of “beliefs” of different kinds 
suggests that the defining “belief” as a unitary functional state is unwarranted. 
The dominant theory of the psychology of semantic memory is the spreading activation 
model. The fundamental feature of this model is that the encoded elements that make up 
our concepts – nodes in semantic memory (A. M. Collins and Loftus 1975) – are linked to 
associated elements and concepts and the strengths or weights of the associative links 
determine the ease, speed and accuracy with which information is retrieved. Thus measuring 
retrieval times of associated information when particular nodes are activated by a 
perceptual stimulus can help the researcher to map the network of semantic nodes that 
make up an individual concept (McNamara 1992).  
                                                
44 According to the same authors, the reverse effect, loss of semantic memories with the retention of episodic recollections 
is less common. This has been taken as evidence of the robustness of semantic memory and supports a distributed rather 
than localised model, such as spreading activation.   
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An outline of the history of research into semantic memory and of how the spreading 
activation model has been developed is highly illustrative of how scientific psychology 
makes use of functional analysis in explaining phenomena. 
One of the earliest investigations into the nature of semantic memory, and one of the first 
systematic models of the capacity (Baddeley et al. 2009: 116) was the hierarchical network 
model suggested by A. M. Collins and Quillian (1969). This paper investigated how people 
determine the truth of statements such as “a canary can fly”. Collins and Quillian suggested 
two possibilities: the fact that a particular species of bird can fly might be stored in semantic 
memory along with the name of that species and that information would be repeated for 
every instance of a species of bird that can fly. This model, however, would require a great 
deal of duplication of information – as many instances of “can fly” as there were 
remembered species of flying bird – and so lacked cognitive economy, which the researchers 
assumed was likely to be a real feature of human semantic memory. Collins and Quillian’s 
preferred model proposed that information true of “birds” in general would be stored 
alongside that “higher-level” category, and derived from that to its members. 
Diagrammatically, the hierarchical model looks like this: 
Fig. 1.3: Diagrammatic representation of hierarchical model of semantic memory, 
reproduced from Collins and Quillian (1969). 
Information specific to the individual member of a group is stored alongside the name of 
that species. Thus “is yellow” is stored at the same level in the hierarchy as “canary”. 
Information that pertains to the category as a whole is stored at the category level: “has 
wings” belongs with “bird” because this is true of birds in general and not just of canaries. 
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FIG. 1. Illustration of the hypothetical memory structure for a 3-level hierarchy. 
retrieval .process must be made before pre- 
dictions such as those above can be stated 
explicitly. First, we need to assume that both 
retrieving a property f rom a node and moving 
up a level in a hierarchy take a person time. 
Second, we shall assume that the times for 
these two processes a readdi t ive ,  whenever 
one step is dependent on completion of another 
step. This assumption is equivalent to Donders '  
assumption of additivity (Smith, 1968) for the 
following two cases: (a) When moving up a 
level is followed by moving up another level, 
and (b) when moving up a level is followed by 
retrieving a property at the higher level. Third, 
we assume that th  time to retrieve a property 
from a node is independent of  the level of the 
node, although different properties may take 
different times to retrieve from the same node. 
I t  also seems reasonable to assume that 
searching properties at a node and moving up 
to the next level occur in a parallel rather than 
a serial manner, and hence are not additive. 
However, this assumption is not essential, and 
our reasons for preferring it are made clear in 
the Discussion section. 
We have labeled sentences that state 
property relations P sentences, and those that 
state superset relations S sentences. To these 
labels numbers are appended. These indicate 
the number of  levels the model predicts it would 
be necessary to move through to decide the 
sentence is true. Thus, "A  canary can sing" 
would be a PO sentence, "A  canary can fly" 
w uld be a P1 sentence, and "A canary has 
skin" would be a P2 sentence. Similarly, "A  
canary is a canary" would be an SO sentence, 
"A canary is a bird" would be an S1 sentence, 
and "A canary is an animal" would be an $2 
sentence. 
I t  follows from the assumptions above that 
the time differences predicted for PO, P1, and 
P2 sentences are entirely a result of  moving 
from one level in the hierarchy to the next. 
Thus, the increase in time from SO to S1 
should be the same as from PO to P1 since 
both increases are a result of moving from 
level O to level 1. Likewise, the time increase 
from S1 to $2 should equal the time increase 
from P1 to P2. In fact, if we assume that the 
time to move from one level to the next is not 
dependent on which levels are involved, all 
the time increases (from PO to P1, P1 to P2, 
SO to S1, and S1 to S2) should be equal. 
Recently, reaction time (RT) has been used 
as a measure of  the time it takes people to 
retrieve information from memory.  By con- 
structing a large number  of true sentences of 
the six types discussed and interspersing these 
with equal numbers of  false sentences, we can 
measure the reaction time for Ss to decide 
which sentences are true and which are false. 
Thus, this method can be used to test the 
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To put this model to the test, Collins and Quillian devised a series of “true or false” 
questions which were put to a number of subjects whose responses were timed. The 
hypothesis was that if the information encoded in the target statement required retrieval 
from different levels of the hierarchy, response times would be longer than if the 
information came from the same level. This would mean that subjects would take longer to 
identify “a canary has skin” as true, than they would to assent to “a canary is yellow”. 
Collins and Quillian’s results were much in line with this prediction. 
These results show that subjects, on average, took longer to identify “a canary has skin” as 
true than they did “a canary can fly” which in turn took them longer than “a canary can 
sing”. 
Although these results were suggestive that the hierarchical model was correct, critics 
pointed out that there was another possible explanation for these results. Associated 
information, such as “a canary can sing” (or even the phrase “singing canary”) are familiar 
tropes. Perhaps, the sceptical argument suggested, closely allied ideas are retrieved more 
quickly simply because they are so familiar. This was investigated by Conrad (1972), who 
found, according to Baddeley et al. (2009: 118) that “when familiarity was controlled, 
hierarchical distance between the subject and the property had little effect on verification 
time.” 
The hierarchical model also fails to account for another feature of semantic memory. 
Experiments on response times like those carried out by Collins and Quillian found that 
Fig 1.4: Plot of response times from Collins and Quillian (1969) 
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each S's correct responses oflly. Error rates 
were on the av rage ab ut  8 ~o and t nded to 
increase where RT increased. 
Deciding a Sentence is True 
The data f rom all three experiments have 
been averaged in Fig. 2. To evaluate the 
differences shown there for true sentences, 
two separate analyses of  variance were 
performed: One for the 2-level runs and one 
$2 sentences should be two paral lel  straight 
lines. The results are certain y compatible 
with this prediction, except for the SO point, 
which is somewhat out of  line. I t  was antici- 
pated that presenting the entire sentence on 
the CRT at one time would permit the Ss to 
answer the SO sentences, e.g., "A  maple is a 
maple," by pattern matching. That  they did 
so was substantiated by spontaneous reports 
from several Ss that on the SO sentences they 
often did not even think what the sentence 
1500 
140C 
130C 
1200 
II00 
lOOC 
900 
[ PO) A CANARY CAN SIN G, 
SO)A CANARY IS A CANAR'I 
(3r8) 
(P2)A CANARY HASS~N~ 
[309) 
(P) A CANARY 
(?@) HAS GILLS 
(S) A CANARY 
ISA FISH 
(S2)A CANARY IS AN ANIM~ W 
_~" / (8o) 
SI)ACANARYISABIRD (3)~27) / 
/ 
¢ ~. PROPERTIES 
o.--.---- , - - o  SUPERSETS 
THE NUMBER OF REACTION TIMES FOR 
EACH POINT ARE IN PARENTHESES 
) I SENTENCES SHOWN ARE ONLY ILLUSTRATIVE 
LEVELS OF TRU' SENTENCES 
(709) 
(723} 
z FALSE 
SENTENCES 
FIG. 2. Average reaction times for different types of sentences in three experiments. 
for the 3-level runs. For  the 2-level data the 
difference between P sentences and S sentences 
was significant, F(1, 60) = 19.73, p < .01, the 
difference between levels was significant 
F(1, 60) = 7.74, p < .01, but the interaction was 
not quite significant, F(1, 60) = 2.06. For  the 
3-level data, the difference between P and S 
sentences was significant, F(1, 6 0 ) =  27.02, 
p < .01, the difference between levels was 
significant, F(2, 60) = 5.68, p < .01, and the 
interaction was not significant, F < 1. 
Our prediction was that the RT curves for 
PO, P1, and P2 sentences and for SO, S1, and 
said. Overall, the underlying model is sup- 
ported by these data. 
I t  can also be concluded, if one accepts the 
model and disregards the SO point as distorted 
by pattern matching, that the time to move 
from a node to its superset is on the order of  
75 msec, this figure being the average RT 
increase from PO to PI,  P1 to P2, and S1 to 
$2. The differences between S1 and P1 and 
between $2 and P2, which average to about 
225 msec, represent the time it takes to retrieve 
a property from the node at the level where we 
assume it is stored. 
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statements such as “a canary is a bird” tended to be more rapidly identified as true than less 
typical examples, such as “a penguin is a bird” (Ibid.). The “hierarchical distance” is the 
same in each of these cases. A complete model of semantic memory would have to account 
for these “typicality” effects. 
In direct response to this, Rosch and Mervis (1975) developed a model of categorisation 
based on prototypes that directly referenced the notion of family resemblance suggested by 
Wittgenstein (2009 §67). On this model, the association of an example with a given category 
is dependent on how closely that example resembles a prototypical member of that category. 
The effect that this model suggests has been shown to be robust through many replications 
and variations on Rosch and Mervis’ original investigation. However, it would have 
remained an effect, a regularity yet to be explained had not A. M. Collins and Loftus (1975) 
suggested a mechanism by which semantic memory acquires, stores and retrieves 
conceptual, categorisation and factual information. This was a much more flexible model 
than hierarchy alone and accounted for typicality effects, being based on semantic, rather 
than hierarchical, distance. This was the spreading activation model of semantic 
memory. 
412 ALLAN M. COLLINS AND ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS
AMBULANCE/y-F|RE
ENGINE
FIGURE 1. A schematic representation of concept relatedness in a stereo-
typical fragment of human memory (where a shorter line represents greater
relatedness).
gate of the interconnections between two
concepts.3
3 Semantic relatedness is a slightly different no-
tion from semantic distance, though the two terms
are sometimes used interchangeably. Semantic dis-
tance is the distance along the shortest path, and
semantic relatedness (or similarity) is an aggre-
gate of all the paths. Two concepts may be close
in distance, say by a path through "red," and still
not be closely related because that is the only
path. Our use of close to refer to both relation-
ships is admittedly confusing. In this paper we
shall use close to refer to relatedness or similarity,
though in sortie tasks (Quillian, 1966) it is only
distance that matters.
Figure 1 illustrates this aggregate notion
of concept relatedness for a hypothetical
human memory. (It is the kind of diagram
that the scaling techniques of Rips et al.,
1973, would produce.) In the figure the
various vehicles are shown as closely re-
lated, because of the numerous individual
connections that are assumed to exist be-
tween them. Conversely, the concepts asso-
ciated with "red" are shown as less related,
because of the presumed paucity of inter-
connections between them.
From the assumption that memory is or-
ganized according to semantic similarity, to-
Fig. 1.5: Diagrammatic representation of concept relationships under a spreading 
activatio  model. From Collins and L ftus (1975). 
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In this diagram, the length of the lines between nodes – individual concepts in memory – 
represents the strength of association. The concept “fire engine” at the centre of the matrix 
is closely associated with the concepts “ambulance” and “fire” although less strongly 
associated with “vehicle”. This would mean that a stimulus that evokes “fire” is likely to 
activate “fire engine” much more readily and rapidly than would an evocation of “vehicle”. 
Activation of items in semantic memory spreads from node to node,45 dependent on the 
strength of association until the required concept, fact or idea is retrieved.  
A. M. Collins and Loftus (1975) describe a series of experimental findings that map on to 
their model quite closely. For example, Loftus (1973) had investigated category-instance 
evocation. Four kinds of pairing between an instance and a category were tested by asking 
the subject whether the example was a member of that category (e.g. “is an oak a tree?”):  
… (a) pairs where both the category and instance evoked the other with high 
frequency (e.g., “tree-oak); (b) pairs where the category evoked the instance 
with high frequency, but the instance evoked the category with low frequency 
(e.g., “seafood-shrimp”); (c) pairs where the category evoked the instance with 
low frequency, but the instance evoked the category with high frequency (e.g., 
“insect-butterfly”) and (d) pairs where both the category and the instance 
evoked the other with low frequency (e.g., cloth-orlon). 
(A. M. Collins and Loftus 1975) 
The presentation of each pairing was varied as to whether the category or the instance was 
presented first. As predicted by the spreading activation model the findings were that: 
…subjects are fast when the category is presented first, if the category evokes 
the instance with high frequency, and subjects are fast when the instance is 
presented first, if the instance evokes the category with high frequency.  
(Ibid.) 
It is thus semantic distance (frequency of association, represented by the shortest route along 
the meaning-pathways) that determines how quickly a pairing is recognised rather than 
                                                
45 This is not the same as a connectionist model of brain architecture: a “node” in these models does not equate with a single 
brain location. Spreading activation is a model of conceptual memory, not of brain function. (McRae & Jones, 2014: 207-
208) 
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lexical association alone. The findings can, they suggest, be explained by spreading-
activation: 
…activation spreads along some number of pathways, because the subject has 
activated the lexical network in addition to the semantic network. Hence, in the 
present explanation, the subject's control is reduced to diffusely activating 
whole networks rather than specific pathways (in addition to the specific nodes 
activated by the stimuli in the experiment).  
(Ibid.) 
Over the ensuing decades, researchers have honed and refined this image of the spreading 
activation model by isolating individual features and testing them experimentally to gain an 
overall picture of the processing of semantic information. In his review of much of this 
research, Elman (2009) suggests that one result has been a shift of focus from the rules 
governing word use to the “semantically rich” content of individual words themselves – 
words that gain much of this richness from the web of associations in which they are held, 
rather than from a lexical “look-up” process. This implies that words are not only…  
…flesh that gives life to grammatical structures, but [also] bones that are 
themselves grammatical[ly] rich entities. This sea change has accompanied the 
rise of usage-based theories of language which emphasize the context-
sensitivity of word use.  
(Elman 2009) 
However, one feature of our semantic memory that is predicted by the spreading-activation 
model is that we are prone to semantic errors, particularly when incorrect information 
activates closely associated information (Erickson and Mattson 1981; Hannon 2014). 
1.5 Developments of Associative Theories 
The associative implications of the spreading activation model have led other researchers 
in new directions. For example, Morewedge and Kahneman (2010) develop a new take on 
the dual process model of judgement and decision making (see Chapter 2, section 2.7). They 
identify “intuitive judgements” with the operations of “System 1” (their term) – the fast, 
largely effortless and automatic processes are both essential to (and frequently sufficient 
for) many of our day-to-day decisions and yet prone to “systematic errors” or biases. 
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For example, take the illusion suggested by Erickson and Mattson (1981). If we ask some 
subjects the following question: 
How many animals of each kind did Moses take into the Ark? 
According to Erickson and Mattson (1981), and in subsequent studies reviewed by Park and 
Reder (2004), most respondents answer “two”. This solution is recovered from memory 
without conscious consideration: without, in Morewedge and Kahneman’s terms, invoking 
the more reflective “System 2”. A moment’s thought reveals that it was Noah, and not 
Moses, who, in the Bible story, took animals on to an ark. 
This is explained by an associative account of automatic processing, and specifically the 
feature that Morewedge and Kahneman identify as “associative coherence”. The 
associations of the names “Moses” and “Noah” are sufficiently similar – both are old-
testament patriarchs whose story would have been learned in childhood by anyone raised 
within the dominant Judeo-Christian tradition of the West – that many will not notice the 
substitution of one patriarch for another. To confirm this, if one asks “How many animals 
did Adam take on to the ark?” almost nobody will fail to notice the substitution (Erickson 
and Mattson 1981). Although “Adam” is the name of the original Old Testament patriarch, 
the associations of that name are sufficiently distinct from those of “Moses” and “Noah” 
that respondents will “engage System 2” (Morewedge and Kahneman 2010). 
Another feature identified by Morewedge and Kahneman is attribute substitution. When 
asked to identify pairs of rhyming words, we might not be surprised that subjects would 
pick out “VOTE-GOAT” more slowly than “VOTE-NOTE” in a written test (Seidenberg 
and Tanenhaus 1979). However, that a similar delay pertains when they hear pairs of words 
being spoken, indicates that the association of a word with its spelling is “…evoked 
automatically, although it is disruptive.” Glucksberg et al. (1982) showed that when subjects 
were asked to state whether a sentence was literally true, they responded more slowly when 
there was a chance that the example was metaphorically true – for example “some roads 
are snakes” or “some jobs are jails” were identified as false more slowly than were other 
cases for which a metaphorical reading was not available. 
A third feature of intuitive judgements invoking associations is described by Morewedge 
and Kahneman as processing fluency. In the example that they draw from Schwarz et al. 
(1991), participants were asked to provide either six or twelve examples of occasions from 
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their own lives in which they had acted assertively. When subsequently asked to judge 
themselves on a scale of assertiveness, the group who were asked for twelve examples 
consistently rated themselves less assertive than those who had been asked only for six. It 
is suggested that the difficulty associated with coming up with those last few examples of 
their own assertive behaviour tended to depress their impression of themselves as assertive 
individuals.  
These observations have two significant implications. Firstly, it shows how a productive 
model of psychological processing – in this case associative activation – can continue to be 
informative and to suggest fruitful avenues of enquiry in areas beyond its original domain; 
this is surely the mark of a genuine explanation, rather than a merely “as if” predictions. 
Secondly, these examples bring out the importance of explaining the process mechanisms 
that underlie specific systematic errors. This is an important guide in scientific psychology’s 
quest for explanations and is a theme to which we will return over the course of the 
following two chapters. 
In common with Marr’s approach, the spreading activation and associative models are 
informed by a quest to describe processes. Systematic biases (like the Moses illusion) are 
helpful in this respect because they help researchers to map out the computational steps that 
the subject goes through in retrieving and manipulating information – what are, for example, 
the circumstances under which substitutions are unnoticed? How is retrieval time affected 
by different kinds of conceptual distance?  
1.6 The Scientific Status of Psychology 
The adherent of philosophical folk psychology might raise the objection that one should not 
treat psychology – a social science – as if it had the same level of commitment to genuine, 
causal explanations as the natural sciences. This doubt lies on a continuum between two 
extremes: at one lies the view that psychology is not amenable to the same methodology as 
natural science and, at the other pole, the normative ethical judgement that psychologists 
ought not to carry out experimental investigations on human subjects.  
This is significant for the purposes of the present thesis because, in challenging the scientific 
status of psychology, the adherent of philosophical folk psychology could claim that the 
models developed in the former have no more explanatory power than, for example, the 
belief-desire law. In this section, I will show why this challenge fails. 
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Concerns over its scientific status have haunted psychology ever since its establishment as 
a discipline. Chung and Hyland (2012: p76) point out that “Almost every introductory 
textbook on psychology starts with the statement that psychology is a science. The fact that 
this statement is made suggests that it is sometimes questioned.” In one psychology 
textbook for undergraduates embarking on psychology courses (Davey 2008) an entire 
chapter (Ch3, pp20-31) is devoted to the debate. Those in favour of “psychology as science” 
point out the methodological rigour and investigative objectivity with which contemporary 
psychologists pursue their explanations (Bell 2002: 75-100). In response, sceptics who 
challenge the scientific status of the discipline claim that many of the theories put forward 
by psychology are not falsifiable (ibid. 82-3), in the terms defined by Popper (1992). As 
per Popper’s charge against Freudian psychoanalysis, they argue that many of the 
theoretical posits of psychology are shaped to fit the data.46 As such they could account for 
any new observations; they make no “bold predictions” that might be shown to be wrong47.  
If we accept the view that psychology seeks to uncover the mechanisms underlying 
observed regularities this objection is allayed. For the purposes of this thesis, I will take 
seriously the claim that psychology, by means of functional analysis, seeks to understand 
person–level psychological phenomena by uncovering the systematic causal relationships 
between the subpersonal functions that make them up – as proposed by Cummins (1980, 
1983, 2006) and Bechtel and Wright (2009). Psychology, understood this way, is committed 
to the real causal efficacy of the entities – psychological functions – that it studies and the 
mechanisms of which they are part.  
The methodology of psychological investigation through functional analysis is archetypally 
scientific. The imaginary experiment with which this discussion began adheres generally to 
the pattern by which an experimenter manipulates an independent variable in order to record 
and measure the effect on an output or dependent variable. Our two examples, Marr’s Vision 
and the development of the theory of spreading activation in semantic memory are equally 
typical of this method. More detailed models emerge from the comparison of results from 
experiments with different independent variables or under which the degree or direction in 
which that variable is manipulated have been systematically varied.  
                                                
46 Note that this concern appears to be mostly directed at “data-fitting” or “as if” hypotheses: regularities presented as 
explanations. 
47 A charge to which philosophical folk psychology is equally susceptible: see Introduction, section 0.3.  
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All that said, the concern about the scientific status of psychology persists in some quarters. 
Since much of the forthcoming examination of the way psychology treats the target 
phenomena rests on the assumption that folk psychology, if true, should inform those 
investigations, I would like to take a moment to consider three alternative ways to view 
psychology and what impact each would have on this contention. 
a) Psychology is not scientific but is a hermeneutic endeavour (Rennie 2012; Terwee 
2012). Rather than uncovering causes, psychologists seek to catalogue, describe 
and rigorously define our common-sense concepts of the mind together with the 
regularities that pertain between these on the one hand and behaviour or further 
mental states on the other.     
b)  Psychology is not scientific, in virtue, for example, of the unfalsifiability of its 
theoretic commitments; however, psychologists either believe that their 
endeavour is scientific or seek to present it to the world as such. They avail 
themselves of a version of the scientific method in order to bolster its claim to 
scientific status – and in so doing present functional analyses and decompositions 
as causal explanations. 
c) Psychology is scientific and seeks to identify causal functional relationships by 
means of the functional analysis of cognitive or behavioural regularities into their 
underlying sub-personal mechanisms.  
These three possibilities are not exhaustive. They are viable alternatives and probably 
mutually exclusive – each seems to contradict the others. Although I would admit they are 
paraphrases, all have been levelled at psychology at one time or another. In the course of 
this chapter I have supported option c), which seems to me to best capture the way that the 
examples offered so far work, along with those that will appear in the next two chapters. 
However, I acknowledge that some might prefer to characterise psychology according to a) 
or b) (review: Dienes 2008) and some psychologists would claim that a) approximates their 
approach (Messer et al. 1988; Richardson and Fowers 2010; Sugarman and Martin 2010). 
However, it would not matter to this project if they are correct. 
If a) is true then its explanatory aims are somewhat at odds with those of philosophical folk 
psychology, which does seek an account of the causal antecedents of action choice and 
regards interpersonal understanding as a species of causal understanding. We would also 
expect, if philosophical folk psychology is correct about the ubiquity of propositional 
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attitudes, that a hermeneutic philosophy would count the attitudes and their psychological 
formation as a significant set of “common sense concepts of the mind” and so to feature 
prominently in its “catalogue” of descriptions.  
If b) is an accurate description of the psychological project (albeit sceptical to the point of 
being dismissive) then we would expect that, in pursuit of the appearance of scientific 
rigour, psychologists would help themselves to propositional attitude terms such as 
“beliefs” and “desires” either because these are the de-facto designators of the causes of 
action, or because they pick out features of a psychological regularity to be explained by 
means of analysis. 
To make this explicit, if b) or c) are the best descriptions of psychology and philosophical 
folk psychology is true, then there are two possibilities: either  
i) the “belief-desire law” is a psychological regularity, an explanandum 
demanding investigation, in which case we would expect to see this law or its 
derivatives featuring as the starting point of scientific (or even pseudo-scientific) 
psychological investigations or  
ii) the terms “belief” and “desire” pick out functional entities in the mechanisms 
through which behaviour, action choice or interpersonal understanding occur; in 
which case they ought to feature in the explanantia of those capacities. 
Given this, the examination of how contemporary scientific psychology treats the 
phenomena of action-choice and interpersonal understanding (in terms of action-
explanation) in the next two chapters is unaffected by the stance that one chooses to take 
regarding the scientific status of psychology. 
1.7 Chapter Summary 
It is insufficient for explanations in scientific psychology to stop at regularities (section 1.1). 
Even if the regularities are between certain psychological “states” and action choices or 
subsequent behaviour, as is apparently suggested by the belief-desire law, then such 
regularities remain in need of further elucidation if they are to be regarded as genuine 
explanations (rather than mere “as if” statistical correlations). Investigations in scientific 
psychology thus do not proceed by the formulation of “laws” or “law-like regularities” but 
regard regularities as explananda to be investigated further. 
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The process by which scientific psychology investigates regularities is one of functional 
analysis (1.1-1.2). This seeks to uncover systematic relationships between ever more simple 
functions that interact to produce more complex, personal-level psychological functions. 
The objective of functional analysis is to uncover the mechanisms through which complex 
psychological operations are built up from these interactions. Illustrations of the process of 
functional analysis at work (1.3-1.5) show how central this has become to the development 
of psychological explanations. 
The “belief-desire law”, if true, would be just the sort of regularity that scientific psychology 
ought to take as the object of analysis. If its components, “belief” and “desire” pick out 
basic functions in the generation of human action, we would expect these terms or their 
referents to feature at some stage in the process of functional analysis. The next two chapters 
will examine scientific approaches to two of the human experiences that the belief-desire 
law is suggested to “explain – action choice and interpersonal understanding – and show 
that these are developed without reference to this formulation or to its components. It makes 
no difference what view one takes of the scientific status of psychology (1.6). If the belief-
desire law works in the way that is claimed for it, then it ought to feature in the dominant 
psychological approaches to these fields of study. 
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2 Chapter Two: 
Action Choice, Judgement and Decision-Making 
Abstract: This chapter examines both the normative ideals of judgement, 
decision-making and action choice and the evidence from scientific 
psychology of the ways that such choices are actually made. The normative 
expected utility decision theory is closely allied to the belief-desire model of 
philosophical folk psychology and so suffers from similar limitations. Not 
least among these is the empirical observation that people are prone to a 
number of cognitive illusions and biases, especially when it comes to the 
calculation of probabilities – which is essential to expected utility. Evidence 
from the circumstances under which people make choices, combined with 
experimental investigations into decision strategies and the computational 
functions that underlie them (some of which are described) suggest that 
people use heuristics to arrive at “good enough” inferences. Further 
evidence suggests that many – perhaps most – of our decisions are made 
subpersonally, out of conscious awareness and are automatic. Some 
contemporary cognitive psychologists posit two types of process that 
facilitate decision-making in the real world.  
As far as ordinary life is concerned, the chance for action would frequently pass 
us by if we waited until we could free ourselves from our doubts, and so we are 
often compelled to accept what is merely probable. From time to time we may 
even have to make a choice between two alternatives, even though it is not 
apparent that one of the two is more probable than the other. 
Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, (1644) Article 3  
2.1  Expected Utility Decision Theory: “Homo Economicus” 
According to the belief-desire law, people will tend (all things being equal) to do whatever 
they believe will bring about the fulfilment of their desires. 
If this is true, then the basis of the scientific investigation of judgement and decision making 
would be to explain, firstly, how this tendency arises from our psychological make-up – 
including how specific beliefs and desires can act upon our preferences with sufficient force 
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to bring the regularity about and, conversely, what factors are at work on those occasions 
that beliefs and desires are insufficient to bring about the action-choice predicted by the 
belief-desire law. Secondly, they would need to focus on the process of belief formation 
and how beliefs are generated in relation to a motivating desire. The regularity described 
by the belief-desire law would be central to these investigations – featuring either as the 
explanandum of a psychological theory or at some stage in the development of an explanans 
through functional analysis.  
As we shall see in this chapter, however, the contemporary psychology of judgement and 
decision making is a vibrant area of investigation. It entails discussion not only of the origins 
of action and action-choice, but crosses into the philosopher’s traditional territory in 
considering the nature – and even the existence – of human rationality (Hardman 2009: 4-
5). Despite addressing broadly similar phenomena to philosophical folk psychology, the 
scientific approaches to judgement and decision making that I consider in this chapter make 
no use of the belief-desire law and little mention of “belief” or “desire”. 
We should begin, however, with “the most widely accepted principle of normative decision 
making” (Speekenbrink and Shanks 2013: 682). This does have much in common with that 
picture and which has been influential in, for example, economics, sociology and political 
science (Oaksford et al. 2012: 140). 
Since at least the 18th century, the dominant theory of judgement and decision making has 
presumed that rational agents seek to maximise their utility48. The enlightenment 
philosopher and economic theorist Adam Smith was among the first to put the idea in formal 
terms when he claimed that, as “economic actors49”, people act in pursuit of the greatest 
satisfaction of their material enrichment at the expenditure of minimum cost in terms of 
material resources, time and effort (A. Smith 1776/1986). Contemporary expected utility is 
a refinement of Smith’s observation. It suggests that individual agents choose courses of 
action on the basis of a probabilistic judgement of the likelihood that a particular action will 
result in a given outcome together with a further judgement of the relative utility, or 
contribution to the individual’s wellbeing, associated with that outcome. Dominant in 
Economics, this model, the Expected Utility Decision Theory (EUDT), has given rise to 
                                                
48 Or at least to pursue goals that they believe will maximize their utility. 
49 Whether as consumers, producers, both or as regulators. 
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an enormous volume of scholarship – overview e.g., Speekenbrink and Shanks (2013). The 
essence of the theory can be stated in a single sentence: 
In choosing how to act, people will select that course that they determine has 
the greatest probability of maximising utility. 
This simple statement obscures a great deal of complexity. Before I deal with some of this, 
however it should be noted that contrary to a common criticism of the model (Speekenbrink 
and Shanks 2013), EUDT does not imply selfishness or preclude altruism. “Utility” is a 
term of value. The degree to which an individual’s actions are entirely self-serving (at one 
end of the scale) or entirely altruistic (at the other) is determined by how much utility the 
agent attaches to altruism or to self-interest. All that matters is that once the agent has 
settled on a way to calculate a value for utility they will act in the way anticipated to be 
most likely to maximise that value. 
The first modern treatment of EUDT appears in Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947, 
2007). Their conception was of a normative account of decision-making. EUDT was offered 
as a template for how an ideal decider, under ideal conditions and in possession of optimum 
levels of information, ought to choose. In support of the theory they suggested that EUDT 
should be understood in terms of the application of a set of axioms of ideal decision making. 
Plous (1993: 81-82) sets out six axioms50 as follows: 
Ordering: It must be possible to compare and rank options 
Dominance: The chosen option must never be outranked or “dominated” by an 
alternative 
Cancellation: Identical outcomes are disregarded in making a choice – only 
outcomes that differ are relevant to the decision. 
Transitivity: If outcome A is judged better than outcome B and B better than 
C then A is to be preferred over C. 
                                                
50 Speekenbrink and Shanks (2013: 684), list the four most important as completeness, transitivity, independence, and 
continuity – incorporating similar requirements to Plous’ list into fewer axioms. 
A Therapeutic Elimination… 
Mark Curtis, UEA June, 2016  74 
Continuity: If the probability of the best possible outcome far outweighs the 
probability of the worst possible outcome, the decider should always prefer this 
gamble to a certain “middle-ranked” outcome51. 
Invariance: the mode, order or style in which options are presented should have 
no bearing on the choice made since the mathematical calculation of expected 
utility is unaffected by such concerns. 
According to Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947, 2007) violation of any axiom would 
lead to a failure to maximise utility and so would not meet the central normative stricture of 
the theory – do whatever it is that you believe has the best chance of maximising your utility.  
Most of the time, agents are confronted with a choice of several potential actions, each of 
which has the potential to lead to any one of a number of outcomes. Formalised versions of 
EUDT (Plous 1993 Ch. 7) maintain that decision-making with respect to action choice 
follows a series of steps: 
i) Choose an optional course of action to examine. 
ii) Posit the possible outcomes for that course of action. 
iii) For each of these potential outcomes, calculate the probability that it will result 
from the examined course action. 
iv) For each of these potential outcomes, calculate the utility it would deliver if 
realised. 
v) Multiply the probability of each possible outcome by its utility value. 
vi) Add these products together to give the sum of probable utilities for that action. 
vii) Repeat this procedure for each considered course of action. 
Some possible outcomes for any considered course of action are likely to have negative 
probable utilities (i.e., risks – deleterious potential outcomes that have a notable probability 
of occurring). This will proportionately reduce the sum of probable utilities; in this way the 
risk of any given course of action is given its appropriate weight. 
The normatively best course of action will be the one with the greatest sum of probable 
utilities. This formulation measures both how advantageous or beneficial the potential 
                                                
51 According to Plous, this injunction is motivated by the need to maximize utility whenever possible. Thus a risky higher 
return has greater normative force than an assured one in the mid-range. 
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outcomes of an action choice are, but also the probability that the action will lead to a 
beneficial (high utility) outcome. The formula for calculation the sum of expected utilities 
of an uncertain choice can be written: 
Pr % U(i) 
(Oaksford et al. 2012: 139) 
Where i is any possible outcome of a given choice. Pr(i) is the calculated probability of that 
outcome and U(i) is the calculated utility for that outcome. P(i)xU(i), thus calculates a 
probabilistic likelihood that any possible outcome will yield a given utility. The optimum 
choice and the normatively correct action would then be the one with the greatest value of 
for the sum of the values of probability and utility for the considered potential outcomes of 
that action – that is, for all examined values of i.  
To illustrate by means of an example how this calculation is supposed to work, imagine a 
motorist buying a new car. They have arrived (for the sake of simplicity) at a couple of 
options. What will determine the final selection of a particular model, under EUDT, is the 
assignment of values to the features of the vehicle they are considering and the probability 
that each choice will deliver that utility. Suppose that one of the two cars on their shortlist 
offers greater fuel economy and the other greater comfort. Our motorist might assign a 
greater value – based on personal preference – to fuel economy than to comfort. Fuel 
economy thus scores greater utility than comfort. At the same time, they might be sceptical 
of manufacturer’s figures on fuel economy which would lower confidence (probability) of 
achieving that outcome. After taking a test drive, the driver is more certain of the thirstier 
car’s comfort than he is of the ostensibly more fuel-efficient vehicle’s ability to deliver that 
benefit. Thus, the probability that the comfortable car will deliver its best feature is deemed 
higher than the likelihood that the economical model will match up to its promises. We 
might present this: 
Model A: Comfort: U=3, P=0.8 Fuel Economy: U=7, P=0.4 
Model B:  Comfort : U=6 P=0.8 Fuel Economy: U=5, P=0.4 
For the purposes of this demonstration it is assumed that the probability that each vehicle 
will deliver on comfort is the same (both have been test driven) and that the probability of 
achieving the promised fuel economy is also the same, given equal scepticism to 
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manufacturer’s figures. If we carry out the probabilistic utility calculations for each option, 
the sum for Model A comes out at (3x0.8) + (7x0.4) = 2.4 + 2.8 = 5.2. The sum of potential 
utilities (Σ) for Model B would be (6x0.8) + (5x0.4) = 4.8 + 2 = 6.8. Thus, despite having 
placed higher utility on fuel economy than on comfort, and even though model B offers 
worse fuel economy, which had been the declared priority, the rational motorist ought to 
choose Model B. 
This would be the normatively rational choice according to EUDT. Whether this bears 
any relation to how decisions are made and acted upon in the real world is questionable. For 
example, Hardman (2009: 66) argues:  
Most economic and psychological accounts of risky decision making52… 
assume that when people make risky decisions they are trying to maximise 
something such as expected value or expected utility. However, economic 
theories fail to capture much of human decision-making behaviour. 
If, as intended by Von Neumann and Morgenstern, EUDT was regarded only as a normative 
prescription for ideal decision making, then departures from the norm would not be at issue. 
Nevertheless, the EUDT model underpins many descriptive accounts of decision-making, 
as is made clear by Stanovich (2011: 6), who argues that people are presumed to behave as 
if they were seeking to maximise utility. This assumption is used to construct models of the 
political economy by sociologists and economists (Elster 1986; Hindmoor 2006). Over the 
medium- to long-term and averaged over a typical customer-base/national/transnational 
population sample, predictions work on an assumption that individual choices will be made 
as if on the basis of expected utility (Mankiw and Taylor 2014: 3-8). 
Evidence, however, suggests that decision-makers frequently violate the axioms of EUDT 
– particularly the axioms of continuity and invariance. Because they do so in predictable 
and systematic ways, researchers in contemporary scientific psychology have been able to 
analyse the underlying processes and develop new descriptive theories of judgement and 
decision-making. These are discussed in the present chapter. 
This is significant because The assumption that EUDT successfully explains decision 
making is parallel to the metaphysical commitments of the belief-desire law. 
                                                
52 The qualification “risky” entails only that the outcome of the decision matters, that something is at stake for the decider. 
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2.2 EUDT and Folk Psychology: The Parallels 
David Lewis was in no doubt that EUDT and belief-desire psychology are deeply 
intertwined.  
Decision theory (at least if we omit the frills) is not esoteric science, however 
unfamiliar it may seem to an outsider. Rather it is a systematic exposition of the 
consequences of certain well-chosen platitudes about belief, desire, preference 
and choice. It is the very core of our commonsense theory of persons, dissected 
out and elegantly systemized. 
Lewis (1974: 337-38) 
In this section I will examine their relationship in order to set the groundwork that both are 
equally susceptible to empirical challenges.  
To begin with, utility is a quantitative measure of the power of the potential outcome of an 
action choice to satisfy the needs and wants (desires) of the agent. Expected utility is a 
process assigning a probability to the chance that the outcome of a choice will satisfy a 
desire. It proposes that action choice is mediated by the strength of the agent’s belief –
another way of describing an assigned probability or expectation – that a given action will 
meet their desire. 
Expected utility decision theory and belief-desire psychology are both committed to a 
normative model of judgement, defining how agents ought to arrive at their decisions to act 
under ideal conditions. According to belief-desire psychology, agents ought to choose the 
action that they believe is most likely to fulfil their desire. Under EUDT, individuals ought 
to weigh probabilities and choose that option that they believe to be most likely to maximise 
their utility – synonymous with desire fulfilment. Expected Utility Decision Theory 
incorporates a specification for normatively rational belief formation based on the 
assignment of probabilities.  
Given this, the underlying normative rule of EUDT can be presented in a form similar to 
the belief-desire law: 
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Faced with a choice of actions, an individual should [will tend to53] choose the 
one that they estimate has the best chance of maximising their own utility. 
This holds wherever “utility” can be considered synonymous with “fulfilment of their most 
compelling desire”. There is no need of the ceteris paribus clause of the belief-desire law 
because the idea that utility should be maximised necessarily implies that no other beliefs 
or desires conflict with that goal. 
The principal difference between these two approaches to action choice is that EUDT seeks 
to give rational choice (and, by extension, FP) a mathematical foundation. It employs 
probability theory and a calculus for weighing expected outcomes.  
Empirical evidence from cognitive psychology raises doubts about the applicability of 
either model to the choices that people make in the actual (non-ideal) world and under the 
real (equally imperfect) conditions that such choices are made. Given these parallels, it is 
reasonable to assume that where EUDT fails to explain the real-world decision-making 
process, philosophical folk psychology will suffer similar weaknesses.  
The first of these to consider emerges from application of the model of rational probability 
calculation: Bayes’ theorem. 
2.3 Dynamic Probability and the Rational Bayesian 
Thomas Bayes was an 18th century English cleric, mathematician and gambler. His 
fascination with card games led him to develop a mathematical technique to calculate 
probabilities for the turn of the next card from a deck. What effect does the turn of one card 
have on the probability that the next card will be a particular value or suit – given that one 
knows the number of cards and the history of the cards produced so far?  Today, Bayes’ 
theorem is central to the calculation of this kind of dynamic probability – how odds change 
in the light of new information – in fields far removed from games of chance. For example, 
it is used to account for how scientists’ confidence in the truth of their theories is affected 
by each new piece of experimental or observational data (Losee 2001: 221). It is also used 
by proponents of Expected Utility Decision Theory to determine how initial estimations of 
the probability that a given course will maximize utility ought to be revised in the light of 
                                                
53 The belief-desire law is presented as if it is descriptive as well as normative, suitably hedged by the claim that it is a 
tendency.  
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new information – e.g. about the environment, the choice itself, the needs of the agent or 
even the interim results of the action that has been chosen (Hardman 2009: 26; 
Speekenbrink and Shanks 2013). 
The starting point of any Bayesian calculation is the prior probability, often known as the 
base rate. The theorem allows us to calculate that the probability of any future occurrence 
in the light of a new occurrence is equal to the probability of the new occurrence (B) given 
the expected occurrence (A), multiplied by the prior probability (base rate) of the expected 
occurrence divided by the prior probability of the new occurrence. This can be represented 
as: 
 
Behind this very brief introduction to Bayes’ theorem lies a great deal of complexity and 
some of the essentials of the way that mathematicians deal with probability. It will suffice 
for my present purposes, however, if we take note of two features of Bayesian probability: 
a) The accurate (or at least closely approximate) calculation of base rates is essential 
to the application of this theory to the calculation of dynamic probabilities. 
b) EUTD and Folk Psychology both assume that people use a version of the Bayesian 
calculus to estimate the likelihood that their actions will bring about a given result.  
2.4 Bayesian Missteps, Framing and Biases 
These assumptions would mean that if people turn out to be poor at applying Bayes’ 
theorem or at estimating base rates, the prospects for the usefulness of EUTD (and, 
analogously, the belief-desire law) are not good. Investigations in cognitive psychology 
strongly suggest that we are all pretty poor Bayesians. 
For example, take the well-documented effect known as the base-rate fallacy (Birnbaum 
2004; Tversky and Kahneman 1974). In their famous exposition, Tversky and Kahneman 
offered their respondents the following scenario: 
Jack is a 45-year old man. He is married and has four children. He is generally 
conservative, careful and ambitious. He shows no interest in political and social 
P(B/A) x P(A) 
P(B) 
P(A/B) = 
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issues and spends most of his free time on his many hobbies, which include 
home carpentry, sailing and numerical puzzles. 
(Tversky and Kahneman 1974) 
The subjects were asked to assess the probabilities that “Jack”, as described in the scenario, 
was an engineer (on the one hand) or a lawyer (on the other). To “guide” their estimates, 
each of the respondents was told that the description of Jack was taken at random from 100 
such personality sketches. Depending on which experimental condition they were in, 
participants were given the following additional information: 
i) Half of the respondents were told that the hundred sketches were taken from 
a sample which included 70 lawyers and 30 engineers.  
ii) The other half were told that the proportions were reversed – 70 engineers 
and 30 lawyers.  
According to the base rate, that is the starting probability before additional information – 
in this case the content of the personality sketch – was considered, the chances that a sketch 
drawn at random from the sample would be that of an engineer would be 0.3 in condition 
(i) and 0.7 in condition (ii). If the base rate was taken into account at all we would expect 
to see a significant difference between the two groups. No such variance was recorded. 
Respondents under condition (i) and condition (ii) estimated the probability that Jack was 
an engineer at 0.9. The base rate was apparently disregarded in favour of a judgement based 
on the only other information about “Jack” that the subjects had to work with: the 
personality sketch. 
Birnbaum (2004) notes that similar effects in which base rates are neglected in favour of 
other, more compelling information have been shown consistently since Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974) first described it as the base rate fallacy. However, Birnbaum challenges 
its characterisation as a fallacy: base rate neglect might be more accurate, since, he claims, 
all of the investigations that have shown similar results have involved “very restricted” 
experimental conditions, rendering the conclusion “quite fragile” (Birnbaum 2004: 55). The 
lack of evidence of a robust effect of base rates is not sufficient evidence to show that base 
rates have no effect, he argues. 
Nonetheless, Birnbaum is quite convinced that people fall some way short of being ideal 
Bayesian probability estimators, as illustrated by an example that he offers: 
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Suppose there is a disease that infects one person in 1000, completely at 
random. Suppose there is a blood test for this disease that yields a “positive” 
test result in 99.5% of cases of the disease and is a false “positive” in only 0.5% 
of those without the disease. If a person tests “positive”, what is the probability 
that he or she has the disease? The solution, according to Bayes’ theorem, may 
seem surprising. 
(Birnbaum 2004: 44 – emphasis added) 
Surprising, in Birnbaum’s word, because despite the 99.5% accuracy of the test, the 
Bayesian probability that the subject of the positive test actually has the disease is just 
0.166’. Although this is still more than 166 times greater than the probability that the subject 
is sick prior to the incorporation of the test information (1/1000 or 0.001) Birnbaum’s 
contention (which seems plausible) is that this will strike most people as very low given 
that they have registered “positive” on a test that has only a 0.05 probability (0.5 %) of 
being wrong. 
That the result of applying Bayesian probability to these numbers is surprising also suggests 
that we disregard base rates when making probability judgements. Although sceptical of the 
contention that the evidence shows us to have no conception of base rates, Birnbaum 
proposes a more modest claim. For him, the results suggest that although sensitive to 
probabilities, we make decisions in a way that is not constrained by Bayes’ theorem – 
despite the fact that this model is central to the Expected Utility Decision Theory. Often, 
other influences override base rates and the Bayesian calculus and lead us “wilfully” to 
neglect both. 
Base rate neglect is not the only way in which people tend to diverge from the Bayesian 
ideal when judging probability on the basis of new information. Take, for example, the 
Monty Hall Dilemma54 (De Neys and Verschueren 2006). The basic description of this 
puzzle, upon which there have been countless variations (Burns and Wieth 2004; Camerer 
1995), begins by inviting the participant to imagine that they are taking part in the final 
phase of a television game show. The “host” shows them three closed doors, labelled 1, 2 
and 3. They are told that behind one of the doors is a considerable sum of money – let’s say 
                                                
54 Monty Hall was a US television game-show host of the 1970s. It has not been established that this demonstration figured 
in any show that he presented; it is perhaps just the “sort of thing” that he might have featured. 
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$64,000. Behind each of the other doors is either nothing at all, or, in some versions, a 
booby prize – such as a live goat! 
Fig. 2.1 The Monty Hall Problem 
The subject or “contestant” is invited to choose one of the doors and told that they will win 
whatever prize is revealed when the door of their choice is opened – a hungry ruminant or 
a pile of cash. The contestant/subject duly makes their choice and announces which it is to 
be – 1, 2, or 3. When this scenario has been run as a psychological experiment there is, as 
would be expected, a random distribution of choices between the three (Burns and Wieth 
2004).   
In keeping with the ritual cruelty of the game show genre, however, the host/experimenter 
then introduces another factor. One of the two doors that the participant did not choose is 
opened and reveals – a goat! 
The contestant/subject is then given a choice: stick with their original choice or switch to 
the other door – which they now know conceals either a second goat or $64,000. 
If you are the contestant, do you stick or switch? 
In experimental settings most – in some instances as many as 85% (Burns and Wieth 2004) 
– stick with their original choice. Many report that this feels intuitively to be the right choice. 
By the rules of probability, however, it is the wrong choice. To maximise their chances of 
walking away with the money, rather than the goat, the contestant should always switch. 
To understand why, imagine that the host opens door 3, revealing a goat. When offered the 
“stick or switch” choice, there are three possibilities: 
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i) The contestant’s first choice, door 1, hides the other goat. The host has opened 
the only remaining non-winning door so switching to door 2 is certain to result 
in success.  
ii) The contestant’s first choice was door 2 but this was in fact the other booby-
prize door. We now know that there is a goat behind door 3 so switching to door 
1 is guaranteed to be successful. 
iii) The contestant chose the winning door (whether 1 or 2) the first time and so will 
win if they stick to their original choice.  
In two out of three of these scenarios, switching is successful. In only one out of the three 
does the subject win the money. Switching has a probability of success of 0.666’, whereas 
their chances if they stick are just 0.333’. Yet when asked what effect the host’s opening of 
the other door had had on the probability that their original choice was the right one, most 
respondents, according to Burns and Wieth (2004), claimed that it had increased from 
0.333’ (one in three) to 0.5 (one in two). In fact, the probability of their original choice 
being the right one is still one in three: the likelihood that the other remaining closed door 
is the best choice is now twice as good, given that we now know that door 3 is a losing 
choice. 
Even when this reasoning is explained, many subjects insist that switching feels 
counterintuitive (Eysenck and Keane 2010: 461). This “feeling” is sufficiently strong to 
override good probability reasoning. Of course, a contestant who sticks will still win the 
money one time in three. All that is certain is that when equipped with a knowledge of the 
way that probabilistic reasoning works, switching is the rational choice. That it is the 
minority choice indicates that most of us are poor estimators of probability.  
For an illustration of another way that judgements diverge from the rational norm, imagine 
a patient facing a diagnosis of lung cancer. An oncologist suggests that there are two 
treatment options: radiation therapy and surgery. He presents the options and the statistics 
on their outcomes as follows: 
Surgery: Of 100 people having surgery, 90 live through the post-operative 
period, 68 are alive at the end of the first year and 34 are alive at the end of five 
years. 
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Radiation Therapy: Of 100 people having radiation therapy, all live through the 
treatment, 77 are alive at the end of one year and 22 are alive at the end of five 
years. 
For both options, the figures are presented, or framed, in terms of survival.  
Would it make any difference to the patient’s decision if the same statistics were instead 
framed in terms of mortality? 
Surgery: Of 100 people having surgery 10 die during surgery or the post-
operative period, 32 die by the end of the first year and 66 die by the end of five 
years.  
Radiation Therapy: Of 100 people having radiation therapy, none die during 
treatment, 23 die by the end of one year and 78 die by the end of five years. 
It is important to note that the numbers under each frame, the proportion of a sample of 
patients who live or die within a particular time period, are exactly the same. The only 
difference is whether attention is drawn to the number of deaths or to the number of people 
who survive. McNeil et al. (1982) carried out a study based on this scenario in which groups 
of medical students, business students and hospital patients were asked to imagine 
themselves faced with such a choice. Half of the subjects within each group were presented 
with the information under the survival frame and half under the mortality frame.  Overall, 
across the three groups, 18% of respondents favoured radiation therapy when they were 
given the survival frame, whereas 44% of those exposed to the same figures under the 
mortality frame said that they would choose the radiation therapy option. These figures 
seemed stable across all three groups of respondents – medical students, patients and 
business school students all found radiation therapy more than twice as compelling if they 
were informed of the figures via the mortality frame. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1985, 1986) pointed out that these results represent a violation of 
the invariance principle of EUDT, stated on p74, above as: 
The mode, order or style in which options are presented should have no bearing 
on the choice made since the mathematical calculation of expected utility is 
unaffected by such concerns. 
(Plous 1993: 82) 
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Contrary to that normative constraint, these findings suggest that the framing of the figures 
has a marked effect on the choice that people would make. Whatever strategy these subjects 
were using to make their choice it was not on the basis of expected utility since the outcomes 
and the probabilities of each outcome are the same regardless of the way the figures are 
presented. The true EUDT decider would make the same choice, regardless of frame. 
Framing effects have been recorded according to various ways that information is presented, 
including the order in which it is presented (Gilovich et al. 2006: 397)55.  
Framing effects have direct bearing on the idea that our choices are determined by whatever 
we believe will bring about the fulfilment of our desires. Assuming that the respondents to 
McNeil et al in both conditions (survival or mortality frame) shared the same desire to 
survive for as long as possible following their imaginary cancer treatment, then what they 
believe about the way to achieve that goal is the same under each presentation of the figures. 
Again, some other consideration takes precedence over the belief-desire law in choosing a 
course of action.  
Cognitive psychology has also uncovered a number of other systematic (reproducible and 
predictable) biases in the ways that people decide which action to take. One classic 
demonstration of a bias is the Wason Selection Task as reported in Wason and Johnson-
Laird (1970).   
Subjects are presented with four cards lying on a table. On the visible side of each card is 
printed a single letter or number:  
 
Fig. 2.2: The Wason Card Test 
                                                
55 For further examples of framing effects in different domains, see E.J. Johnson et. al. (1993), E.J. Johnson & Goldstein 
(2003) and the essays in the collection edited by Lichtenstein & Slovic (2006). 
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The participant is told that it is certainly true that every card has a number on one side and 
a letter on the other. They are also given a further rule about the cards which, they are told, 
might be true or false: 
Any card which has the letter A on one side has the number 3 on its reverse. 
The participant’s task is to determine whether or not this statement is true by turning over 
the minimum number of cards. Which cards should they turn over first? 
In the original demonstration (Wason and Johnson-Laird 1970) and in numerous subsequent 
replications (Evans 2004; Eysenck and Keane 2010: 542-43) the majority of subjects choose 
to turn over either the A card alone or the A and the 3 cards. This is not, however, sufficient 
to determine the truth of the statement. If the A card is turned over and does have a 3 on its 
reverse, this proves only that the statement is true for one instance. We cannot extrapolate 
from this that it is universally true. Of course, turning over the A card alone and finding a 
number 5 on the reverse would be sufficient to falsify the statement. Suppose that we do 
find a number 3 on the other side of the A card: subsequently turning over the remaining 
original 3 cannot decide the truth or falsity of the statement either. If an A is printed on the 
back, we are no better off than when we found a 3 on the reverse of the A card – we now 
have two instances of the rule but still nothing that allows us to deduce whether it is 
generally true. If the reverse of the 3 card is the letter B, this does not disprove the statement 
either: the contention was that any A has a 3 on its reverse – no general claim was made 
about all cards marked 3. 
The best course of action is to turn over the A first and then, if this does not falsify the 
statement (by having any number other than a 3 on its other side), to turn over the 7 card, 
which offers another opportunity to falsify the proposition by having an A on its reverse.  
In their original interpretation of this result, Wason and Johnson-Laird (1970) theorised that 
people have a tendency to assign greater weight to evidence that would support or confirm 
the hypothesis that they are trying to examine rather than that which would falsify it – they 
exhibit confirmation bias. Hardman (2009: 94, 98) reviews research that suggests an 
alternative interpretation: subjects show a marked preference for matching their selections 
to the options that are mentioned in the original question (Evans and Lynch 1973; Evans 
2004).   
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For the purposes of the present thesis, the precise underlying mechanism that produces this 
effect is irrelevant. That such effects seem robust and reproducible, suggests unequivocally 
that people’s reasoning tends to diverge systematically from the optimal deductive strategy. 
2.5 Fast and Frugal Heuristics: “Homo Heuristicus”? 
Growing evidence, both from the features of persistent systematic biases and cognitive 
illusions (Kahneman 2011; Tversky and Kahneman 1974) and from experimental 
investigations of performance on judgement and decision-making tasks (Gigerenzer 2008; 
Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011) suggests that much real-world rationality depends on the 
employment of heuristics. The word “heuristic” derives from the Greek for “serving to 
discover” (Gigerenzer and Brighton 2011: 3).  
Work on the use of heuristics in decision making began with the heuristics and biases 
research pioneered by (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). Work focussed on the positive 
benefits of heuristic reasoning has been pursued principally by the Fast and Frugal 
Heuristics movement, led by the Centre for Adaptive Behaviour and Cognition or ABC 
group (Gigerenzer and Todd 1999b; Gigerenzer et al. 2011). For the debate between these 
two approaches see Gigerenzer (1991, 1996) and Kahneman and Tversky (1996). 
Heuristic “rules of thumb” do not entail a particular outcome, in contrast to normative 
models of inference. Instead, they deliver judgements that are:  
i) advantageous such that the mechanisms delivering them would be potentially 
selectable by evolution through natural selection (Gigerenzer and Todd 1999a: 
32-33) and  
ii) “good enough” (Gigerenzer 2008: 81) to allow the individual to negotiate their 
world successfully. 
“Good enough” implies that these judgements might not be optimal – i.e., the best possible 
– but that they are successful outcomes by the ecological standard of allowing the organism 
to survive and thrive. 
Arguing for scientific realism, Putnam (1982) suggested that unless scientific theories are 
true, then their explanatory and predictive success would be some kind of miracle. Faced 
with evidence of systematic deviations from normatively correct decision-making, it is 
tempting to make use of a similar no miracles argument: how can our species have been 
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so successful, have achieved so much, unless we are, mostly, rational? This assumes, 
however, that the normative requirements define what “rational” means. According to 
cognitive psychologists researching the heuristic basis of judgement and decision-making 
(Gigerenzer and Brighton 2011) there is a better way to describe rationality of the kind that 
has bestowed our advantages.  
To be fully realised, a decision made under Expected Utility Decision Theory needs to 
maximise utility. Ideally, this would entail taking into account all of the possible outcomes 
of a choice, accurately assigning a utility value to each of these and accurately calculating 
the probability that a given action choice will result in a specific outcome. The problem 
with this is that humans have limited time, computational resources and information on 
which to base a decision. This implies that every decision entails an additional decision – 
when to stop the process:56 that is, the decision of when further investment of time and 
effort in acquiring and processing additional information will not produce a sufficiently 
better decision to make that investment worthwhile.  The stop-decision must, if the 
optimisation requirement is to be respected, itself be optimal. This leads to a potential 
regress – we need to make an optimal stop decision in order to justify the decision to stop 
the investment in the principal decision, which would, in turn need to be optimised – and 
so on ad infinitum. This regress is one of the limitations of so-called optimization under 
constraints models (Gigerenzer and Todd 1999a: 10).   
Simon (1955) described the kinds of processes through which we make decisions under 
impoverished conditions of information, time and capacity as bounded rationality. He 
theorised that individuals operating under these constraints consider their options more or 
less sequentially and then stop looking when they find one that minimally meets their 
immediate need57. Simon described this kind of stop-decision based on need-fulfilment 
(rather than optimisation) satisficing. According to Gigerenzer and Todd (1999a: 12) there 
has been a tendency to regard bounded rationality as synonymous with optimisation under 
constraints – for example, the economist Sargent (1993). This is incorrect. As Simon (1991: 
35) writes: 
Rationality need not be optimization, and bounds need not be constraints. 
                                                
56 Cf. the frame problem in artificial intelligence (McCarthy and Hayes, 1981).  
57 Note that this contrasts with the “optimal” or “maximal” target of normative models. 
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To illustrate the contrast between normative and ecological rationality, consider this picture 
of a decision-making process, adapted from Gigerenzer (2008: 21-22). An outfielder in a 
ball game – such as baseball or cricket – attempts to catch a high ball. The traditional view 
of the computational processes involved might be rendered: 
He behaves as if he had solved a set of differential equations in predicting 
trajectory of the ball. He may neither and know nor care what a differential 
equation is, but this does not affect his skill with the ball. At some subconscious 
level, something functionally equivalent to the mathematical calculations is 
going on. Similarly, when a man makes a difficult decision, after weighing up 
all the pros and cons, and all the consequences of the decision that he can 
imagine, he is doing the functional equivalent of a large ‘weighted sum’ 
calculation, such as a computer might perform. 
(Dawkins 1989: 96) 
An optimised under constraints account involves the same series of computations, with an 
added stopping-rule: i.e., stop search as soon as the costs of further search outweigh the 
benefits (Gigerenzer and Todd 1999a: 10). Once all this computation has been performed, 
assuming that, by some unspecified method, the infinite regress can be circumvented, the 
fielder will know where the ball will come to ground and can run to that location, make the 
catch and enjoy the accolade of the crowd. Alternatively: 
Fix your gaze on the ball, start running, and adjust your running speed so that 
the angle of gaze remains constant.  
(Gigerenzer and Brighton 2011: 3) 
This is the gaze heuristic; it is one of a number of simple rules of thumb that experiments 
have found are used by skilled fielders in the process of catching a ball (McLeod and Dienes 
1996). Like many heuristics, these are employed unconsciously and automatically, although 
there is no principled reason why a heuristic, once stated, cannot be employed consciously. 
A definition of a heuristic might be: 
A strategy, conscious or unconscious, that searches for minimal information and 
consists of building blocks that exploit evolved capacities and environmental 
structures. 
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 (Gigerenzer 2008: 22) 
An alternative description of the heuristic decision-making process is offered by Plous 
(1993: 107): 
When people are faced with a complicated judgement or decision, they often 
simplify the task by relying on heuristics, or general rules of thumb. In many 
cases, the shortcuts yield very close approximations to the optimal answers 
suggested by normative theories. In certain situations, though, heuristics lead to 
predictable biases and inconsistencies.  
Although these “biases and inconsistencies” initially drew researchers’ attention to the use 
of heuristics (Tversky and Kahneman 1973, 1974), other researchers have focussed on the 
ecological value of fast and frugal (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011) judgements derived 
from the use of heuristics play in decision making. Fast, because they allow decisions to be 
made under time constraints and frugal because they use just enough information and 
computational resources to deliver a good-enough choice (Gigerenzer and Todd 1999a; 
Gigerenzer and Goldstein 2011).  
When Gigerenzer writes in the quotation above that heuristics exploit “evolved capacities 
and environmental strategies” he refers to the presumption that heuristics are not generally 
thought to require dedicated processing resources – there is no “heuristic module”. Models 
of heuristics assume that they exploit other, more basic features of cognition, such as 
recognition (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011). Features of cognition that have evolved 
under a variety of demands are available for heuristic decision making. 
Individual heuristics, once acquired, are selected for use on the basis of cues drawn from 
the task to be performed. Four possible strategies for the matching of a given heuristic to a 
specific task have been suggested (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011). Some heuristics may 
be hardwired by evolution, such as the “extension of objects in three dimensional space”. 
Others may be individually learned by a process of trial and error. The third strategy might 
involve social learning, either being taught rules by parents and peers or, less formally, 
noticing how others approach problems and applying their heuristics whenever a 
remembered cue suggests it might be appropriate. Finally: 
…the content of individual memory determines in the first place which 
heuristics can be used, and some heuristics’ very applicability appears to be 
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correlated with their “ecological rationality”. For instance, the fluency heuristic 
is most likely to be applicable in situations where it is also likely to succeed.  
(Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011: 456) 
This fluency heuristic is a typical example of a simple rule for inferring which of two 
alternatives is the better choice even when both are recognised.58The rule can be stated as: 
If both alternatives are recognized but one is recognized faster, then infer that 
this alternative has the higher value with respect to the criterion.  
(Ibid.: 462) 
An example would be if you are asked which of a pair of vaguely familiar cities has the 
largest population. Use of the fluency heuristic suggests that whichever name triggers the 
more fluent recognition is likely to be the better known – and so, according to ecological 
rationality, to have the larger population The fluency heuristic is related to the recognition 
heuristic (Pachur and Hertwig 2011), which would be appropriate in this example if only 
one of the alternatives was recognised. Experiments have suggested that heuristically 
derived estimates of two cities’ relative populations is more likely to produce a correct result 
than local knowledge: German students, for example, do better at estimating the relative 
size of American cities – presumably on the basis of which of the two is known to them – 
than do American students who presumably know both (Gigerenzer 2008: 25; Goldstein 
and Gigerenzer 1999). 
Schooler and Hertwig (2011) suggest that the process of forgetting plays an essential role 
in clearing away superfluous information and “aids discrimination between the objects’ 
recognition speeds. In contrast, models of judgement based on optimisation, under which 
as much information as possible is required for the best judgements, do not leave room for 
the process of forgetting, despite the fact that many contemporary cognitive psychologists 
suggest that forgetting (or retrieval inhibition) is an essential part of the management of 
memory (Bjork 1989; Schilling et al. 2014). 
There are four stages to the heuristics research programme: 
                                                
58 And thus the recognition heuristic – “prefer the one you know” – is unavailable. 
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a) designing computational models of candidate simple heuristics, b) analysing 
the environmental structures in which they perform well, c) testing their 
performance in real-world environments and d) determining whether and when 
people really use these heuristics. The results of the investigatory stages (b), (c) 
and (d) can be used to inform the initial theorizing of stage (a). 
(Gigerenzer and Todd 1999a: 16) 
Individual heuristics are differentiated by three factors established through that process: 
A model of a heuristic specifies (i) a process rule, (ii) the capacities that the rule 
exploits to be simple and (iii) the kinds of problems the heuristic can solve, that 
is the structures of environment in which it is successful.  
(Gigerenzer 2008: 24) 
Theorists in the Fast and Frugal Heuristics programme categorise heuristics according to 
the set of cues over which they operate, their application and the computational 
characteristics that they exploit (Gigerenzer and Todd 1999a) rather than by the systematic 
biases and errors (Tversky and Kahneman 1974) or deviation from “rational norms” that 
they produce – although these, being systematic, can be useful clues as to the structure of 
the underlying computational processes (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011). Three heuristics 
were identified in Tversky and Kahneman’s 1974 paper: representativeness, in which the 
cue to the choice of category under which to place an individual or item is how closely it 
matches a stereotype or prototype of that category (the case of judging whether “Jack” is an 
engineer or lawyer, above, would be such an example), availability, under which a choice 
is ranked more likely according to how easily it is retrieved from memory, and adjustment 
from an anchor, under which the starting point of a decision or calculation is the cue from 
which a guess about magnitude of the final value can be constructed – which is why people 
given limited time (typically five seconds) will usually estimate the sum of 
11+27+48+56+90 to be markedly lower than they would if asked to estimate 
90+56+48+27+11 (Mussweiler et al. 2004; Tversky and Kahneman 1974). 
One of the key tasks that remains for the heuristic research programme is to identify which 
and how many individual heuristics make up the adaptive toolbox (Gigerenzer and Todd 
1999a). This will entail analysing the real-world judgements that people make rather than 
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trying to fit them to a normative model or going in search of supplementary theories when 
they cannot be accommodated.  
Keren and Teigen (2004) point out that researchers in heuristics do not offer “…a 
comprehensive theory that can encompass all of the heuristics under one framework…” and 
doubt that such an overarching theory is even feasible, given that the heuristics which have 
been suggested appear to make use of very different input data (including perceptions) and 
cognitive (computational) capacities. However, among the leading lights of research into 
heuristic decision making, neither Kahneman (2011) nor Gigerenzer (2008) claim that 
identifying those occasions on which heuristics are used to make judgements or to facilitate 
decision making will provide a single, unitary description of the mechanisms involved. 
There is unlikely to be a “heuristic system” any more than there is a discrete “non-heuristic” 
reasoning pathway. Both agree that heuristics play a significant role in our judgement 
processes – much more marked than had previously been suspected – and that 
understanding how they work and how they generate inferences is essential to 
understanding human reasoning.  
Heuristics can be applied with or without conscious awareness. For example, recognition 
heuristics can lead us to make probability judgements without our being aware of how we 
have come to the determination that an event is more (or less) likely (Pachur and Hertwig 
2011). On the other hand, air pilots are taught a heuristic for avoiding mid-air collisions – 
“if the relative bearing of another aircraft in your sight remains constant, then a danger of 
collision exists”. Likewise, soldiers working as battlefield medics are given the heuristic 
“attend to silent casualties first” which, although it goes against our instinctive reaction to 
give immediate attention to someone screaming in pain, respects the medical fact that 
somebody who can cry out is exhibiting cardio-pulmonary function.59 Through learning, 
practice and repetition, even consciously learned heuristics can become incorporated into 
an individual’s automatic decision-making routines: they are implemented without being 
consciously selected and without awareness of the procedure(s) (search rule, stop rule, 
decision rule) that they involve (Rieskamp and Otto 2011; Schooler and Hertwig 2011; 
Sykes 2006: 206-12)60 (see next section). 
                                                
59 Both of these are drawn from my personal experience. 
60 This transition from conscious to unconscious competence (expert performance) is significant in work on the ACT-R 
cognitive architecture (see Anderson 1995), a detailed exposition of which is outside the the scope of the present thesis.   
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Gigerenzer and Brighton (2011) suggest that rather than imagining our species as homo 
economicus, the personification of the EUDT model of judgement and decision-making, it 
would be more helpful to see ourselves as homo heuristicus: 
Viewing humans as homo heuristicus challenges widely held beliefs about the 
nature of cognitive processing and explains why less processing can result in 
better inferences. 
(Ibid. 26) 
I contend that the bounded, ecologically rational and open-ended “tool-kit” approach of the 
heuristics programme promises to more closely map onto the way that real people, in the 
real world, make real decisions than do the assumptions of philosophical folk psychology 
or its sibling, Expected Utility Decision Theory. This contention features throughout this 
thesis. Further investigations into the roles of heuristics will feature in Chapter 3 – where 
the focus is on social judgements – and in Chapter 4 – where I consider how heuristics 
contribute to judgements about the acceptability of narrative accounts.  
Investigations into heuristics stand alongside another strand of research into judgement and 
decision making concerned with the range of choices that we make without being aware of 
the process or even, in many instances, that a choice has been made at all. 
2.6 Automaticity and the New Unconscious 
In an influential paper, Kihlstrom (1988) draws together research to that date that indicated 
“the impact of nonconscious mental structures on an individual’s conscious experience, 
thought, and action”. Contemporary research into the cognitive unconscious and automatic 
cognitive processes gained impetus from this paper although, as Kihlstrom points out, the 
observation that a great many of our judgements and decisions take place without conscious 
awareness or control has a long history throughout the philosophy of mind (see also 
Dehaene 2014: 49-52). Kihlstrom suggests that although “scientific psychology began as 
the study of consciousness, … Quite quickly… observations in both the laboratory and the 
clinic suggested that mental life is not limited to conscious experience”. 
However, thanks in part to the rise of behaviourism (Watson 1913) and more latterly 
because of the association of the unconscious with speculative processes suggested by 
Freud (Freud 1999, 2003), serious psychological research into non-conscious processes was 
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neglected through the middle years of the 20th century. However, as Kihlstrom (2013: 176) 
points out, “The new view of the unconscious … owes little to Freud”. 
Research into this new unconscious (Hassin et al. 2005) is often described under the 
heading automaticity (Uleman et al. 2007). As Moors (2013: 164) makes clear, we can 
identify a mental operation as automatic according either to the mechanisms that underlie it 
– arrived at by functional analysis – or by reference to the features of how it occurs. In this 
section I am particularly interested in feature-based descriptions of operations concerned 
with judgement and decision-making. 
Automatic operations can be distinguished by four features. Here I have paraphrased those 
features in terms outlined by Bargh (1984) – the words in brackets are those that Bargh uses 
to identify the features61:  
Unconsciousness (awareness): The person making the automatic judgement is 
unaware of the process involved, the cues that elicit it (stimulus) or the 
“determining influences”. 
Involuntariness (intentionality): The judgement is initiated, progressed and 
completed regardless of the conscious intentions of the person making the 
judgement. 
Effortlessness (efficiency): the decision process does not compete for cognitive 
resources with other processes. Even if the individual making the judgement is 
simultaneously carrying out another cognitive task, performance is 
unaffected.62   
Autonomy (controllability): the goals or motivations of the individual will not 
affect the speed or completion of the process. 
(after Bargh 1994) 
                                                
61 Bargh’s original four, “awareness, intentionality, efficiency and control” are inconsistent in that one (efficiency) is a feature 
that he suggests automatic processes possess while the other three are features that they lack. He also uses “Intentionality” 
differently from its philosophical meaning (“aboutness”). For clarity I have used different names, all of which are positive 
features of automatic judgements.  
62 Confirmed by comparative response-time measurements. 
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Using this model to delineate automatic operations, scientists have begun to explore the 
circumstances under which they occur, the behaviours that result – including how these 
compare with consciously controlled behaviours – and the variety of stimuli that elicit 
automatic operations (Uleman et al. 2007). In the process, researchers have uncovered more 
and more aspects of our mental lives that have this character. 
The recent social-cognitive work on the automaticity of higher mental 
processes, such as those underlying social interaction, affect and evaluation, 
motivation and goal-setting, and social judgment, … has found much of an 
individual's complex psychological and behavioural functioning to occur 
without conscious choice or guidance—that is, automatically  
(Bargh and Ferguson 2000) 
Theorists have supported this contention that complex cognitive operations occur without 
conscious awareness or control through experimental approaches. Not only judgement and 
decision-making: we might not always be aware of how we are influenced by visual stimuli, 
which according to Spencer (2007), is a direct challenge to the “platitudes of Folk 
Psychology”: after all, can a visual stimulus that affects behaviour but is unavailable to 
conscious awareness, control or verbal report be characterised as a “belief”? Other 
investigations have shown that decisions can be made even when conscious faculties are 
fully occupied with other tasks (Bargh and Chartrand 1999; Bargh and Ferguson 2000; 
Dijksterhuis 2004).  
Not only are we unaware of the processes that underlie a good many of our judgements and 
decisions (and are unable to stop them, redirect them or otherwise consciously direct their 
behavioural outcomes) but we are also unaware of the influences that trigger them and 
determine their outcomes (Bargh and Chartrand 1999; Shepherd 2015). Priming effects, 
encountered earlier in the present chapter, would be an example of this kind of influence, 
as when Bargh et al. (1996) famously showed that being unwittingly primed with words 
relating to old age tended to reduce the walking speed of students.  
The evidence suggests that what we believe about a situation or even what outcome we 
would claim to desire might not be in the central factors steering our decision-engines that 
the belief-desire law appears to enshrine. Indeed, those decision engines that make up our 
rationality, in a non-normative sense, perform a variety of tasks without any need for our 
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conscious attention to what we believe or desire, or any ability to articulate such 
preferences. Being unable to articulate our decision-making processes does not preclude 
part of the information over which these tasks operate being beliefs or desires, unless we 
insist that “belief” and “desire” pick out the general causal roles enshrined in the belief-
desire law. In order to fit automatic judgements into a belief-desire law format, we would 
be forced to redefine “belief” and “desire” so broadly that they become meaningless. They 
would need to encompass any information that directs a decision, including primes, 
unconscious biases and preferences, unconscious visual stimuli, implicit stereotype 
activations, for example as well as unattended information about bodily and environmental 
states (at a minimum). All of these have been shown to influence our automatic judgements 
and decisions (Higgins 2005; Kahneman 2011; Uleman et al. 2007; Wegner 2005).  
Automaticity is thought to be an essential component in the development of skill through 
practice (Eysenck and Keane 2010: 193-99). A skilled athlete may make thousands of 
decisions in the course of a game yet all of them might exhibit the four characteristics of 
automatic processes (McLeod and Dienes 1996). An experienced physician might intuit that 
something is not right with their patient, long before scientific investigation can uncover a 
more accurate diagnosis (Chapman 2004). It is fair to suggest that an important difference 
between an expert and a novice lies in the depth and complexity of cognitive operations that 
can be completed without conscious control (K. E. Johnson 2013). Part of the process of 
achieving expertise in a particular domain can be the acquisition and habituation of a 
particularly apt heuristic to the level where it no longer requires conscious attention either 
to initiate or operate (Garcia-Retamero and Dhami 2011; Gigerenzer 2008: 42; Rieskamp 
and Hoffrage 1999).63 One reason for the biases and divergences from normative rationality 
that drew Tversky and Kahneman (1974) into the investigation of heuristics in the first place 
is thought to be that we are unaware either that a heuristic is being used or that the outcome 
of a choice is heuristically derived (Uleman et al. 2007). 
It has been argued that persistent divergences from Bayesian rationality such as the Monty 
Hall problem (above) might be due to the engagement of automatic reasoning in response 
to limitations of working memory capacity. Conscious attention and control requires that 
                                                
63 It has also been noted that lay people using a suitable heuristic can outperform “experts” employing more normatively 
rational models of decision-making – for example; Bernhard Borges et al., 'Can Ignorance Beat the Stock Market?', in Gerd 
Gigerenzer and Peter M. Todd (eds.), Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 59-
72. 
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the factors influencing a judgement be held in working memory (De Neys and Verschueren 
2006). 
Beyond the feature-based delineation of automatic processes, there seems to be no clear-cut 
distinction between the kinds of judgements or decisions that might be made automatically 
and those that must engage conscious control (Moors 2013: 173). Each decision is likely to 
involve some parts of the process that are conscious and controlled and others that are 
automatic. 
Mental processes at the level of complexity studied by social psychologists are 
not exclusively automatic or exclusively controlled, but are in fact combinations 
of the features of each. […] a process can have some qualities of an automatic 
process (e.g., efficient, autonomous), while simultaneously having qualities of 
a controlled process as well. 
(Bargh 1994: 3) 
Nevertheless, a great many of our day to day decisions and action choices are automatic, 
from the “decisions” that I am making about where to place my fingers while typing this to 
the number of times we chew our food before swallowing. Science would agree. Automatic 
judgements have been isolated and measured in how we draw causal inferences (Hassin et 
al. 2002) to the study of emotional responses (Feldman Barrett et al. 2007) or from how we 
conduct close relationships (Chen et al. 2007) to how we make decisions more generally 
(Bodenhausen and Todd 2010). It has even been suggested that the attribution of mental 
states to others – an essential part of belief-desire psychology and the central skill in so-
called Theory of Mind – is a largely automatic process (Butterfill and Apperley 2012). See 
section 3.6 in the next chapter for more on the heuristics and automaticity of social 
inferences.  
Just as researchers into automatic cognition are approaching the subject in a distinct way 
from Freud and his followers, admitting that much decision-making happens sub rosa is not 
a kind of behaviourism. Cognitive scientists and psychologists investigating automatic 
processes seek to uncover the processes involved by a process of functional analysis, as 
described in Chapter 1. It is insufficient merely to catalogue regular conjunctions of 
“stimulus and response” (Skinner 1974).  
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We have argued further, however, that it is an error to conclude that those 
processes that do require the intervention and guidance of conscious or 
executive control processes – such as those that involve the flexible and 
strategic operation of working memory – are any less determined, because such 
processes are also caused. Therefore, the task of future cognitive and social-
cognitive research should be, as Baddeley (1996)64 and others have recently 
argued, the discovery and delineation of the mechanisms by which such 
executive processes operate.  
 (Bargh and Ferguson 2000) 
Given that so much of what is generally regarded as “cognition” can be undertaken without 
attention, it would seem that, pace Freud, attention itself is the most enigmatic aspect of our 
mental life (Sykes 2006). The pressing question for some researchers in cognitive 
psychologists (as for philosophers) is what attention and conscious control are for, given 
that so much happens outside their purview? (Dehaene 2014: 89-114).  
However, even before we reach this fundamental question at the boundary between 
cognitive science and philosophy another issue has stimulated thoughts from both fields. 
How it is possible that a largely automatic creature could develop detailed non-automatic, 
albeit normative, decision-making models like EUDT or the belief-desire law? What is the 
relationship between the automatic, the heuristic, and the normative systems of decision 
making if they are all products of the human mind? 
2.7 Dual-Process Models 
One way to reconcile observations concerning heuristic judgements and automatic decision-
making on the one hand with normatively constrained reasoning on the other is to divide 
our decision-making processes into two categories – two sets of processes, perhaps even 
two separate (but complementary) cognitive systems. 
Kahneman (2011), for example, suggests that cognition consists of a fast, largely 
unconscious, economical (in terms of cognitive resources) but error prone “System 1” and 
a slow, deliberative, more accurate (by the standards of normative rationality) “System 2”. 
System 1 comprises the kinds of cognitive process that humans share with many other 
                                                
64 Baddeley, A. (1996). Exploring the Central Executive. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 49, 5-28.  
A Therapeutic Elimination… 
Mark Curtis, UEA June, 2016  100 
animals. System 2 is more characteristic of – perhaps essential to – human reasoning. 
System 2 is the kind of cognition that Aristotle referred to when describing humans as “the 
rational animal”. Classification of processes into System 1 and System 2 is also a feature of 
the dual-process model developed by (Evans 2008, 2009a) although, as he points out, there 
is some dispute at the margins as to which processes belong with which system. 
Whereas a system may be differentiated by certain features (speed and/or resource 
consumption, for example), processes are distinguished by the set of rules that determine 
their operation. EUDT is built from a set of process rules (Bayes theorem, the sum of 
probabilistic utilities and the procedure outlined above). It is possible to read the belief-
desire law as a process rule in itself: “do whatever you will believe will bring about your 
desire”65. Heuristics and automatic processes share the characteristic that they use non-
entailing rule sets to deliver their inferences, which is one reason that they are often grouped 
together under System 1, as well as the fact that they are both fast and less resource-hungry 
(which are characteristics of that system). 
Many inferences are thought to use processes drawn from both systems (Evans 2008; 
Kahneman 2011).   
The question is whether System 2 processes act as a normatively rational check on the more 
error-prone outputs of System 1. Is System 2 activated (by some mechanism yet to be 
uncovered) whenever there is enduring uncertainty about a System 1 judgement? Or would 
we be better to regard System 2 as an extra resource that can be brought to bear on the 
decisions that System 1 delivers when consciously directed so to do? V. A. Thompson et 
al. (2011) report the results of experiments that, they contend, support the hypothesis that a 
“metacognitive judgment about a first, initial model determines the extent of analytic 
engagement.” As Evans (2008) puts it: 
While some dual-process theories are concerned with parallel competing 
processes involving explicit and implicit knowledge systems, others are 
concerned with the influence of preconscious processes that contextualize and 
shape deliberative reasoning and decision-making.  
                                                
65 Underpinned by rules for identifying the relevant desire and for the formation of an appropriate belief. 
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Evans (2006) proposes that the two sets of process stand in an interventionist relation. Our 
first estimations of the problem and our mental models (Johnson-Laird 2006) of the 
prevailing situation are delivered without conscious awareness, and so are the product of 
System 1 processes and of heuristic rule sets. If time and cognitive resources are sufficient 
and the critical nature of the decision renders it necessary, the slower, more deliberate and 
normatively rational analytic rule set is brought into operation to check on the heuristically 
derived decision and to override it if necessary. Thus Evans describes his model as 
heuristic-analytic: any action-choice that is processed by the analytic system will be 
delivered by that system and not passed back to the heuristic system.  
Conversely, other theorists (Bargh and Chartrand 1999; Saunders and Over 2009) propose 
that the two sets of process work in parallel. Every result that is delivered by an automatic 
or heuristic process – including intermediate results – is both available to and determines 
the starting position of deliberative, conscious processes. The two systems monitor one 
another and exchange processed information. All inferences are collaborative between the 
two kinds of reasoning and can be delivered - and so manifested in behaviour – as a 
consequence of the completion of a process in either system. 
Serial and parallel families of dual-process model also agree that although decisions (and 
so actions) can be generated by System 1 alone, System 2 is always dependent on the output 
of System 1 to get going (Evans 2003, 2009b; Kahneman 2011; V. A. Thompson et al. 2011; 
Verschueren and Schaeken 2010). 
Not everyone agrees that we need to posit twin processes in order to explain the apparent 
dichotomy of automatic and controlled processes. For example, Neumann (1984) argues 
that the evidence that tasks that were once only capable of being performed under conscious 
attention can become automatic with practice – together with the observation that there 
seems to be no essential difference between automatic and controlled tasks – indicate that 
there is one system and that this system is capable of being brought under conscious 
attention when necessary. Central control is not a separate system, but a feature of human 
cognition. It is, for Neumann, not possible to allocate tasks to one or the other system 
because unified human cognition operates over every task – with varying degrees of 
attention (Sykes 2006: 191-95). For a more recent but related take on the evidence, see 
Kruglanski and Gigerenzer (2011). Gigerenzer and Todd (1999a: 20) question the “fiction” 
of dual process models on the basis that they rest on a false premise: 
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The unquestioned assumption behind these theories is that the more laborious, 
computationally expensive, and nonheuristic the strategy, the better the 
judgements to which it gives rise. This more-is-better ideology ignores the 
ecological rationality of cognitive strategies. 
However this debate cashes out, it is widely accepted that while some of our complex 
judgements and decisions take place under conscious and deliberative control, many take 
place unattended (Evans 2003; Nickerson 2008). Neither has the monopoly on rationality.  
Dual process models are sometimes offered as an explanation of why we can describe the 
normative rules and yet so frequently fail to live up to them. Speekenbrink and Shanks 
(2013: 682) observe “… people’s preferences are often unstable and subject to various 
influences from the method of elicitation, decision content and goals.” Or as Keren and 
Teigen (2004: 104) put it: 
Evidently, people are not always able to follow the prescriptions of normative 
theories (despite the fact that these were originally constructed by the human 
mind) as is assumed by standard economic theory. 
Which is why the notion of ecological rationality, introduced in the preceding section, is 
so powerful. Here we have a model of judgement and decision-making that can explain our 
species’ evolutionary success, our ability to shape the world to our needs and to adapt to 
almost any environmental challenge, our achievements in science, arts and philosophy all 
without the assumption that we are always, or even most of the time rational according to 
the requirements of our normative models of reasoning. Those models, which determine 
what an ideal decision maker might decide under ideal circumstances should be listed 
among our species’ greatest intellectual achievements. Nevertheless, we should not become 
misled by the assumption that the ideal is descriptive of the way that real people decide and 
make judgements in real-world situations. 
2.8 Chapter Summary 
This chapter began with an outline of the highly influential Expected Utility theory of 
human judgement and decision making (section 2.1). EUDT was originally put forward as 
a normative model, but has become – certainly for the purposes of economic modelling – 
regarded as sufficiently descriptive to be used as the basis of predictions of the choices that 
people will make, at the aggregate level of populations if not at the individual level. I argue 
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that this model is very closely allied with the belief-desire law picture of action and action 
choice (2.2) and that both are vulnerable to similar challenges. 
The first wave of challenges emerges from the intrinsic requirement of EUDT that people 
are adept at estimating probabilities (2.3-4). After introducing Bayes’ theorem as the 
accepted standard for the calculation of dynamic probability, I presented several 
investigations in contemporary cognitive psychology that indicate that people are generally 
poor at estimating probability. Since the EUDT demands that the maximisation of utility 
can only be achieved through the accurate assignment of probabilities (both that a given 
choice will lead to a given outcome and that a particular outcome will deliver a precise 
value of utility) the prospects for that theory as a description of judgement and decision-
making are affected by these empirical data.  
These results have also motivated cognitive psychologists to develop and investigate new 
models of judgement and decision-making. The first of these to be considered was the fast 
and frugal heuristics programme (2.5). People use heuristic strategies of decision making: 
i) Under conditions of uncertainty – where information is scarce. 
ii) When under time pressure. 
iii) Where cognitive resources are less than optimal – such as when individual 
making the choice is tired, distracted, overwhelmed by other inputs etcetera.  
In short, heuristic strategies are used in the majority of real–world judgement and decision 
tasks. Unlike normative models (such as EUTD) heuristics imply a set of non-entailing rules 
that produce good enough or ecologically rational inferences.  
Cognitive psychologists have uncovered a series of such heuristics. These provide 
individuals with an adaptive toolbox to suit many decision tasks and can also can be 
analysed into their process rules by the way they are used in many real-life situations. 
Further scientific work on decision strategies has drawn attention to the fact that a great 
many of our decisions take place outside conscious awareness (2.6). Investigations into 
automaticity have shown that the processes underpinning such choices have clear 
identifying characteristics and are immensely powerful. Some researchers maintain that 
most of our cognitive processes are automatic. 
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Neither EUTD nor philosophical folk psychology play essential roles in the formulation of 
some important psychological explanations of human judgement and decision making. 
There are as number of predictive-explanatory accounts in contemporary cognitive 
psychology which have enriched our understanding of how real people, in the real world 
make decisions that do not feature these terms at all. Even in the case of dual-process models 
(2.7), few if any researchers now believe that any of our decisions are entirely the product 
of the slow and deliberate “system 2” – which would be where decision processes that most 
closely resemble the normative models would take place. Our complexity and the range of 
influences that play upon our reasoning ensure that normative models – even if they 
prescribe the best kind of decision making (which is doubtful in the light of work on 
ecological rationality) – do not comprehensively describe how we decide. 
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3 Chapter Three: 
Interpersonal Understanding of Action; 
 “Attribution Theory” 
Abstract: The prevalence of mind-detection and the identification of agents 
sets the scene for a discussion of attribution theories in social psychology, 
which are the ways that the science accounts for our understanding of the 
causes of events and, especially, actions. Two families of causal attribution 
with regard to action are discussed: personal attributions, in which features 
of the agent are considered as causes and situational attributions in which 
agents are caused to act by the circumstances in which they do so. Examples 
of two classic investigations into the power of situations to direct behaviour 
are introduced along with two biases or errors of attribution: the 
fundamental attribution error (correspondence bias) and the actor-observer 
difference (illustrated with experimental investigations) which show how the 
attribution of causes to agents takes place in social psychology without 
reference to belief or desire.   
No man is an island, entire of it self. 
John Donne (1623), Meditation XVII.  
3.1 Interpersonal Understanding and the Appeal of “Agency” 
Interpersonal understanding is a theory-neutral term66 that describes an essential aspect 
of human existence. As social creatures, much of our lives are dependent on others in one 
way or another. Most people,67 most of the time find understanding other people, including 
being able to predict what they will do under particular circumstances, relatively effortless 
and straightforward. Interpersonal understanding is an essential component in learning and 
teaching, the transmission of information, perhaps even language itself (D. A. Baldwin 
2000).  
                                                
66 Which is why I employ it in preference to, for example, “theory of mind” or “mind-reading”. 
67 Exceptions include those people who exhibit social deficits associated with the autistic spectrum. 
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For all that, philosophers and psychologists have long argued about the precise set of skills 
on which interpersonal understanding rests. Research into the methods people use to explain 
action and the cognitive processes involved in this critical social skill fall under the heading 
of attribution or attribution theories in social psychology. Försterling (2001: 17) defines 
these research projects as “…the scientific study of naïve theories and common-sense 
explanations”. I contend that an implication of this definition we would expect one of its 
goals to be establishing an empirical foundation for philosophical folk psychology if belief-
desire psychology accurately described these “naïve theories and common-sense 
explanations”. 
In a ground-breaking set of experiments that are regarded among the founding 
investigations of the discipline that was to become social psychology, Heider and Simmel 
(1944) examined how people describe apparent behaviour. Subjects were shown short films 
depicting a series of animations. In each film, a number of geometric shapes moved around 
the screen, sometimes interacting with each other and with a “box” shape with a single 
“entrance” or “exit” in ways that simulated physical reactions (collisions, obstruction and 
so on) and sometimes in ways that implied perceptual detection of each other (suddenly 
changing direction to avoid a collision, for example). 
The film was shown three times to three groups of subjects. The first group were given the 
most general instruction; to “write down what happened in the picture”. The second running 
of the experiment required a little more interpretive work on the part of the participants. 
Their instruction was to “interpret the movements of the figures as actions of persons”. 
Participants in the main study were also asked to complete a survey after viewing the film 
which included the following questions: 
1) What kind of a person is the big triangle? 
2) What kind of a person is the little triangle? 
3) What kind of a person is the circle (disc)? 
4) Why did the two triangles fight? 
5) Why did the circle go into the house? 
6) In one part of the movie the big triangle and the circle were in the house together. 
What did the big triangle do then? Why? 
7) What did the circle do when it was in the house with the big triangle? Why? 
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8) In one part of the movie the big triangle was shut up in the house and tried to get 
out. What did the little triangle and the circle do then? 
9) Why did the big triangle break the house? 
10) Tell the story of the movie in a few sentences. 
(Heider and Simmel 1944: 246) 
The third iteration of the experiment showed the subjects the film run in reverse and they 
were asked only questions 1, 2, 3 and 10 from the above list. 
Fig. 3.1: A still from Heider & Simmel’s 1944 animated film. The full film is available 
online at https://youtu.be/wp8ebj_yRI4. 
The researchers regarded the second experiment as the main focus of their investigation, 
under which they wanted to know whether the subjects would interpret the film according 
to the “story” that they designed into it. However, the questions (1-10) are leading: it is clear 
from these that the experimenters expected the shapes to be interpreted as moving like 
intentional agents. The first experiment is more interesting with regard to how the test 
subjects spontaneously interpreted the motion of inanimate forms. 
Heider and Simmel reported that of 34 subjects68 in the first condition, “only one described 
the film almost entirely in geometrical terms” (Ibid.: 246). All of the others felt compelled 
to describe the movements of these simple shapes as if they were witnessing the interactions 
of intentional, agents – two of the subjects independently interpreted the movements as 
those of birds. Nineteen of the subjects formed their account of the action into what Heider 
and Simmel describe as a “connected story”. There were a number of common features in 
these reports: the two triangles were said to have fought each other, The large triangle was 
described as being shut up in the house and trying to get out, the large triangle was said to 
                                                
68 In all three conditions all of the subjects were female undergraduates. 
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be chasing the small triangle and the circle. All of the subjects described the shapes (or 
“actors”) as opening or closing the “door”. None described the shapes as being moved by 
the force of the door. Several based their story on a love-triangle (in the figurative sense) in 
which the two triangle shapes were in competition for the affections of the circle. 
The Heider and Simmel experiment has become famous (and many times replicated) 
because it illustrates how prevalent the attribution of intentions is when people come to 
explain movements as actions – even when, as in the case of a series of geometric shapes, 
it is clear that the “actors” are not minded beings.69 This anthropomorphism in describing 
events is “…a process of inference about unobservable characteristics of a nonhuman agent, 
rather than descriptive reports of a nonhuman agent’s observable or imagined behaviour” 
(Epley et al. 2007). As such, it is a manifestation of the methods that people use to explain 
each other’s actions rather than a separate phenomenon.   We are: 
… over-enthusiastic mind-perceivers. We see minds even in objects, animals, 
and deities, depending on the accessibility of agency (autonomy), motivation to 
explain (effectance) and motivation to affiliate (sociality). Consider everyone 
who talks to their plants, computers, cars, and pets as if they had human 
dispositions. 
Fiske and Taylor (2013: 152: emphasis added, references omitted) 
We are prone to see agents – beings with minds and intentions – all around us. This is a 
demonstration of our interpersonal understanding skills at work at their most basic level. 
My contention is that much of this attribution of intentions takes place without the 
ascription of specific propositional attitudes – beliefs and desires – in order to explain or 
predict behaviour. Recent investigations in social psychology support this contention, as 
will be examined in this chapter.  
3.2 Attribution Theory 
Fiske and Taylor (2013: 149) describe the “fundamental concern” of attribution as being 
“how people infer causal explanations for other people’s actions and mental states” and 
                                                
69 I will acknowledge the objection here that the shapes were telling a story designed by the filmmakers – carrying out their 
intentions, in a sense. 
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point out that “Causal reasoning thus recruits knowledge of other people’s qualities and of 
situational dynamics to infer an event’s causes”.  
The origin attribution research can be traced back to Heider (1958).70 Heider took 
“commonsense psychology” as the starting point of his investigation into the phenomena, 
by which he understood the way that people “think about and infer meaning from what 
occurs around them”  (Fiske and Taylor 2013: 154). Heider describes the process whereby 
he constructed the first model of his attribution theory by listening to the way people (the 
folk) describe what causes individuals to act in particular ways. He sought to establish the 
rules and mechanism by which we determine whether particular causal accounts are to be 
regarded as personal, under which some feature or features of the individual agent are taken 
to cause them to perform a particular action (beliefs and desires, were they to feature, would 
be in this category), or situational, whereby causal explanations rely on features of the 
environment or circumstances in which the action occurs.     
People make attributions because causal reasoning is essential to the human need to predict 
the future and to control events (M. Ross and Fletcher 1985). Causal attributions are 
essential not only so that we can answer “why” questions of the form “why did she do that?” 
but also to make predictions of the form “what will she do now?” Some of these questions 
might never occur to us consciously. Most of the time we find other people’s actions – and 
our own – so easy to understand that there is no need to ask, let alone to answer such 
questions (see 3.6, below). The mechanisms underlying these unconscious inferences – and 
the conscious inferences that sometimes arise – are the subject of attribution research.  
Gilovich et al. (2006: 339) define attribution theory as “an umbrella term used to describe 
the set of theoretical accounts of how people assign causes to the events around them and 
the effects that people’s causal assessments have”. Although the principal concern here is 
with attribution of the causes of actions, it is presumed that similar mechanisms are in play 
whether causal inferences are drawn to explain the actions of identifiable agents or where 
events occur when no agent can be discerned. This would go some way to explaining the 
findings of Heider and Simmel (1944) with which this chapter opened: if we use the same 
techniques for explaining causes whether agents are in play or not, this would explain why 
agent-like motion is sufficient to generate inferences of agency. 
                                                
70 The same Fritz Heider involved in the Heider-Simmel experiment with which this chapter began. 
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Försterling further describes attribution research as being concerned with “conceptions of 
perceived causality” – how people account for the causes of actions and the relations of 
those causes to the agents that carry them out – and “the determinants of causal ascriptions” 
– under what circumstances to people ascribe one cause rather than another.  
For philosophical folk psychology, the causes of any action qua action must at least include 
– and in some cases must comprise – the intentional mental states of the agent, particularly 
their beliefs and desires. Also, for belief-desire psychology to really be descriptive of naïve 
theories and common-sense explanations then the kinds of explanations that attribution 
researchers encounter when they investigate the strategies that people (the “folk”) use ought 
to reference individual beliefs and desires. 
The personal/situational distinction, and the first account of the underlying rule-sets were 
developed by Kelley (1973). Kelley was the first to suggest the discounting principle, 
under which people tend to discount personal causes if the situation is sufficient to explain 
their behaviour. An example would be a person fleeing a burning building. We would be 
unlikely to trust their post-facto assertion that their egress was motivated by a desire to give 
first aid to their fellow survivors: running from such a conflagration is sufficiently explained 
by the situational fact of the fire. Gilovich et al. (2006) give an alternative example; we are 
likely to give less credence to (discount), or at least treat with caution, any information 
offered by a prisoner who is threat of torture. The personal attribution – that the person 
knows or believes, and wishes to make known the information that they offer – is discounted 
in the face of the fact that the threat of torture alone might be sufficient to bring about their 
openness.  
The other side of the discounting principle is the augmentation principle. This suggests 
that extra weight is given to personal causal attributions (such as something that they know, 
or some feature of their character) if situational factors mitigate against their actions. In 
the burning building example, if we see somebody running into the flames, we will be likely 
to look for personal explanations – they are trying to rescue people still inside, for example, 
or they are an off-duty fire-fighter and so their training has equipped them to enter a burning 
building. 
Gilovich et al. (2006: 345) describe augmentation and discounting as follows: 
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A person’s traits are discounted as a likely cause of behaviour if the behaviour 
goes with the flow of the situation. In contrast, a person’s traits are augmented 
as a likely cause if the behaviour goes against the flow of the situation. 
M. Ross and Fletcher (1985: 48) lay out the two dimensions along which causal attributions 
are categorised: the first is the locus of the cause – which could be “internal” to the person 
or agent or “external”, as with causes that originate in the situation or environment. As 
suggested, contemporary social psychologists tend to measure the locus dimension on a 
scale from personal to situational.  The second dimension suggested by M. Ross and 
Fletcher is stability. Causes originating in either the personal or situational loci can be more 
or less stable, meaning that either they last for a considerable length of time (and so become 
encoded in the long term memory of the agent or the observer) or they are transient and 
fleeting, in which case they are not sufficiently well established to be encoded in or recalled 
from long-term memory and so are held in working memory for the task of making a causal 
attribution. Because working memory is limited to only a few items at a time (Baddeley et 
al. 2009 Ch. 3), people have a natural tendency to seek causal explanations in long term 
memory and so tend to prefer stable causes. Remembering a person’s stable traits or 
dispositions (if the person is known to us) and attributing them as a cause, or simply 
categorising a person who we don’t know under a set of stable traits based on the activation 
of stereotypes – “people like that always act that way” – requires a good deal less effort 
(exhibits greater cognitive economy) than would the deduction of specific mental states, on 
a moment by moment basis, from the  minutiae of their behaviour (Fiske and Taylor 2013: 
166-67). 
Attributions involving stable personal causes, such as trait-based or disposition-based 
attributions play a much more significant role in the way that theorists explain causal 
attributions than do attributions of specific mental states – such as beliefs and desires (Fiske 
and Taylor 2013 Ch. 6; Gilovich et al. 2006 Ch. 9; E. R. Smith and Mackie 2007: 73-77).  
We might summarise current attributional research like this: 
Much attributional reasoning is effortless and virtually automatic. Much 
attributional reasoning focuses on inferring other people’s dispositional 
qualities. Much causal inference is domain specific, not abstract and generic. 
Explicit attributional reasoning is reserved for special occasions, most notably 
when unexpected and negative events occur. And like all social reasoning, 
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attributional reasoning is inherently social. When at a loss to explain an event, 
we ask someone.  
(Fiske and Taylor 2013: 153, emphasis added) 
At this stage I would draw attention to one of the significant ways in which this approach 
to the attribution of causes diverges from the ascription of beliefs and desires as an account 
of interpersonal understanding. The suggestion that causal inference is domain specific is 
in direct contrast to the idea of metaphysically essential action-causing category of beliefs 
and desires. There is no single set of individually necessary and collectively sufficient 
causes of every human action that is applied to make sense of an individual action. Our 
causal explanations of action depend on who we perceive to be the agent – including our 
relationship with and prior knowledge of them – and on the circumstances under which we 
perceive them to be acting. 
3.3 Historic Investigations into Situational Attributions 
Two of the most famous investigations in the history of research into social psychology 
illustrate the importance of situational factors – including their relationships with others –
to people’s choices of behaviour. 
Milgram (1974) describes a series of experiments carried out in the early 1960s to 
investigate the phenomenon of obedience to authority and the suspension of individual 
moral judgement that often appear to accompany it. Milgram’s investigation was motivated 
by the widespread revulsion felt within Western societies at the atrocities carried out in 
Europe under the fascistic regimes of the 1930s and 1940s. Milgram sought to understand 
how people could have become complicit in this horror and why the infamous Nuremberg 
defence – “I was only obeying orders” – should carry little or no weight. Milgram (1974: 
179) expected his experiments to show that outside pressure had limits in its power to 
overcome ordinary moral constraints. His methods and his results have become notorious 
and, since concern with research ethics has become an essential part of the contemporary 
academy, are unlikely to be replicated.71 
                                                
71 The only replications I am aware of in recent years have been for “entertainment purposes” – As in the case of Derren 
Brown, The Heist, first broadcast in the UK on Channel 4 Television on 4th January 2006. 
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The subjects of Milgram’s experiments were told that the experiments were designed to test 
the effect of punishment on learning outcomes: it had been advertised as a “test of memory”. 
On arrival, subjects were selected by lot to play the role of “teacher” or “learner”. This was 
a sham. The lottery was rigged so that the “learner” was a confederate of the researcher – 
the same genial, middle-aged man in each case, to eliminate the identity of the “learner” as 
a variable. Actual subjects were always, unwittingly, assigned the role of “teacher”. 
Authority was represented in the test scenario by an experimenter, again the same person in 
each test. This individual was dressed in a white lab-coat and carried a clipboard, 
conforming to the stereotype of a “scientist”. 
Each subject, in their role as teacher, was taken to a room and shown an impressive-looking 
machine with dials and a row of switches, marked from 15 to a maximum of 450 volts in 
15 volt increments. The subject was strapped into a chair and given a brief electric shock of 
45 volts as an illustration of the effect that the punishment would have on the learner. This 
was to be the only genuine electric shock administered. The “learner” was taken to the next 
room.72 
 
Fig 3.2 The machine operated by the “teacher” (subject) in the Milgram 
experiments.  
The subjects were told to ask the “learner” a series of questions which required them to 
memorise and repeat pairs of words. Incorrect answers were to be “punished” by the teacher 
flicking the switch to administer an electric shock of the corresponding voltage, beginning 
at 75 volts. The voltage was to be increased with each subsequent incorrect answer, which 
                                                
72 In some later variations to test the effect of proximity the “learner” was in the same room as the “teacher”. 
A Therapeutic Elimination… 
Mark Curtis, UEA June, 2016  114 
had been prearranged with the complicit learner. The learner acted out a pre-scripted 
response to these “shocks”, from a mild yelp to screams of pain and entreaties that the 
procedure be stopped as the “voltage” increased to around 270 volts. 
Sixty per cent of the subjects (in most of the tests) continued to administer shocks all the 
way to the maximum of 450 volts – long after the learner had fallen silent and might, as far 
as the subject knew, have been unconscious or even dead. The subjects were told to interpret 
a non-response as an incorrect answer and so to flick the switch for the next voltage. This 
was one of a limited set of scripted interventions made by the white-coated experimenter 
during the procedure. Others included telling the subject that the shocks were “necessary 
for the experiment” and requesting that they “continue, please”. One subject asked the 
experimenter whether he would take responsibility (after the “learner” had stopped 
responding) and was told “the responsibility is mine. Please continue.” His reaction was to 
flick the next switch, administering a further apparent shock. 
According to Blass (1999), the finding that “…ordinary individuals are much more willing 
to obey a legitimate authority’s orders than one might have thought remains an enduring 
insight”. This observation raises two questions. Firstly, why would we have thought that 
they would be less likely to obey the orders of a “legitimate authority” than appeared to be 
the case? This question is related to our moral expectations and, to a degree, to our wishful 
thinking that people are more morally constrained than real-life experience would suggest. 
This is outside the scope of the present discussion. More pertinent to this investigation is 
the second question: what factors determine the action choices that people make, even when 
those action choices countermand their moral considerations? 
It is possible to present Milgram’s findings in belief-desire terms. For example, the subjects 
believed that they were being directed to administer the shocks by a scientist and desired to 
please this authority figure by complying. Perhaps they further believed that no scientist 
would allow the experiment to get to the stage where the “learner” would suffer lasting 
injury. This latter point would also require them to set aside their knowledge that giving 
somebody an electric shock of 450 volts is dangerous, in favour of their trust of the actor in 
the white coat. 
Milgram (1974: 172) investigated the role of belief in the experiments as part of his 
debriefing of the subjects only to the extent of confirming that the subjects believed that the 
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experimental setup was genuine – that they had administered real electric shocks. He found 
that 80% would admit to believing that they had been inflicting real punishment.  
Milgram suggested two possible explanations for his findings. The first was the theory of 
conformity which suggests that, especially in stressful or crisis situations, individuals tend 
to pass responsibility for decisions to their peer group or to the prevailing hierarchy 
(Milgram 1974: 113-15). We become conformist, not only with the authority figure but with 
what we believe our peer group would expect of us – although we retain sufficient autonomy 
to feel that the choice to conform is our own (Milgram 1994). The second idea he offers is 
the agentic state theory (B. E. Collins and Ma 2000: 69-71; E. R. Smith and Mackie 2007: 
374). This proposes that under particular circumstances, again, usually under stress but 
always in the presence of an identified authority figure rather than merely where social roles 
are defined, individuals cease to be or even to regard themselves as autonomous intentional 
agents in their own right, instead becoming vehicles of the authority figure’s agency. Seeing 
themselves as instruments, they are no longer responsible for the consequences of their 
actions and so are able to bypass their inhibitory feelings of compassion or disgust (Milgram 
1974: 43-48, 132-34).   
Again, a plausible belief-desire rationalisation can be constructed for the agentic state 
explanation. In order to become such agents and to cede their individual agency to the 
authority figure, it could be claimed that they had to believe that they were no longer 
responsible and to desire that they rid themselves of blame for a morally dubious action. 
However, Milgram’s characterisation of the agentic state expressed more in computational 
terms than this suggests: 
From the standpoint of cybernetic analysis, the agentic state occurs when a self-
regulating entity is internally modified so as to allow its functioning within a 
system of hierarchical control. From a subjective standpoint, a person is in a 
state of agency when he defines himself in a social situation in a manner that 
renders him open to regulation by a person of higher status. … An element of 
free choice determines whether the person defines himself in this way or not, 
but given the presence of certain critical releasers, the propensity to do so is 
exceedingly strong and the shift is not freely reversible. Since the agentic state 
is largely a state of mind, some will say that this shift is not a real alteration to 
the state of the person. I would argue, however, that these shifts in individuals 
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are precisely equivalent to those major alterations in the logic system of … 
automata. 
Milgram (1974: 133-34) 
This reading sees the agentic state as an alteration to the kinds of inferences that the 
individual is capable of making. It describes a situation in which the alleged entailments of 
the belief-desire law break down because what the individual believes or desires are no 
longer relevant to their behavioural outputs. Even if the belief-desire law was true, the 
agentic state would be a condition in which it is set aside. 
Less easy to fit into belief-desire terms is the equally infamous Stanford prison 
experiment (Haney et al. 1973).  As reported in Gilovich et al. (2006: 4) this intended 
experiment into the social dynamics of a prison environment involved 24 male 
undergraduates of Stanford university, all of whom had been selected on the basis of their 
previous good character and screened for any psychological frailties. They were paid to play 
the part of a “guard” or a “prisoner” in a simulated prison. Which subjects would fill which 
roles was determined by the flip of a coin. Although intended to run for two weeks, the 
experiment had to be abandoned after six days because the behaviour of the “guards” 
towards their charges had begun to result in noticeable signs of stress among the 
“prisoners”. Verbal and physical abuse had escalated to the point where the students posing 
as “prisoners” had been blindfolded, stripped naked and forced to simulate sex acts in scenes 
that, as Gilovich et al. (2006) point out, were eerily prescient of the real-life events at the 
Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq during the US occupation in 2004. 
Both groups in the Stanford prison experiment knew that they were engaged in a simulation. 
The “guards” did not believe that their charges were criminals who, in some way, deserved 
the treatment that they administered. It is equally unlikely that, having signed up for the 
experiment, the subjects who played the guards desired to inflict humiliation on their peers.  
The Stanford Prison Experiment is frequently held up as illustrative of the power of the 
situation to overcome normal moral constraints on behaviour (Carnahan and McFarland 
2007; Zimbardo et al. 2000). As reported in the original paper “The environment of arbitrary 
custody had a great impact upon the affective states of both guards and prisoners as well as 
upon the interpersonal processes taking place between and within those role groups” (Haney 
et al. 1973). 
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Whatever factors were at work in these infamous and probably unreplicable investigations, 
it is difficult to make a case that the essential role of beliefs and desires described by 
philosophical folk psychology is up to this task. Experiments like Milgram’s and the 
Stanford Prison have provided the impetus to new directions in research into how we 
attribute causes to actors. 
3.4 Fundamental Attribution Error or Correspondence Bias 
The realisation that situations have such a marked effect in the actions that actors choose, 
led researchers to investigate why it is that we seem to prefer personal attributions. After 
all, one of the anticipated outcomes of the Milgram experiments was that there would prove 
to be some fundamental difference in the way that people from one culture (Germany in the 
1930s) would respond to authority, when compared to another (Americans in the 1960s). In 
the process, social psychologists uncovered a fascinating bias in our attribution strategies. 
The Fundamental Attribution Error (L. Ross 1977) or correspondence bias (Gilovich 
et al. 2006: 356) describe an inferential bias to which our attribution strategies are prone 
simply because of the mechanisms that underlie them. It suggests that people have a 
preference for causal explanations of an action based on features of the agent (personal 
attributions) even in circumstances where the situation and an agent’s reaction to it offer 
sufficient explanation for what happened.  
Superficially the correspondence bias is reminiscent of the way that propositional attitude 
ascriptions are generated by the belief-desire law according to philosophical folk 
psychology. The assumptions underlying the FP picture that generate these kinds of 
inference are summarised in this quotation from Horgan and Woodward (1991: 149 
emphasis added):  
Whatever else a person is, he is supposed to be a rational (at least largely 
rational) agent – that is, a creature whose behaviour is systematically caused 
by, and explainable in terms of, his beliefs, desires, and related propositional 
attitudes. 
If this is true, then the observer of an intentional action would be compelled to seek out 
beliefs, desires “and related propositional attitudes” that make sense of the action – that 
“fit” according to the schema. We would maintain that those particular beliefs and desires 
etc. were present even if the agent denies holding them and even if their behaviour is fully 
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accounted for by the situation in which they acted. The person did not run from the building 
because it was on fire (situational attribution) – an action which is entirely rational in terms 
of survival. They left the building because they believed that it was on fire and desired to 
avoid being burned and believed that leaving hurriedly was the best way to avoid being 
burned (unstable personal attributions); even if their best recollection was of seeing the 
flames, feeling the heat and running in a state of panic. This is almost the same effect as the 
tendency to make stable personal causal attributions even when situational causes are 
sufficient to explain the action. The only difference is that it is much more easy to refute an 
erroneous stable personal attribution than it is to cancel out a set of propositional attitudes 
that, as well as transient and unstable, might even occur beneath the subject’s conscious 
awareness. 
Two reasons have been suggested for the Fundamental Attribution Error/Correspondence 
bias (Gilovich et al. 2006: 360-66):  The first is the so-called just-world hypothesis. This 
suggests that many of us have an in-built tendency to regard what happens to anyone as, in 
some way deserved. An insidious and unpleasant effect which has been attributed to the just 
world hypothesis has been the tendency of many commentators (and, sadly, of some people 
involved in the criminal justice system) to express the view that victims of rape must bear 
some responsibility for their having been attacked (Furnham 2003). Belief in a just world 
would mean that even when people are entirely at the mercy of situational causes, they must 
possess some feature, as individuals, that has brought about the result. 
A second reason for the fundamental attribution error is the higher perceptual salience of 
persons compared to situations: “People are compelling stimuli of considerable potential 
importance to us” (Gilovich et al. 2006: 366). We can draw impressions of people and their 
behaviour directly through perception, often with limited need to infer unseen elements. 
Situational facts are not so readily presented to perception and so we are reluctant to place 
them at the fore when seeking explanations. 
We are also reluctant to correct biased attributions. Doing so is effortful, time consuming 
and hungry for cognitive resources which might not be available to replace personal 
(dispositional) attributions with situational attributions, even when the latter might be more 
successful as an explanation for the action (Geeraert et al. 2004). 
Van Boven et al. (1999) set out to show that although individuals might be prone to the 
correspondence bias, they would be unaware of its effects. Accordingly, in a scenario where 
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situational factors clearly played the dominant role in their own actions, it was expected that 
they would discount the effects of the correspondence bias when predicting the attributions 
made by those who observed them. Their findings appear to contradict this expectation. 
In their first study, involving a total of 92 participants, a group of twenty were pre-selected 
to play the role of “speakers” according to their attitudes to affirmative action – the 
controversial policy of giving preferential treatment in recruitment or job promotion to 
female candidates or those from minority groups in order to redress imbalances which have 
arisen from many years of discrimination. All of the candidates had been pre-selected by 
questionnaire (at a time unrelated to the study so that the connection was unknown to them), 
according to the extreme nature of their views on the subject – either for or against. 
Each speaker was asked to write and to deliver a videotaped speech either supporting or 
opposing affirmative action for academic admissions. Without the speakers’ knowledge, 
the experimenters ensured that those speaking in support of affirmative action were those 
identified as the most vehemently opposed to the policy and those speaking against the idea 
were those who had previously expressed the strongest support. Each speaker was given 
thirty minutes to write their own address, based on a model provided by the researchers. 
They were encouraged to incorporate as much of their own thinking and ideas on the subject 
as they could (while remaining within the pro- or anti- brief). 
An experimenter introduced each speaker on his or her video by saying: 
“This is speaker number [x]. We have asked speaker number [x] to write a short 
speech entitled ‘why colleges and universities should [should not] use 
affirmative action policies in their admissions policies.” 
It was made clear to the participants who would watch the speeches on video that the 
speakers were not expressing their own opinions but presenting the view that they had been 
given. They were, in other words, operating under situational constraints. 
After watching each video, the participants were asked to rate each speaker against the 
statement “Speaker [x] is a supporter of affirmative action laws for hiring women and 
minority individuals” on a thirteen-point scale from “The speaker doesn’t agree at all” (-6) 
to “The speaker agrees very much” (+6). The speakers, after making their recordings, were 
told that other students would view their speeches and attempt to discern their true opinions. 
A Therapeutic Elimination… 
Mark Curtis, UEA June, 2016  120 
Each speaker was asked to predict, against the same scales, how the observers would rate 
their true attitude to the subject. 
Initially the experimenters had expected the speakers not to anticipate the extent of the 
correspondence bias, given that they knew that the observers were fully aware of their 
situational constraints. In fact, not only did the results show a clear correspondence bias on 
the part of the observers (a tendency to attribute dispositions to the speakers which 
corresponded to the content of their speeches), the speakers overestimated the extent of 
that bias by a factor of more than two. This in spite of the fact that the speakers had been 
made aware that the observers knew that they had not chosen the position they expressed 
(their situational constraints). 
Fig. 3.3 Results of first study from Van Boven et al. (1999: 1190) 
The second study reported in Van Boven et al. (1999) was based on an approach from 
Gilbert and Jones (1986).  
Participants were divided into pairs (screened to ensure that they did not know one another) 
and the members of each pair were randomly assigned the roles of “questioner” and 
“responder”. Communicating via an intercom system, the questioner asked the responder a 
series of twenty questions about their general life attitudes, including some indicating their 
moral outlook, such as: 
 Do you consider yourself to be sensitive to other people’s feelings? 
Each responder was equipped with a set of the questions and a set of scripted answers. Two 
possible responses were available for each question, one of which was designed to be 
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Figure 1. Observers' inferences of speakers' attitudes toward affirmative action and speakers' predictions of
observers' inferences.
than speakers who delivered anti-affirmative action speeches
(M = 3.5), f(18) = 5.18, p < .001.
Observers' inferences and speakers' predictions. To examine
the accuracy of speakers' predictions of observers' inferences, we
conducted a 2 (direction of speech: pro- vs. anti-affirmative ac-
tion) X 2 (role: obs rver vs. speaker) analysis of variance
(ANOVA) on participants' attitude inferences. As might be ex-
pected, there was a main effect for direction of speech, F(l,
18) = 21.81, p < .001. The left portion of Figure 1 indicates that
observers who watched a pro-affirmative action speech errone-
ously inferred that the speaker supported affirmative action more
than did observers who watched an anti-affirmative action speech,
F(l, 18) = 4.93,p < .05. The right portion of Figure 1 shows that
speakers, to our surprise, not only anticipated the correspondence
bias, F(l, 18) = 17.06, p < .001, they overestimated its magni-
tude, as evidenced by a significant interaction between direction of
speech and role, F(l, 18) = 4.70, p < .05.1
Simple effect tests indicated that this discrepancy between ac-
tual and anticipated attitude inferences was most pronounced
among speakers who delivered pro-affirmative action speeches,
who overestimated by more than two scale points how much
observers would infer that they truly endorsed affirmative action,
f(9) = 4.21, p < .01. Those who delivered anti-affirmative action
speeches likewise overestimate  how much observers would inf r
that they opposed affirmative action, although their degree of
overestimation was not statistically significant, t < 1 ?
Finally, in contrast to the self-perception as meta-perception
hypothesis (Kenny & DePaulo, 1993), speakers did not appear to
use their own attitudes as a basis for estimating observers' infer-
ences. The correlation between speakers' own attitudes and their
predictions of the observers' inferences, controlling for condition,
was negligible, r = .12, ns.
Discussion
The results of Study 1 were exactly counter to what we had
expected. On the basis of previous research, we predicted that
speakers would not fully anticipate the correspondence bias be-
cause they would overestimate the transparency of their true atti-
tudes, which were at odds with the direction of their speech.
Instead, we found that speakers not only predicted that observers
would conclude that their privately held beliefs were in line with
what they had said in their speeches, they also overestimated the
extremity of the observers' correspondent inferences. This was
true even though speakers knew the observers were aware that the
experimenter had assigned the topic of the speech. Furthermore,
speakers did not appear to believe their true attitudes would be at
all discernible, as there was no correlation between their own
attitudes and their predictions of observers' inferences.
Two elements of Study 1, however, may have artificially pro-
duced this pattern of results. First, speakers may not have been
convinced that observers were fully aware of the speakers' situa-
tional constraints, and thus may have questioned whether the
observers would be in a position to moderate their correspondent
inferences. Second, because speakers were preselected for their
relatively extreme attitudes toward affirmative action, they may
1 There also appears to be a main effect in people's estimates such that
speakers expected relatively pro-affirmative action attributions and observ-
ers saw relatively pro-affirmative action attitudes. This is likely due to the
widespread, though erroneous, belief among Cornellians that most students
support affirmative action (Van Boven, in press).
2 We also examined the accuracy of speakers' predictions by computing
the correlation between their predictions and the observers' inferences,
controlling for the direction of the speech. This correlation was not sig-
nificant, r = —.05, nor were similar correlations in Studies 2, 3a, or 3b, rs
ranged from - .01 to .28, all ns.
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altruistic and caring, the other selfish and cold-hearted. For the example given above, the 
two possible answers were: 
I try to be sensitive to other’s feelings all the time. I know it is important to have 
people that one can turn to for sympathy and understanding. I try to be that 
person whenever possible. 
Or alternatively: 
I think there are too many sensitive, ‘touchy-feely’ people in the world already. 
I see no point in trying to be understanding of another if there is nothing in it 
for me. 
This would be a straightforward “question-response” type test except for this twist; The 
questioners were equipped with a signal light system, whereby they could tell the responder 
which kind of response to give. In half of the cases, the responder was told by the 
experimenter to signal for 80% selfish responses, in others for 80% altruistic responses.  
After each set of 20 questions, the questioners were asked to assess the responders’ “true, 
underlying character” against a series of traits – likeable, trustworthy, selfish, greedy, 
dependable, altruistic and kind hearted – on a 13-point scale for each measured from “not 
very” (0) to “very” (12). Each responder was given the same set of measures and asked to 
predict how the questioner would rate them. 
Fig 3.4 Results of second study from Van Boven et al. (1999: 1192). 
The participants on both sides knew that the kinds of response that were given were entirely 
determined by the situation; indeed, the questioners were responsible themselves for 
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Figure 2. Questioners' impressions of responders and responders' predictions of questioners' impressions.
would make insufficient allowance for those constraints. The ad-
justments made by the observers were indeed insufficient, but not
to the extent expected by actors.
Forced to set aside our original predictio s, we considered two
alternative hypotheses for these surprising findings. The first is
that people might base their estimates of others' attributions on a
very simple intuitive theory—that other people are inveterate trait
theorists who leap too quickly from acts to dispositions. In other
words, people may think that others' attributions follow a naive
calculus that maps dispositions directly on to behaviors, with little
regard for the situational factors that might have produced the
behaviors. To the extent that observers correct their initial dispo-
sitional characterizations in light of prevailing situational con-
straints, this intuitive theory will lead people to overestimate the
correspondence bias.
Alternatively, actors' rather extreme predictions may have re-
sulted from their concerns about being evaluated by others. Actors
in both studies may have felt as though their social identities were
on the line, and may have been deeply concerned with how they
would be evaluated by observers. This concern may have trans-
lated into inflated predictions about the extremity of observers'
attributions. Actors, in other words, may have viewed their con-
cerns regarding the evaluative risks they faced as informative
about the questioners' actual impressions. They may have rea-
soned, "if I am this concerned, there must be some reason for it"
(Savitsky, Medvec, Charlton, & Gilovich, 1998; Schwarz, 1990;
Schwarz & Clore, 1983).
We designed Study 3a to distinguish between the oversimplified
intuitive theory account and the evaluative concerns hypotheses by
employing "witnesses" who watched the interaction between ques-
tioners and responders and who predicted the questioners' impres-
sions of the responders. If responders' predictions of questioners'
attributions were based on an oversimplified intuitive theory that
views others as strict dispositionalists, then witnesses should like-
wise overestimate the extremity of questioners' impressions be-
cause witnesses hold the same intuitive theory. If, in contrast, it is
responders' evaluative concerns that cause them to overestimate
the correspondence bias, then their predictions of questioners'
impressions should exceed those made by witnesses because the
witnesses' identities are not on the line.
Study 3a
Method
Sixty Cornell undergraduates who did not know each other participated
in groups of three in exchange for course credit. One student was assigned
the role of questioner, another the role of responder, and a third the role of
witness. Instructions and dependent measures for the questioner and re-
sponder were the same as in Study 2. Witnesses were seated next to the
responders and given a copy of the 20 questions and answers. They were
told that their task was to watch the "interaction" between the questioner
and responder unfold.
As in Study 2, there were two experimental conditions. In the altruistic
condition, the questioner was instructed to elicit 80% altruistic responses
from the responder. In the selfish condition, the questioner elicited 80%
selfish responses. Following the interaction, questioners rated the respond-
ers on the same scales used in Study 2, and responders predicted those
ratings. The witnesses also predicted the questioners' ratings of the
responders.
Results
After appropriate reverse scoring, we combined the nine mea-
sures of the questioners' impressions of responders, responders'
predictions of those impressions, and witnesses' predictions of the
questioners' impressions into three composite measures (Cron-
bach's as = .94, .98, and .97, respectively). The means of these
ratings are displayed in Figure 3.
To compare questioners' impressions to responders' and wit-
nesses' predictions of those impressions, we conducted a 2 (con-
dition: altruistic vs. selfish) X 3 (role: questioner vs. responder vs.
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determining whether the answer to each question would be “altruistic” or “selfish”. And 
yet still they tended to think more highly of the real character of those who had read out 
predominantly altruistic responses. The participants seem incapable, even in this extreme 
example, of denying that something about the individual determines their responses. If you 
give mostly altruistic replies, then you are a nicer person than someone who gives 
predominantly selfish replies - even if I am the one telling you how to respond to each 
question! 
The responders’ predictions of the size of the correspondence bias was consistent with the 
first study, in that they consistently overestimated the degree of bias.  
In their general observations and conclusion, the authors firstly noted that people expect the 
correspondence bias – that the attributions will tend to be dispositional, even when the 
situational cause of the behaviour is explicit. They go on to suggest that, under constrained 
experimental situations where the speaker’s or responder’s self-image is at odds with (and 
so obscured by) their overt behaviour, they overestimate the degree to which the observer 
or questioner, blinded by the deliberate obfuscation of the “true self” would rely on 
behavioural cues. These findings were at odds with their original hypothesis that people 
would underestimate other people’s susceptibility to the confirmation bias.  
Explaining these findings in belief-desire terms is, I suggest, a considerable challenge. We 
would have to presume that observers and questioners in all of these studies based their 
assessments of the speakers’ and responders’ characters on an assumption that in order to 
speak the words they must, on some level, believe them. And what of desire? Are we to 
understand that speakers desire to be believed by their audience so much (even when they 
are uttering words utterly foreign to their own attitudes) that they predict that people will 
attribute their behaviour to their dispositions to an even greater degree than they actually 
do? 
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We consistently found that people not only anticipate the correspondence bias, 
they tend to overestimate its magnitude. We attributed this overestimation to 
people's oversimplified intuitive theories that others are inveterate 
dispositionalists who give little regard to situational influences; we obtained 
support for this contention by showing that overestimation of the 
correspondence bias does not stem from actors' evaluative concerns. 
(Van Boven et al. 1999: 1198) 
Intriguingly for those who regard belief-desire reasoning as an innate feature of human 
social cognition there were marked differences in the scale of the estimates for the 
correspondence bias when similar (translated) studies were carried out with Japanese 
students: They report that: 
Japanese participants, whose folk theories about the causes of behaviour 
emphasize situational factors more than Western folk theories, did not 
overestimate the magnitude of the correspondence bias.  
(ibid.) 
This evidence of cultural difference in attribution strategy supports the contention that I will 
make more overt in Chapter Four that far from reflecting an essential feature of human 
social cognition, the idea of a folk-psychology based on the ascription of beliefs and desires 
is a learned cultural artefact: part of the stock of stories and story archetypes that make a 
significant contribution to culture. 
3.5 Actor-Observer Differences 
Another observed bias in our attribution strategies presents a further challenge to the 
assumptions of belief-desire psychology. One of the appeals of the belief-desire model of 
intentional agency is its inherent symmetry. It is presumed that if on the basis of our 
introspective experience of our own intentional actions we notice that when we desire 
something we tend to do whatever we believe will satisfy that desire, then we are justified 
in assuming that the same goes for other agents whose actions we witness. Because we 
introspect the causes of our own actions in this way, we can extrapolate that any agent’s 
desire for something, guided by the belief that a particular action will fulfil that desire, will 
cause them to act. 
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Unfortunately for this picture, research in social psychology has uncovered considerable 
asymmetry between the causal attributions that people make to explain their own actions 
and those that they use to account for actions that they witness. This effect is known as the 
actor-observer difference (Gilovich et al. 2006: 367; E. R. Smith and Mackie 2007: 101). 
At its simplest, this observation suggests that people are much more likely to attribute their 
own actions to situational factors while tending to attribute the actions that they observe in 
others as being caused by personal traits. Jones and Nisbett (1972: 80) argued from their 
experimental investigations that “…there is a pervasive tendency for actors to attribute their 
actions to situational requirements, whereas observers tend to attribute the same actions to 
stable personal dispositions.” If the belief-desire picture were even half right, in that we 
begin to understand the causes of action by introspection, then we would, I suggest, expect 
this pattern to be reversed. Also, according to philosophical folk psychology, the belief-
desire law applies equally to explanations of our own actions (reason-giving) as to our 
interpersonal understanding of the actions of others. The asymmetry of the actor-observer 
difference is a direct challenge to this picture. 
For example, Nisbett et al. (1973) asked a group of U.S. male undergraduates to explain 
their own choice of college major and their choice of romantic partner73 and to describe 
what had motivated their best friends’ choices in the same areas. Even in the case of people 
they knew well, the subject attributed their own choice of partner to twice as many features 
of that person than to their own “dispositions” while in the case of their friends they offered 
a similar number of reasons for each. In the case of their choice of college major, the 
subjects gave three times as many features of the course as reasons for their choice than 
they thought might explain their friends’ choices. 
 To revisit the burning building example, when someone downplays their “heroic” action in 
saving others with words like “I’m not a hero: I just did what anyone would have done” 
they might not be exhibiting false modesty. When they go on to say that “the fire-fighters 
who went into the building after I got out, now they are the real heroes” this might be a 
manifestation of the actor-observer difference. Likewise, if we ask the “heroic” fire-fighters 
why they went into a burning building they might say “the building was on fire and it’s my 
                                                
73 This being the 1970s the word used in the study was “girlfriend”. 
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job” – again preferring situational rather than personal attributions in accounting for their 
own actions. 
Gilovich et al. (2006: 367-69) posit four factors in concert that play a role in generating the 
actor-observer difference: 
i) actors and observers might have different understandings of what they need to 
explain. Actors might take their stable dispositions (traits) for granted and so not 
necessary to any explanation. The fire-fighter who says “that’s my job” doesn’t 
need to add that they are also the kind of person who becomes a fire-fighter in 
the first place. 
ii) Actors and observers might have different perceptual saliences. The actor is 
attending to the situation, its opportunities to act and the constraints it places on 
their possible courses of action. They do not see themselves in the setting. 
Observers, on the other hand, tend to focus on what the actor is doing. They are 
better placed to identify not only what the actor does, but what personal 
attributes might be at play. 
iii) Actors and observers have different information about the action. Actors might 
consider that they have access to their intentions (although, as we will see below, 
this is unlikely to be infallible) and so give greater weight to the situational 
factors that either motivated or thwarted their intentions.74 
iv) The false consensus effect (Gilovich et al. 2006: 368) is another well-
documented social cognitive bias through which individuals tend to regard their 
own actions as more “typical” than those of others.75 When an observer 
witnesses an action that is at variance with how they (or any of their friends) 
might expect to act in a similar situation, this “low-consensus” behaviour is more 
likely to be attributed to dispositional factors than to the situation. 
The role of saving face (Försterling 2001: 87-91) should also be considered: this is thought 
to be an important contributor to causal attribution strategies (Brockner et al. 1981; E. R. 
Smith and Mackie 2007: 131). If there is a risk that one’s action might be judged negatively, 
                                                
74 Which suggests that we might seek to attribute the outcome to situational factors even when taking unstable personal 
factors (mental states) into account. 
75 Because we tend to socialise with people who share our attitudes, this sense that we are just like “everybody else” is 
reinforced by our peer group. 
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it is more face-saving to blame the situation than to accept “that’s what I am like” – as 
would be implied by a trait attribution. In the burning building example, an individual who 
fled the building alone without trying to help or to lead others to safety might claim that 
“the heat was so intense and there was a real danger of collapse” (situational factors) while 
anyone who saw his exit might call that same individual a coward (dispositional attribution). 
Face-saving might help to explain Malle (2006), who found, through a meta-analysis of 173 
actor-observer studies, that the bias is most marked where actors might be susceptible to 
unflattering dispositional attributions.  
Charged with researching issues of road safety and, in particular, the contribution that driver 
aggression makes to road traffic accidents, Lennon et al. (2011) started from a hypothesis 
that differing accounts of the causes of accidents (due to actor-observer differences) might 
explain why aggressive drivers seem not to learn their lesson even when their attitude has 
resulted in an accident. 
Their method was to invite 193 drivers to take part in a study. The subjects were divided at 
random into two groups, with the members of one group each being assigned the role of 
“instigator” and those in the other group given the role of “recipient”. The two groups were 
given eight descriptions of driving scenarios that had been identified (by previous research) 
as examples of aggressive driving. Recipients and instigators were given versions of the 
scenario worded appropriately for their role. For example: 
 Scenario 8 (recipient perspective); You are in the left lane behind another 
vehicle. When the left turn arrow light is given, the vehicle does not move 
because the driver is not paying attention. You tap on the horn to get his/her 
attention and he/ she gives you the middle finger in their rear-view mirror  
Scenario 8 (instigator perspective): You are in the left lane waiting for a green 
arrow. When the left turn arrow light is given, you do not move because you are 
not paying attention. The driver behind you taps his/her horn to get your 
attention and you give him/her the middle finger in your rear-view mirror  
After reading each scenario, the recipients were asked the following question: 
Thinking about the actions of the other car driver in the situation, which of the 
following descriptions would best explain their behaviour?  
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While the instigators were asked: 
Thinking about your actions in relation to the other car driver in the above 
situation, which of the following descriptions would best explain your 
behaviour? 
Both groups were given four possible explanations from which to choose: 
a) Bad luck. 
b) The road or traffic conditions or The road sign and road markings (depending on 
scenario). 
c) A mistake of your/their judgement at the time. 
d) Shortcomings in your/their driving ability. 
These options correspond to the four possible dimensions of a causal attribution. The reason 
given at a) is an unstable situational attribution, b) is a stable situational attribution, c) 
refers to unstable personal traits or dispositions and d) to stable personal traits or 
dispositions (Lennon et al. 2011: 213).  
The conclusion of this study supported the starting hypothesis. Recipients were significantly 
more likely than instigators to attribute aggressive driving behaviour to poor driving skills. 
Instigators preferred to account for their performance in terms of the situation – explanation 
(b) – or, where the scenario made these unavailable, in terms of personal but unstable causes 
such as simple errors of lapses of judgement. If they just made a simple mistake, the 
researchers reasoned, why would an aggressive driver see the need to get help to modify 
their behaviour? What you identify as the cause of aggressive driving seems to depend on 
your standpoint. 
3.6 Social Heuristics and Automaticity 
Researchers have applied the fast and frugal heuristics programme, introduced in the last 
chapter, to social navigation and specifically to attribution strategies. In part this has been 
motivated by a desire to functionally analyse the fundamental attribution 
error/correspondence bias and actor-observer differences into their underlying capacities 
and processes, in keeping with the objective of psychology established in Chapter 1, 
whereby genuine causal explanations are sought for persistent effects.  
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Dealing with other people is a typical case of operating with less than optimal information, 
with limited time to make a decision and with restricted computational resources. For 
example, we do not always know what other people expect from our exchanges or have a 
complete history of their life prior to the interaction. Many social interactions are fleeting 
and we are expected to respond to people without much time to deliberate. We are also 
frequently preoccupied with our own goals for a particular interaction, rather than having a 
great deal of resources available for “reading” the other party.  
Experimental results suggest that much of our interpersonal understanding depends on the 
application of simple heuristics rather than on the ascription of mental states. In his review, 
Marsh (2002) categorises the kinds of heuristic used in social settings under three headings: 
i) Search heuristics, which are shortcuts to find meaningful knowledge is specific 
circumstances: an example would be to find a suitable stereotype under which 
to match a person to their actions. 
ii) Assessment Heuristics are used to rank those options identified by the search 
according to preference or suitability to the situation. 
iii) Selection heuristics are used to choose from a limited set of alternatives such 
as the choice between personal and situational causes in attribution. 
Slovic et al. (2002) argue that we should not overlook the power of what they dub the 
“Affect Heuristic” in managing social interactions. We very quickly – on the basis of 
minimal cues – judge individuals we meet and even their trivial actions as “good” or “bad” 
on the basis of our emotional responses to them and to their actions. This colours our causal 
attributions to a degree that should not be underestimated. Messick (1999) suggests that 
decisions in social settings depend on “alternative logics” in which our perceptions of 
appropriateness, identity (including stereotype activation) and some socially encoded rules 
play decisive roles. Similarly, Garcia-Retamero et al. (2009) have investigated how, despite 
the “notoriously complex” nature of social contexts, we make decisions quickly and on the 
basis of minimal information by employing deceptively simple strategies which employ 
implicit (and culturally pre-determined) knowledge of how social environments are 
structured. 
Divergences from normative ideals and other features emerge from the non-entailing nature 
of heuristic and implicit decision making. Some theorists, most notably Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974) would characterise these divergences as errors or biases. Most of the 
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time, however, these heuristics help us to avoid errors or embarrassment. They are also key 
to understanding each other’s actions. 
Fiske and Taylor (2013) dedicate a chapter (Ch. 7) to “heuristics and shortcuts” in the 
context of social inferences and decision making. Among the heuristics they consider are 
the representativeness heuristic, and the simulation heuristic. Since each has a bearing 
on how we make judgements about people and their potential actions/choices, we should 
consider the application of representativeness and simulation to attribution theory. 
The representativeness heuristic (Kahneman and Tversky 1972; Tversky and Kahneman 
1974) is key to the way that people activate stereotypes. A useful illustration of 
representativeness is still that offered by Kahneman and Tversky. Subjects were invited to 
read a short description of an imaginary person: 
Steve is very shy and withdrawn, invariably helpful, but with little interest in 
people or in the world of reality. A meek and tidy soul, he has a need for order 
and structure, and a passion for detail. 
(Tversky and Kahneman 1974: 1124)  
The subjects were then asked to choose which profession they found it most likely76 that 
“Steve” would work in from this list: farmer, trapeze artist, librarian, salvage diver or 
surgeon. Fiske and Taylor (2013: 179 ) point out that “With adequate information about the 
frequency and personal characteristics of people in these occupations, one could 
conceivably tally up the probability of a meek surgeon, a shy trapeze artist, and so on, and 
calculate the odds that Steve is in each occupation.”  In practice this is not what we do – 
and not only because, as we saw in Chapter 2, we tend to be rather poor at dealing with 
probabilities. We cannot spare the time and effort involved in this calculation and so we ask 
“what kind of person do we typically expect to find in these occupations?” and then “what 
kind of person is Steve most like?”. We then (as did most subjects in Tversky and 
Kahneman’s experiments) answer “Steve is a librarian”. Despite this being a divergence 
from normative rationality, we are likely, in such a case, to be right: stereotypes do not 
become stereotypes without some long-standing empirical justification, even if, in the case 
of negative stereotypes, the evidence has been exaggerated. 
                                                
76 A probability judgement. 
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Even though representativeness heuristic might result in persistent divergences from 
normative standards (Teigen 2004; Tversky and Kahneman 1974), they have considerable 
utility in making attributional judgements. Faced with a burning building and the 
background information “Steve is a librarian” we would not expect Steve to run into the 
flames. If, however, we know that “Lisa is a firefighter” then we would not be surprised to 
witness Lisa trying to enter the building to effect a rescue.  
Even in less dramatic settings we frequently make fast and frugal trait attributions on the 
basis of stereotypes. Why didn’t Steve go to the party? because he’s shy. Typical librarian.  
The representativeness heuristic is a quick, though occasionally fallible, method 
of estimating probability via judgements of relevancy. It is also perhaps our 
most basic heuristic. Identifying people as members of categories or assigning 
meaning to actions is fundamental to all social inference. 
(Fiske and Taylor 2013: 181) 
More negatively, representativeness is the source of prejudicial judgements on the basis of 
the way somebody is dressed, the way that they speak and, perhaps most sadly of all, their 
ethnicity. It allows us to explain someone’s action with the minimum of effort. 
The simulation heuristic77 (Kahneman et al. 1982) is a problem-solving strategy involving 
the use of imagination to consider a hypothetical situation and so imagine what might 
happen. If I want to know how a friend is going to react if I tell her that I can’t make it to 
her wedding, I am likely to imagine my friend and her stable traits and dispositions, and to 
imagine the conversation I will have with her when I tell her that I won’t be there. I could 
even try out various excuses in this simulation and imagine her reaction to each of them 
before deciding whether to make up an excuse or tell her the real reason. According to Fiske 
and Taylor (2013: 184) “The simulation heuristic addresses a variety of tasks, including 
prediction (Will Joan like Tom?) and causality (Is the dog or the kid to blame for the mess 
on the floor?).” Part of the simulation is likely to be our own and the imagined participant’s 
emotional responses to the hypothetical scenario, which allows us to give weight to the 
various options and to choose that which will cause the least upset for ourselves and others 
(for example).  
                                                
77 Not to be confused with “simulation theories” of philosophical folk psychology. 
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We could also use the simulation technique to imagine (rather than calculate) which course 
of action will entail the least effort. If we are applying this to our own action choices, the 
simulation will guide us to the preferred option, knowing what we do about our own 
preferences (traits). When it comes to predicting the actions of others, we will predict what 
someone known to us will choose based on their stable dispositions and the imagined or 
simulated features of the task: Jenny will run to the coffee shop because she is an exercise 
fanatic. Kelvin will take the bus because he can’t bear cold weather. In the case of 
somebody we don’t know well, we might construct a simulated scenario from the traits we 
have applied to them thanks to stereotype activation (through the representativeness 
heuristic, for example): it’s no use following the young man in the Metallica T-shirt because 
I doubt that he’s going to the Bach organ recital. 
Much of our social reasoning also seems to take place outside conscious awareness or 
conscious control.  
When one considers that this automatic perception of another person's 
behaviour introduces the idea of action – but from the outside environment 
rather than from internal, intentionally directed thought – a direct and automatic 
route is provided from the external environment to action tendencies, via 
perception. The idea that social perception is a largely automated psychological 
phenomenon is now widely accepted. 
(Bargh and Chartrand 1999: 465 emphasis added) 
Bearing in mind the features of automatic processes (effortless, unconscious, non-
intentional and autonomous) introduced in Chapter 2, section 2.6, it is apparent that a good 
deal of our interactions with other people are mediated by these non-controlled processes, 
even if not all and even if one accepts that these are mediated (in part) by belief and desire 
ascriptions (Apperley and Butterfill 2009; Steuber 2012).  Gilovich et al. (2006: 19) point 
out that our emotional reactions to people and to situations occur largely outside conscious 
control and are an essential part of our interpersonal understanding. They also suggest that 
some of the persistent errors and biases in attributions – including the two examined in the 
present chapter – occur because of a mismatch between automatic and controlled processes. 
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The concepts of automaticity and preconscious processing of information help 
us to understand why we are often blind to the role of many important situational 
factors and why the processes underlying construal may be hidden from us. 
(Gilovich et al. 2006: 22) 
The question that arises from this observation is: in what circumstances are automatic or 
heuristic causal attributions not up to the job? To put it another way, what circumstances 
might trigger the ascription of beliefs and desires – among other varieties of deductive 
reasoning – as a way of explaining the causes of a particular agent’s actions? Fiske and 
Taylor (2013: 153) suggest that we tend to deploy normative models as a potential 
explanation when there are anomalous behaviours to be explained. For example, when we 
see someone run into an obviously burning building our conscious attention is drawn to the 
event and it is then that we ask “why” in a more conscious and attentive way. 
It might be that the problem with causal attributions in action explanation is not so much a 
problem of other minds, but problems with accessing the content of our own minds with 
any certainty. Evidence suggests that the introspection of mental states to which we presume 
ourselves to have privileged access is a far from straightforward matter. As Wilson (2002: 
93) puts it: “There are cases in the psychological literature of people who are so ignorant of 
why they respond the way they do that they have to invent an explanation.” 
Nisbett and Wilson (1977) contend that “…there may be little or no direct introspective 
access to higher order cognitive processes.” Based on a review of the experimental data in 
social psychology to that date, this claim breaks down into three parts. Firstly, that people 
are not usually able to predict the effect that any given stimulus might have on their rational 
inferences. They might be unaware of a stimulus, of their responses to the stimulus or even 
that, as the authors put it “an inferential process of any kind has occurred.” Secondly, they 
might mistake other, plausible explanatory inferences for those which were the real causes 
of the behaviour. They might, in such cases, be answering a different question altogether: 
asking “what might plausibly justify my having taken this action” is not the same as (nor 
likely to elicit the same answer as) “what caused me to take this action”.  Finally, although 
Nisbett and Wilson accept that “…subjective reports about higher mental processes are 
sometimes correct” this success is not, they argue, due to privileged introspective access to 
their mental states (perception of the mental), but an instance of an “…incidentally correct 
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application of a priori causal theories”. In other words, sometimes, perhaps, belief-desire 
inferences get lucky! 
The idea that the introspection of mental states is an inaccurate, perhaps even misleading 
source of data when attributing the causes of actions to oneself persists. As Gilovich et al. 
(2006: 21) write: 
For many cognitive processes, it seems, we cannot accurately describe what is 
going on in our heads. … This applies to our guesses about other people, to our 
understanding of how we go about making causal attributions for physical and 
social events, and even how we come to choose one applicant versus another 
for a job (or one romantic partner over another). Often we cannot even 
consciously identify some of the crucially important factors that have affected 
our beliefs and behaviour.   
Heider (1958 Ch. 1) began his investigation with an analysis of common sense psychology. 
If belief-desire psychology does not feature in social psychology’s models of attribution, 
that is probably because researchers have found better explanations for the target 
phenomena. For example: 
In the 1970s the naïve scientist view identified complex reasoning to underlie 
causal inference. These analyses created the impression that explicit causal 
reasoning is time consuming, ubiquitous and central to other inferential 
processes and behaviour. However, the idea that people use much of their 
cognitive capacity much of the time for causal reasoning is unlikely to be true. 
… cognitive capacity is costly … By contrast long-term memory is virtually 
limitless so probably we solve many causal dilemmas simply by accessing long-
term memory for causes relating to specific people, situations or events. 
(Fiske and Taylor 2013: 150, emphasis added) 
All of this suggests that self-reports of mental states which precede action and so might be 
offered as reasons or causes of that action should not be accepted as straightforwardly 
correct. There is no “privileged access”. The Fundamental Attribution 
Error/Correspondence Bias indicates that we have a marked preference to make personal 
attributions, even when situational factors are sufficient to explain the action. Actor-
observer differences point out that we often arrive at different causal attributions when we 
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explain the actions of others to when we explain our own. If we are also wrong, in many 
cases about our own motivations then the explanatory value of belief-desire psychology is 
in question. 
3.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter considered how social psychologists investigate our understanding of our own 
and of others’ actions – the field usually called attribution theory (section 3.2). 
Investigations into causal attribution have suggested that we make attributions of what 
causes a person to act on the basis of two kinds of factor: personal and situational. These 
two kinds are further divided into stable and unstable factors. Stable personal factors 
include individual traits or dispositions while unstable personal factors comprise mistakes 
as well as transient mental states. Stable situational factors include most of the situations 
of the environment in which the action was performed whereas unstable situational factors 
include variables such as the weather or simple “bad luck”.  
As shown in two highly influential experiments in social psychology (3.3), features of the 
social environment – situational causes, in other words – have been shown to have marked 
effects on the decisions that people make. Under certain conditions the situation causes 
them to override their own stable personality traits, to act markedly “out of character”.  
Two persistent errors or biases of attribution have been observed and used by attribution 
researchers to uncover the computational processes of attribution. The fundamental 
attribution error (or correspondence bias) (3.4) is a tendency mistakenly to attribute a cause 
based on an agent’s traits or dispositions rather than the situation under which the action 
takes place or when an inference about the traits or dispositions the person is mistakenly 
drawn in order that this corresponds with the behaviour to be explained. The attribution of 
beliefs and desires that fit a behaviour – even when the agent is consciously unaware of 
possessing those states, is functionally similar to the correspondence bias (except the 
personal qualities being attributed are unstable propositional attitudes). 
The second feature of ordinary causal attributions is the asymmetry between self-
attributions made when the person making the attribution is the actor and those attributions 
that people tend to make when observing the actions of others. This actor-observer 
difference (3.5) is again at odds with the belief-desire picture, the inherent symmetry of 
which is part of its appeal. 
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Like the judgements and decisions examined in Chapter 2, many inferences of causal 
attribution are facilitated by social heuristics and many occur automatically, outside 
conscious control (3.6). Social psychologists have also investigated the presumed 
infallibility of introspection, that we are expected, mostly, to know the contents of our own 
minds. This is a source of the expected symmetry between reasons and genuine motivations 
which is foundational to the truth of the belief-desire law: when we give reason-
explanations featuring propositional attitudes we are assumed to be accurately and truthfully 
reporting the mental states that motivated our actions.78 Social psychologists doubt this, as 
well. We seem to know much less about our own motivations than was formerly thought.   
                                                
78 Even if not committed to the view that those mental states are the cause of their action. 
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Part Two: 
Everyday  
“Belief” and “Desire”  
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4 Chapter Four: 
Narratives of Action; 
 Stories and our Picture of the Mind 
Abstract: In this chapter, I develop the idea that the proper place of action 
accounts and reason-giving couched in belief-desire terms is as a species of 
narrative discourse. As such, they do not serve as causal explanations but 
merely offer a story about what has happened, the acceptability of which is 
judged by a different standard than are causal explanations (an idea which 
is developed in the course of the chapter). In support, I call on the 
importance of narrative to the way that people construct their understanding 
of the world. Narratives are ubiquitous. More than this, they seem to be an 
essential part of the way that humans make sense of events, relationships 
between events and actors, including themselves and, especially, the 
understanding and handling of time. As an illustration of the power of 
narratives, and by way of contrast with the causal-explanatory commitments 
of cognitive and social psychology, I introduce narrative psychology. From 
narrative psychology, a number of therapeutic approaches have been 
developed with narratives at their heart – none of which, I will suggest, 
depend on fixing the metaphysical status of beliefs and desires as causes of 
action. I will also suggest that judging the acceptability of narratives has 
features in common with heuristic judgement and I postulate the existence 
of a narrative heuristic. In conclusion, the acceptability of a narrative of 
action – even one featuring beliefs and desires – does not depend on its 
causal-explanatory adequacy. 
The problem of how to make all this wisdom understandable, transmissible, 
persuasive, enforceable - in a word, how to make it stick - was faced and a 
solution found. Storytelling was the solution - storytelling is something brains 
do, naturally and implicitly. Implicit storytelling has created our selves, and it 
should be no surprise that it pervades the entire fabric of human societies and 
cultures. 
(Damasio 2010: 293) 
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4.1 Why Narratives? Heider and Simmel revisited. 
My contention in this chapter is that narratives are among the most powerful linguistic forms 
that we encounter – and as I will argue in the next section, we seem to encounter them all 
the time. Of most interest to the present thesis are what I call narratives of action – stories 
about what people have done and why: in particular, those that advert to the mental states 
(propositional attitudes) of individual agents. How are these assessed? What are our criteria 
for assessing them? As we shall see, the narratologist Marie-Laure Ryan suggests that it is 
definitive of a narrative that “the sequence of events must form a unified causal chain…” 
(Ryan 2007). I raise the question of whether this entails that beliefs and desires are 
acceptable as events in a narrative sequence (of action) in virtue of their presumed causal 
role. And even if that is the case, is the presumption warranted other than being the default 
within a particular cultural context? Is a statement such as “I wanted [desired] to buy milk. 
I remembered [believed] that the corner shop was open and so went there,” a satisfactory 
narrative? These are the questions that this chapter seeks to answer. 
Along the way I intend to establish that: 
a) Narratives play a crucial role in people’s relationship with the world. 
b) Narratives have a notable effect on how people impose meaning on experience. 
c) Narratives are mutable. We can shape our conception of the meaning of an event by 
making changes to the narratives that we use to describe them. 
d) Judging people as minded beings and autonomous agents does not depend on the 
possession of a mental state vocabulary.  
e) The content and form of narratives that we habitually construct and judge acceptable 
is culturally determined, dependent on the kinds of narratives that we have 
encountered since our formative years. 
The discussion of attribution in chapter 3 opened with an outline of experiments carried out 
by Heider and Simmel (1944), to illustrate the point that we can’t help explaining motion 
(of certain kinds) in terms of the intentions of agents. At the opening of this chapter, I want 
to revisit those experiments to draw attention to another feature of their findings. 
The experiments involved subjects watching the apparent motion of a few geometric shapes 
in an animated film. In the first experiment, 36 participants were asked to describe the action 
of the film in their own words – to “write down what happened in the picture” (Ibid. 245). 
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The following description is presented in the original paper as “representative of the 
interpretation commonly made in the group”: 
A man has planned to meet a girl and the girl comes along with another man. 
The first man tells the second to go; the second tells the first, and he shakes his 
head. Then the two men have a fight, and the girl starts to go into the room to 
get out of the way and hesitates and finally goes in. She apparently does not 
want to be with the first man. The first man follows her into the room after 
having left the second in a rather weakened condition leaning on the wall 
outside the room. Man number one, after being rather silent for a while, makes 
several approaches at her; but she gets to the corner across from the door, just 
as man number two is trying to open it. He evidently got banged around and is 
still weak from his efforts to open the door. The girl gets out of the room in a 
sudden dash just as man number two gets the door open. The two chase around 
the outside of the room together, followed by man number one. But they finally 
elude him and get away. The first man goes back and tries to open his door, but 
he is so blinded by rage and frustration that he cannot open it. So he butts it 
open and in a really mad dash around the room he breaks first one room and 
then the other.  
(Heider and Simmel 1944: 246-47) 
A few sociological points: the use of “girl” should be read in the context of the time 
that the experiment took place -1944. Also, the fact that all of the participants were 
female undergraduates is a product of the time: a large proportion of males aged 19-
24 would have been serving in uniform. Likewise, we should not be surprised that all 
of those interpretations that ascribed characters to the shapes described them as two 
males pursuing one female. In the United States of the 1940s it would simply not be 
“the done thing” for two females to pursue the same male aggressively to the point of 
fighting over him. 
For Heider and Simmel’s purposes, the interesting words in this description are the action 
verb phrases: “have a fight”, “follows”, “makes several approaches” and so on. These are 
taken as evidence of a propensity to describe the film in terms of the intentional actions of 
the actors – even though these “actors” are nothing but simple two-dimensional geometric 
shapes.  To make sense of the actions, the participants assigned anthropomorphic characters 
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to the shapes – “the girl”, “man number one” and “the second man”. Incidentally, note the 
paucity of mental state ascriptions: “a man has planned”, “She apparently does not want to 
be with the first man,” and, at a stretch, “blinded by rage and frustration” are the only 
references to what the “actors” might be thinking or feeling in the whole piece and they are 
elaborations rather than being integral to the flow of the action. 
For the purposes of the present chapter the most interesting features of this subject’s 
description are that: 
i) The piece is written in the form of a sequence of temporally located events 
(dictated by the sequence of the film) in which each event follows on as a 
consequence of the preceding event. 
ii) Each consequence is (at least in part) determined by an actor’s understandable 
response to what occurred immediately prior. 
iii) The resolution has the “rejected suitor” taking out his impotent rage on 
inanimate objects – unable to have further impact on the course of events as they 
involve the other two characters. 
What this describes is a narrative. In this chapter I will contend that just as we seem unable 
to avoid describing apparent behaviour in terms of the intentions of the participants in that 
behaviour we cannot help but to situate action in the form of a narrative. Again, judging an 
action as intentional need not imply that the actor is in possession of any specific thoughts, 
propositional attitudes or similar mental states, only that it is not accidental, incidental or 
otherwise unintentional: see Austin (1979b) and passim for an elucidation of this 
distinction. We are compelled by certain features of our cognitive engagement in the world 
to order events that involve any kind of intentional agents into narratives.  
4.2 The Ubiquity and Definition of Narratives 
Narratives are everywhere. As well as the obvious fictional narratives – novels, epic poetry, 
fairy tales, films, television and radio drama, comedy and soap opera and so on – we are 
surrounded every day by narratives in the form of news stories (contemporary culture is 
probably the most news-saturated there has ever been) through the print and broadcast 
media. Then there are the myths, legends and religious texts on which culture is built – all 
are in the form of narratives. Jokes and anecdotes are mini-narratives with slightly different 
intentions – the first to make us laugh, the second to illustrate a point or to support a 
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contention. Gossip, excuses, testimony and even documentary use narrative form to 
different ends. Then we have role-playing games, of the computer or paper variety. It is 
difficult to imagine how history would even be possible without narrative to convey the 
sense of a succession of events in a palatable, understandable form. The media through 
which narratives are transmitted have developed in parallel with our technology. From word 
of mouth to calligraphy, from block printing to the internet, all have been used for people 
to tell each other stories. Even pictures can be used to tell a story (Abbott 2008: 7). 
We use narratives “… almost from the moment that we begin putting words together. As 
soon as we follow a subject with a verb, there is a good chance that we are engaged in 
narrative discourse” (Abbott 2008: 1). Much childhood play comprises making up and 
acting out stories of one kind or another. For Herman (2007: 17), narrative “can be viewed 
not just as a means of artistic expression or a resource for communication but also as a 
fundamental human endowment.” Every culture that we know of uses narrative: “narratives 
are everywhere that humans are” (Abbott 2008: xv). We have written narratives from every 
literate culture whose script has been deciphered – bar those whose use for “writing” was 
limited to accounting.79 Given the contemporary prevalence of narratives in non-literate 
cultures and the fact that some of our own greatest stories – such as the works of Homer – 
were originally orally transmitted, it is reasonable to presume that narratives played a 
significant role in the lives of people for almost as long as we have had language (Nunan 
and Choi 2010). It has even been suggested that narrative is central to all human 
communication (Fisher 1984).80 
It would be surprising if something this ubiquitous did not have considerable effects on its 
users. I will return to those effects and to the psychological purposes to which narratives 
are put shortly. Firstly, we should try to pin down what “narrative” means.  
Ryan (2007: 31-32) laments that “Asking people to decide whether or not a text is a story 
is one of those artificial situations in which results are produced by the act of investigation,” 
and that “‘Narrative’ is less a culturally recognised category that influences are choices of 
                                                
79 In some senses even a record of the form “so and so produced such and such an amount of grain in a particular year” is 
a kind of narrative. Especially when combined with a comparative (more or less than the previous year) and a reason for the 
difference (in that year, the rains failed). It is not hard to see how narrative writing developed from record-keeping scripts 
(Olson 1994; 65-66). 
80 Fisher’s “Narrative Paradigm” has important parallels with the thesis advanced in the present chapter, albeit from a different 
perspective. 
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reading, viewing, or listening materials than an analytical concept designed by 
narratologists.” It is difficult to settle on a definition of “narrative”. Possibly, the very 
ubiquity of stories offers too many opportunities for counterexamples for any definition that 
reduces the category to a set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions to 
be satisfactory. This has not prevented some scholars from attempting a definition. 
Abbott (2008: 1) suggests that the fundamental criterion for a piece of language to qualify 
as a narrative is that it must comprise a representation of an event. “Event” can be 
misleading. The kind of “event” that Abbot describes as being essential to a narrative can 
include nothing happening – provided that nothing happening has significance for the 
recipient (reader, hearer, viewer etc.) Events, then are temporally distinct occurrences that 
have some significance or meaning. 
In further analysis, Abbott (2008) and Herman (2009b) concur that every narrative 
comprises two distinct parts: the content that is relayed by the narrative and the mode by 
which that content is to be transmitted. The content part is synonymous with story. The 
mode of transmission is what narratologists call the discourse. These are clearly 
differentiated when one considers that the same story may be relayed by any number of 
different discourses – as when one of Shakespeare’s plays is adapted into ballet, a narrative 
form without words (Prokofiev’s Romeo and Juliet, for example).  
This distinction between story and narrative discourse, between what is being told and the 
telling might be “…arguably, the founding insight of the field of narratology” (Abbott 2007: 
36). It is analogous to the linguistic distinction between signified and signifier (Saussure 
1916/2011). However, Abbott cautions that the distinction has been dogged by “two notable 
controversies”: 
One is the question of whether it is a real distinction at all since all we ever 
know of story is what we get through discourse. Story seems to pre-exist its 
rendering (note how often stories are narrated in the past tense) yet … the 
rendering also seems to generate the story, which would make it follow rather 
than precede the discourse. The other controversy is closely related to the first 
and involves the repeatability of the story. If the story has a separate existence 
such that it can be rendered in more than one way and even in more than one 
medium, how do we know it is the same story when we see it again? 
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(Abbott 2007: 41) 
Both worries are concerned with how a story is altered by – perhaps even dependent on – 
the telling. To answer the concern about how we can say that the same story is performed 
by the RSC at Stratford declaiming iambic pentameter as is danced by the Royal Ballet at 
Covent Garden to Prokofiev’s score, Barthes (1988) developed a formal distinction between 
the nuclei and catalysers of story, which Herman (2007: 13) characterises as the core and 
peripheral elements. Change the core elements and you have a different story altogether 
(such as a version of Romeo and Juliet ending with the young lovers living happily ever 
after). The story is preserved so long as the mode of telling affects only the peripheral 
elements. Much work in the analysis of narrative has been dedicated to the reduction of core 
elements into a set of foundational archetypes of story (Frye 1951). Abbott’s concerns are 
over whether altering the discourse is to alter the core features of the story. 
This is relevant to the present discussion because when we consider a narrative that 
describes an action in terms of the mental states of the actor, the question arises as to 
whether those mental states are core or peripheral elements of the story. Could the same 
story be told, with its core elements preserved, if different mental states were attributed or 
if the telling relied on other reasons for the action (i.e. reasons not connected to the 
attribution of propositional attitudes at all). I will contend that so long as the reasons for the 
action (such as situational attributions) were acceptable, we would still have the same story; 
thus propositional attitude ascriptions are, at best, peripheral elements in story 
construction. 
For Abbott (2008: 14), the defining characteristic of a narrative is the “… representation of 
an event or series of events. … Without an event you may have a ‘description’, an 
‘exposition’, an ‘argument’, a ‘lyric’, some combination of these or something else 
altogether, but you won’t have a narrative. ‘My dog has fleas’ is a description of my dog 
but it is not a narrative because nothing happens. ‘My dog was bitten by a flea’ is a narrative. 
It tells of an event. 
Whether one event is sufficient for a narrative or any narrative needs to describe a sequence 
of events is, Abbott admits, controversial. As is whether we should require the events 
covered by the narrative to be causally related. Abbott’s claim is only that the representation 
of a single event is “… the key and it produces the building blocks out of which the more 
complex forms are built” (Ibid: 14). 
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In Wittgensteinian mould, (Ryan 2007: 30-31) admits that any definition of “narrative” is 
likely to be a fuzzy set in which we make a judgement that a particular text or utterance is a 
narrative on the basis of a tacit comparison with a number of prototypical cases (cf. Rosch 
and Mervis 1975). So we have learned, in infancy, what stories are like and when we are 
told something we compare it to these examples and decide to accept it as a narrative (or 
not) on the basis of how closely it resembles (or does not resemble) the prototype examples 
of narrative that we have stored in long-term memory. This foreshadows my suggestion of 
a narrative heuristic, in section 4.8 of this chapter. 
As an illustration, consider which of these statements is a satisfactory narrative: 
i. The moment she heard about Kepler’s laws of motion, Amanda burst 
into tears. 
ii. The moment she heard about her mother’s illness, Amanda burst into 
tears. 
I contend that our criterion for evaluating these as narratives rests on our ability to 
understand, in a broad “folk psychological”81 sense, Amanda’s reaction. Some physics 
undergraduates might empathise with the first without elaboration, but I believe that we 
would all agree that the relationship in the second example is more universally acceptable. 
The first would require more information about the actor, Amanda, and her circumstances 
which might follow: my point is only that the second narrative is complete within itself. 
Each sentence describes two events: Amanda hearing about… and Amanda bursting into 
tears. And each describes the relation between the actor and each of those events: the first 
event changes Amanda’s state in such a way that she instigates the second event. Unless we 
know that Amanda has a particular revulsion for 17th century physics, the first does not 
describe a reaction that we would immediately judge to be reasonable. Knowing our usual 
assumptions about people’s relationship with their parents, the second strikes us as 
straightforward, understandable and acceptable. Unless it were to read: 
The moment she heard about her mother’s illness, Amanda burst into tears of 
joy. 
                                                
81 Not necessarily a “belief-desire psychology”. 
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In which case we would find it understandable only with additional information. Perhaps 
the mother’s illness proved to be less serious than had been feared. Perhaps Amanda 
despises her mother. Perhaps Amanda suffers from some affective disorder in which her 
reactions are the reverse of those we would expect. There is a distinction here between 
acceptability and truth that is central to this discussion. All three of these sentences could, 
conceivably, be true. Our judgement that the relationship in the second example is the most 
readily understandable does not depend on our judgement that it is the most true, or even 
the most likely to be true. It suggests only that, in the presence of certain universal 
background information (child-parent relationships), we find it understandable without 
elaboration. Similarly, we might find action descriptions featuring “belief” and “desire” in 
traditional roles (such as the “shopping for milk” example) acceptable as narratives only 
because these are the default roles that such terms are presumed to fulfil in our culture. 
4.3 Narrative Psychology 
Narrative theorists, some psychologists and some philosophers have suggested that a 
facility with narratives plays a central role in how individuals relate to the world. Ricoeur 
(1984: 3), for example, suggests that it is through narrative that physical time is packaged 
in to “human time”. Abbott (2008: 3) accepts that narratives play a variety of roles in human 
life and discourse but “…if we had to choose one answer above all others, the likeliest is 
that narrative is the principal way that our species organises its understanding of time” 
(italics in original). 
As part of outline of the way that he wants to define narrative, the narratologist David 
Herman offers: 
Narrative, in other words, is a basic human strategy for coming to terms with 
time, process and change - a strategy that contrasts with, but is in no way inferior 
to, “scientific" modes of explanation that characterise phenomena as instances 
of general covering laws. Science explains the atmospheric processes that (all 
other things being equal) account for when precipitation will take the form of 
snow rather than rain; but it takes a story to convey what it was like to walk 
along a park trail in fresh-fallen snow as afternoon turned to evening in the late 
autumn of 2007.  
(Herman 2009b: 1) 
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Narratives allow the individual not just to order events in time or take control of time but 
also to imbue moments in time with meaning at the scale of human experience. Reviewing 
scientific investigations of the role of stories in action-descriptions Herman (2009a: 56), 
writes: 
Stories, this research suggests, are a primary technology for making sense of 
how events unfold in time, one that helps reveal how actions arise, how they are 
interrelated, and how much salience they should be assigned within a given 
environment for acting and interacting. 
Major alterations to the portrayed temporal relationships can significantly shift the meaning 
of the overall narrative. In this sense it is a core element (Herman 2007: 13) or nucleus 
(Barthes 1988) of the story in a way that propositional attitudes need not be. 
Bruner (1990, 1991) laments that in its quest for scientific respectability Psychology has 
lost sight of its true subject matter. He claims that, in thrall to positivistic, empiricist ideals, 
psychologists have tended to ignore the “construction of meaning” (Bruner 1990: 4). The 
psychologist’s central task, in Bruner’s view, is to understand how people interpret the 
worlds that they inhabit and to develop models of how to “interpret their acts of 
interpretation” (Bruner 1990: xiii). The move to computational analogies has diverted the 
emphasis of enquiry away from any concern with meaning: information is “indifferent with 
respect to meaning” and so, he argues, information should not be the principal concern of 
a discipline in which meaning is paramount (Bruner 1990: 4). 
It is important to note the distinction that for those philosophers who promote the belief-
desire model, a belief is the fundamental unit of information. For Bruner, a belief is one unit 
of meaning, in the sense of providing one route through which the individual can relate, 
understand and participate. 
Folk psychology, in the shape of the ascription of beliefs and desires, is described by Bruner 
as the lens through which human action is interpreted. It is “…a culture’s account of what 
makes human beings tick” (Bruner 1990: 13). This is another important distinction. Belief-
desire psychology is culturally dependent, according to Bruner. He recognises that different 
cultures could use different models to achieve similar ends. Culture, alongside meaning, is 
another theme that Bruner feels has been neglected by Psychology’s search for universals. 
He writes:  
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It is man’s participation in culture and the realisation of his mental powers 
through culture that make it impossible to construct a human psychology on the 
basis of the individual alone. 
(Bruner 1990: 12) 
Because meaning, the central concern of psychology for Bruner, can serve a purpose only 
if it is shared, psychology must investigate the mechanisms through which meanings 
become shared – for example, of how a notion like the belief-desire law becomes embedded  
within a culture.82 All meaning is, in Bruner’s view, culturally dependent and mediated by 
shared transactions. 
Bruner does not expect a folk psychology and its entities to figure in causal accounts of 
action. “Real causes,” he writes “may even not be accessible to ordinary consciousness” 
(Ibid.: 17). This echoes the views of many contemporary social psychologists – for example 
Wilson (2002). Bruner argues that:  
Antimentalistic fury about folk psychology simply misses the point. The idea 
of jettisoning it in the interest of getting rid of mental states in our everyday 
explanations of human behaviour is tantamount to throwing away the very 
phenomena that psychology needs to explain. It is in terms of folk psychological 
categories that we experience ourselves and others. It is through folk 
psychology that people anticipate and judge one another, draw conclusions 
about the worthwhileness of their lives, and so on.  
 (Bruner 1990: 14-15) 
Bruner’s argument against elimination of beliefs and desires here, directed at the eliminative 
materialism of Churchland (1981); or Stich (1983) need not directly challenge the modest 
elimination of this thesis. As we have seen, Bruner rejects the notion of folk psychological 
entities as describing causes. In Part One I show that contemporary psychological accounts 
that do seek genuine causal accounts of psychological phenomena and behaviour also 
eschew talk of these attitudes. Bruner is suggesting a non-explanatory way to do psychology 
– one in which causes do not figure and so folk psychology – including beliefs and desires 
- can.   The elimination of “belief” and “desire” from causal accounts of action would have 
                                                
82 Even if that “culture” is made up only of the community of academic philosophers! 
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no impact on Bruner’s project. Equally, Bruner’s approach has no direct impact on the 
eliminative intent of this thesis, save to underline the point that folk psychology does not 
belong in the realm of causal accounts.  
Bruner advocates an approach whereby the explanation of action in folk-psychological 
terms is a starting point for the psychologist’s investigations. Folk psychology’s role in the 
construction of meaning (as he sees it) must be restricted to its proper domain. That domain 
is one in which narratives play a significant part. Bruner’s influence has been to give 
impetus to approaches in psychology that studies how the construction of meaningful 
accounts of mental life, experience and behaviour depends on the narratives that we build. 
This is narrative psychology.  
Narratives are used to construct autobiographical identity, in the description of action and 
in the ordering of events in time sequences and with causal connections. McAdams (1993) 
describes human identity as a life story, a “personal myth” on which the unity, purpose and 
meaning of a life is built. It is an essentially social construct: although we each play a central 
role in our personal narratives, the story can have no momentum and no cohesion without 
the contributions of other actors. The myth, according to McAdams, is one that is built on 
throughout the life of the individual, developing through the addition of experience which 
gives rise to new compelling narratives. 
Polkinghorne (1988: 1) describes narrative as “…the primary form by which human 
experience is made meaningful”. He also suggests that narrative provides “a framework for 
understanding the past events of one’s life and for planning future actions,” (ibid. 11).  
Narrative psychology is concerned with how individuals use stories to construct and convey 
meaning and investigates the specific stories and story archetypes that individuals and 
cultures construct. The narratives at work in constructing meaning include “…personal and 
social histories, myths, fairy tales, novels, and the everyday stories we use to explain our 
own and others’ actions” (ibid: 1, emphasis added). This narrative paradigm offers a way 
to describe human life and behaviour that has its own internal logic: it not only builds on 
the relationship between situations and the individual, between stimuli and responses but 
also encompasses “emotions, images, time or perspective that have not been treated 
conceptually so far [within psychology]” (Polkinghorne 1988). 
Another proponent of a narrative psychology, László (2008: 9) argues that the discipline 
“…entails certain assumptions about the relationship between self, identity and social 
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structures which are distinct from … more ‘traditional’ perspectives”. Those other 
perspectives – cognitive psychology and experimental social psychology, for example – 
“…operate on the basis of ‘realist’ assumptions that are problematic in terms of the study 
of the self”, including “…the assumption that the self exists as an entity that can be 
discovered and described in much the same way as can any object in the natural or physical 
world,” (Ibid.) 
Robinson and Hawpe (1986) suggest that narratives are constructed and used to assist our 
understanding by means of a heuristic process aimed at arriving at an inference or 
description that “… creates a fit between a situation and the story schema”. Such a narrative 
is an explanation only to the extent that the event to be understood can be made to fit the 
narrative. This means that rather than judging the acceptability of a narrative account of, 
for example, the antecedents of an action, on the basis of whether or not we have correctly 
identified the causes of that action, we judge them against our memory of past stories – 
organised as pre-existing story schemas – and ask ourselves whether this is a likely story. 
No attempt is made to uncover the processes by which the events described might bring 
about the phenomena under examination, which is the essential causal-explanatory concern 
of cognitive psychology and social psychology as described in Part One of the present 
thesis. This contrasts with a central commitment of the belief-desire law, according to which 
the acceptability of an explanation is judged against the presumed causal-functional roles 
of specific beliefs and desires. 
As with Bruner, what differentiates narrative psychology from other approaches is, for 
Crossley (2000), meaning and meaning-making, interpretation rather than explanation. This 
difference “highlights the inadequacy of quantitative ‘scientific’ methods for the study of 
self and identity.” Narrative psychology, she contends, “… advocates the need to focus 
attention on human existence as it is lived, experienced and interpreted by each human 
individual.” Significantly for the argument to come, concerning the culturally situated 
nature of folk-psychological narratives, she also argues that such lived experience is “… 
inextricably tied up with our use and understanding of the linguistic and moral resources 
made available to us in the cultures that we’re brought up in,” (Crossley 2000: 10). These 
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resources are “made available to us” by means of the stories that we begin to be told as soon 
as we, as infants, are able to understand language.83 
For the narrative psychologist, this way of constructing meaning from experience is not so 
much the imposition of structure on a stream if perceptions and ideas: it is essentially how 
the individual experiences, how raw information is shaped into meaningful thought. As Carr 
(1986: 61) puts it: 
It is not the case that we first live and then afterward, seated around the fire as 
it were, tell about what we have done.  … narration, intertwined as it is with 
action [creates meaning] in the course of life itself, not merely after the fact. 
The suggestion that a central role in psychology should be given to a concept such as 
narratives, or even meaning, together with some of Bruner’s concerns as highlighted 
above, might seem to be antithetical to the scientific method. László (2008: 4) would 
deny this, claiming that narrative psychology:  
…assumes that studying narratives as vehicles of complex psychological 
contents leads to empirically based knowledge about human social adaptation. 
Individuals in their life stories … compose their significant life episodes. In this 
composition, which is meaning construction in itself, they express the ways in 
which they organise their relations to the social world, or construct their 
identity. 
László demands that narrative is something to be taken seriously by science. Our 
autobiographical histories and identities are not delivered to us fully formed by the events 
that we experience. Neither are the psychological causes of our actions directly accessible 
to introspection.  Narrative provides the framework for the construction of autobiographical 
memory and identity an also for the generation of meaningful reasons for our judgements, 
choices and actions. Although the framework of narrative might be fixed, the content of our 
narratives is contingent on our enculturation, as I will show. 
Underpinning the use of narratives in the psychological investigation of the self is this idea: 
                                                
83 Perhaps even earlier than this. 
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The basic principle of narrative psychology is that individuals understand 
themselves through the medium of language, through talking and writing, and 
it is through these processes that individuals are constantly engaged in a process 
of creating themselves.  
(Crossley 2000: 10) 
Citing the anthropologist Geertz (1979), Crossley agrees that the view of the self or person 
that is endemic to the Western (or European) tradition is not typical of the world’s cultures. 
As Geertz describes it, the habit of seeing the person as: 
 … a more or less integrated motivational universe, a dynamic centre of 
awareness, emotion, judgement and action, organised into a distinctive whole 
and set contrastively against other wholes and the social and natural background 
is … a rather peculiar idea within the context of the world’s cultures. 
(Geertz 1979: 229) 
This leaves something of a “chicken and egg” question: does the Western conception of 
identity emerge from the prevalent kinds of narrative in western culture or do our narrative 
traditions proceed from a conception of the person as “a dynamic centre”? For our purposes 
here this debate can be left aside.  It is significant that our prevalent narratives either shape 
or are shaped by our understanding of the individual as an “integrated motivational 
universe”.  
Perhaps the most influential philosophical examination of narrative identity is that of 
Ricoeur (1984, 1991). He contends that the foundations of two principal components of 
identity – unity and permanence – rest on the narratives through which the self is 
understood. It is through such narratives that meaning and temporal structure is given to the 
stream of experience. It is only through narrative’s inherent temporal structure (beginning-
middle-end) that humans are able to appreciate time at all. The social-constructivist view of 
identity expounded by Ricoeur and others might be linked to narrative psychology and 
summed up thus: 
A narrative conception of identity implies that subjectivity is neither a 
philosophical illusion nor an impermeable substance. Rather, a narrative 
identity provides a subjective sense of self-continuity as it symbolically 
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integrates the events of lived experience in the plot of the story a person tells 
about his or her life.  
Ezzy (1998: 239) 
Narrative psychologists have sought to bring this concept under experimental examination. 
In their review of the empirical literature, McAdams and McLean (2013) describe a series 
of experimental investigations concerning the impact of specific narrative constructions of 
identity on development and adaptation to changing life circumstances. They draw 
attention, in their conclusion, to the effect that differences of culture, different “menus of 
images, themes, and plots for the construction of narrative identity” can have on how 
individuals, embedded within a culture, come to build the narrative identity that they do. 
The remaining challenge, they suggest, is to extend these investigations to comparisons 
between cultures and between narrative styles.  
This inevitably leaves open the idea that if a person can make changes to their habitual 
narratives they can make radical changes to their self-conception. This is precisely how 
narratives are used in therapeutic approaches.  
4.4 Therapeutic Narrative Psychology 
The underlying principle of applying narratives to therapeutic approaches is that the stories 
we tell ourselves directly influence our picture of the world. If the picture generates 
problems, the therapist can help the subject to challenge it. Changing the narrative (or 
stepping outside of it) generates a more empowering world-picture: 
The therapist helps clients articulate and bring to language and awareness the 
narratives they have developed that give meaning to their lives. The clients are 
then able to examine and reflect on the themes they are using to organise their 
lives and to interpret their own actions and the actions of others. The reflective 
awareness of one’s personal narrative provides the realisation that past events 
are not meaningful in themselves, but are given significance by the 
configuration of one’s narrative. This realisation can release people from the 
control of past interpretations they’ve attached to events and open up the 
possibility of renewal and freedom for change. 
(Polkinghorne 1988: 188) 
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Patients are firstly encouraged to uncover and to examine the narratives that they use to 
describe their present situation, their past experiences and their future expectations. The 
therapist guides them to notice the effects that their narratives are having on them. For 
example, a subject who constantly rehearses their mistakes might have settled on a narrative 
that reinforces the view “everything I do goes wrong” and so be reluctant to try anything 
new or to welcome change. Often, as Pennebaker (2004) notes, simply acknowledging the 
hold that negatively charged narratives have had on them leads people to positive effects. 
I make no apology for the obvious parallels between this and the diagnostic-therapeutic 
intent of the present thesis. 
Many talking therapies have narrative elements – including cognitive behavioural therapy 
or CBT (A. T. Beck 1979), one of the most widely used interventions funded by the National 
Health Service in the UK (Stiles et al. 2008). For an example of a narrative therapy at work, 
however, I will describe the story editing approach pioneered by Pennebaker (1997). 
Wilson (2011), in reviewing this method, compares story editing favourably with more 
traditional approaches to recovery after traumatic experiences. One traditional approach 
involves recounting the facts of the traumatic event and, under the guidance of a therapist, 
reliving experienced emotions. This critical incident stress debriefing technique is widely 
used. However, Wilson (2011) claims that some evidence suggests that this is at best 
ineffective and might even be harmful.  
Story editing, in contrast, involves the subject developing a narrative account of the 
traumatic event, reshaping the emotional content to their present needs. Wilson argues that:  
Our interpretations are rooted in the narratives we construct about ourselves and 
the social world, and sometimes … we interpret things in unhealthy ways that 
have negative consequences. We could solve a lot of problems if we could get 
people to redirect their interpretations in healthier directions. 
(Wilson 2011: 9) 
Story editing is defined as “A set of techniques designed to redirect people’s narratives 
about themselves and the social world in a way that leads to lasting changes in behaviour,” 
(Wilson 2011: 11). Subjects are invited to write about their traumatic experiences repeatedly 
for a fixed time each day for the duration of their therapy. Each time they do so, they are 
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given licence to diminish some elements and enhance others. Pennebaker (1997: 95) 
suggests that this ensures that: 
Over time, individuals who are writing about an event become more and more 
detached. They are able to stand back and consider the complex causes of the 
event and their own mixed emotions. Perhaps by addressing the trauma multiple 
times, people's emotional responses become less extreme. In other words, 
repeatedly confronting an upsetting experience allows for a less emotionally 
laden assessment of its meaning and impact.  
For the purpose of testing the technique, to find out whether it really could accelerate 
“adjustment to ongoing life transitions” (Ibid.: 79-80), Pennebaker sought experimental 
subjects dealing with a major life-upheaval. As a university academic, the answer was on 
his doorstep; college freshers, many of whom would be away from home for the first time 
in their lives, often in an unfamiliar locale and always in a highly pressured environment. 
Pennebaker (1997: 80) describes his procedure as follows: “In order to learn if we could 
accelerate coping, we asked about 130 entering freshmen to participate in an experiment 
that dealt with ‘writing and the college experience’.” These students wrote for 20 minutes 
each day for three consecutive days. The subjects were allocated to one of two experimental 
conditions by the flip of a coin. Those in the first condition were invited to write about some 
superficial topics, while students in the second condition were told:  
For each of the writing sessions, I want you to let go and write about your very 
deepest thoughts and feelings about coming to college … In your writing, you 
might want to write about your emotions and thoughts about leaving your 
parents, about issues of adjusting to the various aspects of college … or even 
about your feelings of who you are or what you want to become. 
One surprising result was that a considerable number of students in the second condition 
took the opportunity to record their thoughts about genuine traumas that they had suffered. 
Some writings included “… suicide attempts, family violence, rape … basically the same 
things that I had read when people had been asked to write about traumas” (Pennebaker 
1997: 81). 
In all cases, the subjects who wrote about their college experience had fewer visits to the 
doctor and reported illnesses than did those in the control condition. There was no 
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discernible difference between those who took part in September and those who joined the 
programme in December.  
Starting university, for all the upheaval, is a relatively benign circumstance. Pennebaker 
wanted to try out these techniques with a group whose experience must be among the most 
extreme examples of trauma in living memory.84 Through the Dallas Memorial Center for 
Holocaust Studies (DMHC), Pennebaker made contact with sixty survivors of the Nazi 
death camps. More than seventy per-cent of these people reported that they had never 
spoken of their experience with anyone – including close family.  The motivating question 
behind this research was this: would it be possible to accelerate the coping process even for 
this unique group? 
The subjects were invited to speak of their experience in the safe environment of a 
psychological interview. While they spoke, their skin conductance and heart rates were 
monitored. This would establish a base rate for the emotional intensity of their telling the 
tale. One year after their initial interview, each subject was invited to a health assessment.  
Using the skin conductance data, as well as ratings of the content of each 
survivor’s testimony, [we] could define each survivor as a high discloser, a 
midlevel discloser or a low discloser. High disclosers were people who, when 
they told of the personal traumas that they had suffered, remained 
physiologically relaxed. Low disclosers, on the other hand, exhibited biological 
signs of increased inhibition and tension when disclosing traumatic events. 
Overall, we found that high and midlevel disclosers were significantly healthier 
in the year after the interview than before it. 
(Pennebaker 1997: 86) 
Pennebaker acknowledges that there are individual differences in coping strategies: some 
people my do better by “bottling up” their emotions than would others. Notwithstanding 
this, he is convinced that in the case of people for whom trauma is having a lasting impact, 
writing, rewriting and opening up about the experience is beneficial. “Other studies in 
addition to the holocaust project point to the same conclusion. If you are currently living 
with a trauma from years gone by, writing or telling about it can help you get past it. … If 
                                                
84 There were many more people for whom these events were “living memory” in the mid 1990s. 
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something horrible happened to you five years ago and you are still living with it, writing 
about it will likely help,” (Ibid.: 88) 
Pennebaker suggests that “People have a basic need for completing and resolving tasks,” 
(Ibid: 90) and that “We are often so intent on finding meaning in an event that we become 
irrational,” (Ibid.: 92). As evidence of this latter tendency, Pennebaker cites the prevalence 
of victim blaming and the just world hypothesis (Gilovich et al. 2006: 360). Following a 
traumatic experience “we naturally search for meaning and completion to events that we 
know at some level don't have meaning and can never be resolved” Pennebaker (1997: 92) 
By writing down their experience, or telling the tale of what happened – preferably 
repeatedly, Pennebaker maintains that they construct meaning from the jumble of 
experience. Because narratives must conform to the beginning-middle-end pattern they 
impose a resolution, of sorts, on the previously unresolvable. Perspectives are changed and, 
consequently, emotional bearing managed. Pennebaker writes “… repeatedly confronting 
an upsetting experience allows for a less emotionally laden assessment of its meaning and 
impact” (Pennebaker 1997: 95). Note that this does not imply any altered understanding of 
the causes of a traumatic event. By making the story their own, trauma survivors are better 
able to deal with what happened. This is supported by the contention that acute stress or 
post-traumatic stress disorders can be understood either as a break with an established 
narrative, a gap between reality and the narrative that we use to explain and understand it 
or as the absence of a suitable narrative to accommodate an experience (Brewin 2001; 
Davey 2008: 490; Palgi and Ben-Ezra 2010).  
A significant correlation between writing style and health benefits was that overall narrative 
coherence seemed to be a positive indicator: 
We realised that the people who benefitted from writing were constructing 
stories. On the first day of writing they would often tell about a traumatic 
episode that simply described an experience, often out of sequence and 
disorganised. But day by day, as they continued to write, the episode would take 
on shape as a coherent story with a clear beginning, middle and end. 
(Pennebaker 1997: 104) 
The imposition of narrative structure showed the highest degree of correlation with 
improved health. By ordering the raw and anarchic elements of a traumatic experience – 
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what might be characterised as a violation of the expected narrative (Crossley 2000) – the 
individual is more able to come to terms with it.  
We need to construct coherent and meaningful stories for ourselves. Good 
narratives or stories, then, organise seemingly infinite facets of overwhelming 
events. Once organised, the events are often smaller and easier to deal with. 
(Pennebaker 1997: 103) 
The foregoing section underlines the importance and the power of narratives in constructing 
our world-view. Could not the philosopher, however, object on the grounds of truth? 
4.5 Narrative Truth versus Historical Truth 
But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness; 
nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited 
background against which I distinguish between true and false. 
Wittgenstein, On Certainty, §94 
If the standard is one of correspondence with historical facts, the truth of the 
constructed account – at least in so far as words are chosen to minimise negative 
emotional consequences – might be doubted. How far should the therapeutic narrative 
be allowed to diverge from facts about the patient’s history? As Crossley (2000: 61, 
emphasis added) asks: 
If certain psychotherapeutic techniques encourage us to imagine alternative 
possibilities and imaginatively rewrite our stories, to what extent are they 
committed to historical truth? Does narrative truth, construction of a pleasing, 
coherent and persuasive story, take precedence? 
The criterion for narrative truth is not that the story corresponds to the historical events. It 
is perhaps more important that the narrative serves the purpose of constructing a useful 
meaning for the individual. Usefulness is dependent upon circumstances or the occasion for 
which the narrative is deployed. The notion of narrative truth and the construction of 
meaning are thus compatible, just as each is incompatible with a correspondence standard 
of truth.  
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Bruner (1990: 61) maintains that “We interpret stories by their verisimilitude, their ‘truth 
likeness’, or more accurately their ‘lifelikeness’.” This distinction, between “verisimilitude” 
or “lifelikeness” and causal-explanatory (or historical) truth is key to an appreciation of how 
we can judge a narrative with a particular content acceptable without committing to the 
historical truth of the implied relations between the entities that it contains. A folk 
psychological reason for an action can ring true without being available as a causal 
explanation of that same action. Bruner (1990: 118) again: 
… there are no causes to be grasped with certainty where the act of creating 
meaning is concerned. Only acts, expressions and contexts to be interpreted.  
This implies a different interpretation of truth. Spence (1982) applied just such a distinction 
to psychoanalysis. His project was to differentiate the truth of descriptions of events from 
the unique perspective of a patient and the truth of events – potentially the same event – 
from the objective, historically accurate standpoint. He describes this as the difference 
between narrative truth and historical truth. Events might have meaning and resonance 
for the individual patient; they might even be revealing of the objective ways in which that 
patient behaves. However, the narratives that the patient constructs to describe their role in 
the events and the reasons for their behaviour do not necessarily objectively describe actual 
events related in the precise chronological order that they occurred. By putting things into 
words, constructing our own meaningful narratives from the raw material of episodic 
memory we simultaneously construct our own truths.  
The evidence from the past that emerges in the course of our clinical work may 
be used to confirm our search [for formative events], but it has fallen under the 
shadow of our construction, whatever it happens to be. … The construction not 
only shapes the past – it becomes the past in many cases because many critical 
early experiences are preverbal and therefore have no proper designation until 
we put them into words. 
(Spence 1982: 175) 
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Spence points out that narrative fit (cf. Bruner’s verisimilitude) is often all that the 
psychoanalyst85 in the clinical setting or the lay person in the everyday setting demands in 
order to accept a particular narrative as true.  
A particular clinical event … may seem to clarify the unfolding account of the 
patient’s life history so precisely that both patient and analyst come to the 
conclusion that it must be true. …narrative fit is usually taken to be conclusive, 
and if a piece of the past completes the unfinished clinical picture in just the 
right way … then it acquires its own truth value and no further checking is 
necessary. 
(Ibid.: 181) 
In common with Bruner’s psychology, Spence’s conception of psychoanalysis is of a 
discipline concerned with the interpretation of meanings. These are uncovered by 
examining the constructed narratives that the subject uses to make sense of their experience 
rather than seeking evidence for the historical causes of present psychic disturbances.  
One of the pioneers of narrative psychology, Sarbin (1986) also cautions against regarding 
the interpreted, socially constructed truths of narratives – including, explicitly, folk-
psychological narratives – as true causal-explanatory accounts of action. He suggests that 
we can regard narratives of action as guiding patterns for life and conduct that become 
useful only when used as a pre-existing scaffolding for the interpretation of events. Sarbin 
suggests that we ask ourselves “what kind of narrative is this like?” and impose that 
structure on the received event. When the events are new, unexpected and resist explanation 
according to the situational or personal schemas of ordinary attribution (see Chapter 3) we 
construct a narrative that fits by modifying one from our stock of ready-made structures. 
This is, I argue below, indicative of the application of some kind of narrative assessment 
heuristic. 
According to Sarbin, narrative is the root metaphor of human psychology, the fundamental 
scaffolding for our experience of the world. He writes “… human beings think, perceive, 
imagine, and make moral choices according to narrative structures” (Sarbin 1986: 8). 
Narrative is “a fruitful metaphor for examining and interpreting human action,” (Ibid.: 19). 
                                                
85 Spence’s concern is with psychoanalysis but for my purposes it is safe to assume that the same consideration applies to 
other psychotherapeutic practices employing narratives. 
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It would thus be a mistake to regard a narrative, constructed to provide a ready-made 
scaffolding for an action or an experience of action for a causal-explanatory account of 
that action. 
In the context of psychotherapeutic efficacy, Spence is adamant that, although recognising 
the difference, we should allow the narrative to take the lead. What is important, he argues, 
is the meaning that the patient has constructed through narrative, rather than historical 
accuracy. The therapist’s role is to make changes to the narrative that bring about helpful 
changes to the meaning, diminishing negative associations and augmenting positive 
interpretations. In this way, the patient might be liberated, if not from the history (which we 
assume to be immutable) but from the meaning that they have attached by means of their 
narrative. The narrative psychologist requires only that our narratives of those episodes, 
together with the overriding narrative through which episodes are interrelated and given 
structure, are sufficiently coherent to offer a narrative truth. The contention of therapeutic 
narrative psychology is that certain mental pathologies result either when those attached 
meanings have negative connotations or when coherence breaks down. 
In answer to the question with which this section began, scientists, such as the psychologists 
featured in Part One of this thesis, should be concerned with historical truth, in which 
causes can be identified and categorised. Since belief-desire psychology is best suited to the 
realm of narrative meaning construction, it is not suitable for this purpose. Philosophers 
should be aware of the distinction and ensure that belief-desire accounts are restricted to 
their proper, non-causal, domain. 
This finds philosophical resonance, I suggest, with Austin (1962) when he urges 
philosophers to pay attention to the roles that utterances play in discourse:  
It is essential to realise that ‘true’ and ‘false’, like ‘free’ and ‘unfree’, do not 
stand for anything simple at all; but only for a general dimension of being a 
right and proper thing to say as opposed to a wrong thing, in these 
circumstances, to this audience, for these purposes and with these intentions. 
(Austin 1962: 145) 
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4.6 Narratives With or Without Mental State Terms? 
Surprisingly for those who regard belief-desire attributions as a fundamental way that 
humans organise stories, explicit ascriptions of mental states tend not to feature in narrative 
storytelling, particularly literary narratives. One, perhaps the main, narrative archetype is 
the quest, in which the agent driving the story (the protagonist) seeks to restore equilibrium 
to a world that has been disrupted by some force beyond the protagonists control.  This 
force is known by film story-writing teacher Robert McKee as the inciting incident of story 
(McKee 1999: 181). 
This is coterminous with the “disruption or disequilibrium” that Herman (2009b) suggests 
is introduced into the character’s story world and from which they seek to recover their 
balance – even if the resolution of the story is an entirely new state of affairs.  
It is possible to cast this quest model of narrative in terms of belief-desire psychology. We 
could insist that, after the inciting incident, every action the protagonist takes is one that 
they believe will bring about their desire to restore balance to their world. 
However, making any propositional attitude states of the protagonist explicit is not helpful 
to the storyteller. Recipients of narratives find that the inciting incident or upset that the 
protagonist suffers is a sufficiently powerful situational stressor (cf., references to 
situational attribution in Chapter 3) to lead to whatever action the protagonist takes. Their 
choices of action will reveal their underlying character or personality traits (see personal 
attribution, again in Chapter 3). Revealing character through action choice in this way is 
the origin of the oft-cited suggestion that would-be creative writers concentrate on showing 
rather than telling their story. Author Chuck Palahniuk recommends eschewing “thought 
verbs” (believe, understand, desire, hate etcetera) altogether (Palahniuk 2013).  According 
to McKee (1999: 144-45), narratives that explicitly reveal a protagonist’s intentional mental 
states are unsatisfying to the reader, viewer, listener or hearer: this way of making the inner 
life of characters explicit and serves only to remind the audience that what they are 
experiencing is an artificial construct. 
As Hutto (2008b), Ratcliffe (2006, 2007) and Reddy and Morris (2009) point out, in real 
life, most of the time we have no need to posit a relationship between propositional attitudes 
and behaviour in order to make sense of what a particular agent does under which particular 
circumstances. This also seems to be the lesson of attribution theories in social psychology 
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(Chapter 3, this thesis). All that is required is the story of who did what and when. 
Combining the specific character traits of the agent with the prevailing circumstances and 
the temporal position relative to other relevant events builds a coherent, meaningful and 
acceptable narrative. 
The fact that propositional attitudes are usually omitted does not refute the contention that 
the belief-desire law underlies action choice. However, it does suggest that we are fully 
equipped to make sense of actions without having the propositional attitudes that the agent 
possessed at the time spelled out or imposed on the protagonist. 
The author who is committed to FP-style explanations of behaviour might, conceivably, 
advert to explicit belief-desire language in making the “inner life” of his characters obvious: 
this is a characteristic of much bad writing. The objective here is to show that we can 
understand action without such exposition. 
Evidence from our oldest literary traditions and from at least one other culture suggest that 
an appreciation of people as minded, intentional actors is not dependent on a mental-state 
vocabulary. 
An objector to my stance thus far in this chapter might suggest that because narratives of 
action featuring “belief” and “desire” ascriptions have appeared “throughout our literary 
history” they must have some foundation in truth. One way that this objection was put 
directly to me is that “Belief and desire action explanations are even in Homer!” 
It would be possible to argue against this point on the grounds that just because we can cite 
instances of the description of action in terms of causal beliefs and desires does not 
guarantee their truth. It could be that all such narratives are never more than narratively 
true, that they might provide a certain meaning (perhaps that the agent is the author of their 
own actions) but this does not establish the causal relationship between beliefs and desires 
and actions. This would be one way of approaching the objection. It would be unlikely to 
convince the interlocutor who maintains that the ubiquity and antiquity of such action 
descriptions must have originated in some recognition of their underlying truth. 
More fatal to the objection, however, is that the assertion “they are even in Homer” is, 
objectively, not true. 
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The most striking feature of the Homeric conception of mind is that they had 
none. There is no evidence of a concept of mind as distinguished from body and 
there is an absence of such terms as ‘decided’, ‘thought’, ‘believed’ or 
‘equivocated’. 
(Olson 1994: 238) 
David Olson, a professor of applied cognitive science, used textual and historical analysis 
to investigate the way that advent of writing and the coming of widespread literacy to 
populations has had a profound effect on our relationship with information and our mental 
lives. Since the Homeric epics were, originally, orally-transmitted narratives, designed to 
be memorised and performed to groups of listeners, this would, he theorised, make them 
significantly different in character to the kinds of narrative that are present in our modern, 
literate culture. 
Citing earlier analytic work (Jaynes 1976) on Homer and on the earlier parts of The Bible,86 
Olson maintains that the kinds of occurrences that might today be described in mental state 
terms are, instead, described as bodily sensations. For example, “feelings or emotions are 
referred to as the palpitating heart or panting breath or uttering cries,” (Olson 1994: 239). 
If a character in the Homeric epics makes a choice or decision, he is reported as hearing 
voices, telling him what he should do. In the Iliad, Book 19, 100-104 (Homer 1991) we have 
Agamemnon simultaneously accepting responsibility and passing blame for his having 
taken Briseis from Achilles: 
But I am not to blame! 
Zeus and Fate and the furies stalking through the night 
They are the ones who drove the savage madness in my heart 
That day in assembly when I seized Achilles’ prize 
On my own authority, true, but what could I do? 
Olson notes that Bruner (1990, 1991) has postulated that the sense of self emerges from 
“story-telling” involving the “narrative ‘I’’. The bards who composed the Homeric epics, 
before they were committed to writing and attributed to a single semi-mythical author, 
seemed to lack this sense of an autobiographical narrative. “Action, for them, appears to 
                                                
86 Given that the first written versions of the Homeric epics are thought to date from the 8th century BCE (Nicolson, 2014) this 
would make the older parts of the Bible roughly contemporaneous (Jaynes, 1976). 
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reside in the collective which included the gods, rather than in the individuals and their 
minds,” (Olson 1994: 240). 
In the Homeric period, even those ancient Greek terms that are today inevitably associated 
with mind are used in ways indistinguishable from their bodily effects. The term “psyche” 
(ψυχή), for example, which is today taken as a cognate for “mind” seems to mean nothing 
more than “life”: when people are killed, their psyche “bleeds out” of them.  
Even today, there are cultures whose language has no mental-state terms such as “belief” 
and “desire”. The Junin-Quechua people of south America speak one of the successor 
languages to those of the Inca civilisation. This is predominantly an oral tongue, having no 
indigenous script of its own; although it has been transcribed into the Roman alphabet since 
the Spanish colonisation of South America. According to an investigation by Vinden (1996) 
this language has no cognates for “belief” or “desire” nor any words designating mental 
states. The culture has acquired some mentalistic terms since colonial times in the form of 
Spanish loan-words. However, these are altogether absent from some of their older (pre-
Colombian) folk tales.  
This lack does not prevent the Junin-Quechua having a rich narrative tradition. An 
illustration will show how a non-mentalistic culture tells stories and how this is possible 
without such constructs. 
Here is how Vinden briefly relates one of the Junin-Quechua folk tales: 
The story of the Fox and the Cheese provides an example of such a folk- tale. 
Briefly, the tale is about a very hungry fox who sees a large, round cheese in 
the middle of the lake. As the narrator tells us, however, it is really the moon's 
reflection, which looks like a cheese. When he asks an owl to help him, the owl 
refuses, saying that it's not a cheese. The fox attempts to swim out and eat it, 
and drowns. In the Junin Quechua version of the story, there is clear use of the 
language of appearances to describe the fact that the moon looked like a cheese. 
However, the thoughts and beliefs of the fox and owl are never discussed.  
(Vinden 1996: 1708) 
Vinden (1996) used this example to describe how differently people from our culture, with 
their rich panoply of mental-state terms, would retell this story. A literal translation of the 
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story was read out to a small group (seven) of Canadian graduate students. They were then 
asked to write the story down as they remembered it. All of these subjects added at least 
one mental state term to their version of the story. 
Vinden also wanted to investigate whether the absence of mental-state terms from the 
language would hamper the ability of Junin Quechua children to understand the mentality 
of other people. Groups of Junin Quechua children were set a series of false-belief tasks. 
The classic false belief task is the “Sally-Anne” test (Baron-Cohen et al. 1985). Subjects 
(usually children) are shown a scenario acted out with two dolls. One of the dolls, Sally, is 
in possession of a marble. The experimenter shows Sally placing her marble in a hiding 
place and then leaving the room. The second doll, Anne, then takes the marble and places 
it in a different hiding place. The subjects then are asked where Sally, on returning to the 
room, will look for her marble? 
Most subjects over the age of about four years suggest that Anne will expect her marble to 
be where she left it, in other words she will have a false belief. Children under four and 
autistic adults typically “fail” this task and predict that Sally will go straight to the new 
hiding place, where Anne has secreted her marble (ibid.). This is taken as evidence of a 
failure to ascribe false beliefs to Sally. Non-verbal versions of the false-belief task have 
suggested that non-human primates also lack this ability (Call and Tomasello 1999). 
Interestingly, pre-verbal infants, using the same gaze-tracking methods, seem to be more 
successful at anticipating that Sally will look for her marble in her original hiding place (S. 
C. Johnson 2000). 
Vinden’s results with the Junin-Quechua children were similar to those expected from 
children of equivalent age whose native European languages are replete with mental-state 
vocabulary. This should not be surprising: the story of the fox and the cheese requires some 
conception of being mistaken, of acting on false information. The finding is in accordance 
with Olson’s comment regarding the Homeric epics that: 
Homeric folk psychology was therefore quite different from ours in at least one 
way. Like us, they understood lies and deception – the competence that 
distinguishes children under four years, autistic adults and non-human primates 
from normal humans – yet they lacked a vocabulary and its corresponding 
concepts for thinking about the mind. 
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(Olson 1994: 240) 
This suggests that an understanding of deception and mistake and the realisation that people 
can be subject to these does not rest on the deployment of a term for “belief” or a cognate 
of “false-belief”. The concepts of deception, error and so on are thus potentially independent 
from a causal conception of “belief”. In her conclusion, Vinden suggests that: 
Perhaps, however, we should also cast our nets more widely in a variety of 
cultures, seeking not so much to discover common achievement on such things 
as theory of mind tasks, but also looking for ways to explore more generally the 
extent to which people think of individuals as holding private, interpretable 
mental states. 
(Vinden 1996: 1715-16) 
Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis have shown that that many cognitive and social psychologists 
do not employ mental-state terms to describe or explain action choice or interpersonal 
understanding, respectively. Taking the observations of Olson alongside those of Vinden 
also suggests that employing mental state terms in narratives of action is culturally 
dependent and describing action in belief-desire terms is an artefact of our contemporary 
culture.   
4.7 Narrative Folk Psychology 
As suggested in the introduction, two descriptions of belief-desire psychology have vied for 
the dominant position and spawned a number of intermediate positions. Theory-theory has 
it that people are equipped with an innate theory of the relationship between beliefs and 
desires and action. Simulation theory suggests that we run off-line simulations of how we 
would act if attending to particular belief-desire sets. In recent years these two have been 
joined by a third distinctive entrant to the debate, the Narrative Practice Hypothesis 
(NPH), proposed by Hutto (2008b, 2008a, 2009). 
Hutto argues that we should adopt some lessons from Bruner (1990) and from narrative 
psychology if we want to understand how folk-psychological accounts develop and come 
to seem so plausible as reasons for actions.  
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Folk psychology just is the practice of making sense of intentional action by 
means of a special kind of narrative, those that are about or feature a person’s 
reasons. 
(Hutto 2008b: 7) 
Hutto offers an account of the development of folk psychology as a skill, suggesting that a 
mature individual’s ability to deploy reasons is allied with and dependent upon that 
individual’s acquisition of competence with narratives. As primary evidence for this, he 
marshals research from developmental psychology that suggests that our ability to 
understand and deploy belief/desire reasons and our ability to construct coherent narratives 
reach something approaching their mature facility around the same age in most individuals 
(typically four years of age). His critique of more traditional, theory-based, accounts of how 
folk psychology works is more conceptual. Defining “folk psychology” as the human 
facility to make sense of actions in terms of reasons, he claims that the NPH, postulates “no 
dedicated inherited inner mechanisms” (Hutto 2008b: 246) because the practice of 
attributing propositional attitudes in order to provide reasons for action would be an integral 
part of the practice of constructing narratives, which he, along with the narrative 
psychologists and philosophers such as Ricoeur (1984, 1991) and MacIntyre (1981) (see 
below), take to be a significant developmental stage in its own right. The NPH suggests that 
narrative competence does everything that we might require a dedicated mindreading 
mechanism to do. 
Hutto is at pains to point out that many of our social transactions do not depend on the 
attribution of folk-psychological states to others at all. Sometimes, he recognizes, the 
situation, or some character trait or stable disposition that we attribute to ourselves or others, 
is sufficient to offer a reason for specific instances of behaviour. He writes: 
It is therefore false to say that without folk psychology we would be bereft of 
any reliable means of interacting with others. Nor do we call on it that often. 
Many of our routine encounters with others take place in situations where the 
social roles and rules are well established, so much so that unless we behave in 
a deviant manner we typically have no need to understand one another by means 
of the belief/desire schema. More often than not we neither predict nor seek to 
explain the actions of others in terms of their unique beliefs and desires at all. 
A Therapeutic Elimination… 
Mark Curtis, UEA June, 2016  168 
(Hutto 2008b: 3-4) 
Even if one accepts Hutto’s hypothesis that folk psychological competence develops 
through the acquisition of skills at understanding, constructing and deploying narratives, 
could it not be that our mature understanding of the roles of belief and desire in providing 
reasons for an agent having acted in a particular way is “abstracted away” from narratives? 
That is to say, we might learn how beliefs and desires work by seeing their roles within 
certain kinds of narrative but once we have acquired this understanding we are able to 
deploy them to designate causally efficacious mental states – without the “narrative 
scaffolding” that allowed the individual to gain an understanding of their roles. Hutto, 
however, maintains that the ability to account for actions in terms of reasons remains, 
throughout our lives, vested in our ability to deploy narratives that feature propositional 
attitude attributions. 
Hutto’s objective is that folk psychology should be immunised from certain philosophical 
concerns that have dogged the theory-theory and simulation-theory accounts. Of particular 
significance to the stance taken in the present thesis, he suggests that regarding a 
belief/desire claim as narratively grounded avoids issues over the degree to which such 
claims can be satisfactory as causal explanations – at least compared with the demands of 
scientific causal explanations and the resulting doubts over issues of mental causation.  
… at least in some cases the mere citing of the appropriate belief/desire, even 
when it fits appropriately with the other relevant beliefs and desires and even 
assuming that it is causally responsible for the action in question, does not 
suffice to explain an action in the strong sense of making it intelligible. A larger 
narrative that further contextualises the reason, either in terms of different 
cultural norms or the peculiarities of a person’s history or values, is required for 
that (that is, if anything can achieve this end).   
(Hutto 2008b: 8) 
We determine whether a belief/desire claim satisfactorily explains an action, this implies, 
by the acceptability of the narrative. This contrasts with the question of causal 
determination, which scientist would demand of a mechanistic explanation such as those 
arrived at by functional decomposition in psychology (Chapter 1).  
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Ratcliffe (2008, 2009) agrees with Hutto that reasons couched in terms of beliefs and desires 
are not the only nor even the most usual way in which we understand our own or others’ 
actions. However, for Ratcliffe, any description of folk psychology as the way that ordinary 
people (“the folk”), free of the constraints or requirements of either scientific explanation 
or of philosophically rigorous precision, account for actions is either an unwarranted 
oversimplification of or an unhelpful abstraction (“an uninformative caricature”, he alleges) 
from a rich variety of ordinary practices which may vary by the moment, let alone by the 
occasion. In his view, describing “our so-called folk psychology requires difficult 
philosophical work” that, he claims, has not been done (Ratcliffe 2009: 379). He alleges 
that, for all its strengths, Hutto’s NPH suffers from being another attempt by a philosopher 
to identify and describe the abilities that allow us to deploy belief-desire reasons rather than 
addressing the pressing and more fundamental question of “…whether ‘using belief-desire 
psychology to predict and explain behaviour’ is something that we do.” (ibid: 380). This, 
of course, is part of the rationale for the present thesis. 
Also, even if Hutto is right about the fact that competence with belief-desire reasons, on the 
limited occasions that they are deployed, emerges from our competence with narratives this 
is entirely consistent with the idea that the content of the belief-desire hypothesis is 
culturally determined. As such, it would be a feature of the narratives that we use, in this 
culture, today. It need not be an essential part of action choice or interpersonal 
understanding for all humans, everywhere and forever. 
Another influential view of the central role of narratives in the development of our 
relationship with the world comes from MacIntyre (1981: 54) 
It is through hearing stories … that children learn, or mis-learn, both what a 
child and what a parent is, what the cast of characters may be in the drama into 
which they have been born and what the ways of the world are. Deprive children 
of stories and you leave them unscripted, anxious stutterers in their actions as 
in their words. Hence there is no way to give us an understanding of any society, 
including our own, except through the stock of stories which constitute its initial 
dramatic resources. Mythology, in its original sense, is at the heart of things. 
I suspect that Hutto, MacIntyre and even Ricoeur would agree that individuals come to a 
mature understanding of the world, themselves and each other only once they acquire a 
facility with narratives. For philosophical accounts of the role of narratives, and for the 
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narrative psychologist. stories are a tool by means of which individuals impose temporal 
order on and make sense of the chaotic stream of experience: as rationalisations of what 
agents do, their value lies in the way that they permit the person who constructs them to 
impose order on their appreciation of the world of the world – not to explain it in terms of 
causes and effects. The commitment to truth in the everyday narrative of action is not the 
same as the commitment to causal-explanatory adequacy required by science. 
Using such narrative procedures does not presuppose or entail having a theory 
of one’s own or another’s mind. Rather it involves building a model of how 
actions are situated in time and (social) space, and of how they emerge from 
and impinge upon the larger pattern of actions that constitutes all or part of a 
person’s life-course. 
(Herman 2009a: 69) 
I have suggested that philosophical folk psychology, belief-desire psychology and its 
central tenet the belief-desire law constrain philosophical thinking by presenting diverse 
phenomena as a single philosophical picture: a fixed viewpoint that excluded alternatives. 
Perhaps, in the light of the present chapter, I might employ an alternative metaphor: perhaps 
we should see philosophical folk psychology as a persistent narrative of action-
explanation, interpersonal understanding of reason giving. Like a culture’s fundamental 
mythology, it is difficult for anyone in thrall to the world view to admit that there are other 
ways to relate the phenomena. However, other narratives of action are available – both 
within other cultures and within the specific fields of social and cognitive psychology 
(chapters 3 and 2, respectively).  
The propositions describing this world picture might be part of a kind of 
mythology. And their role is like that of rules of a game; and the game can be 
learned purely practically, without learning any explicit rules. 
Wittgenstein, On Certainty, §95  
4.8 Is There a “Narrative Heuristic”? 
Mythology, fairy tales, gossip and news reports: we are drenched in stories from our earliest 
years. We learn that much of the information that we use to understand the world comes in 
the shape of a narrative. In this section I want to speculate that the ubiquity of narrative has 
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an even more insidious effect: whether our choice of whether and what to accept might be 
influenced by the way the information is presented. I want to ask whether it is possible that 
we base some of our judgements on a narrative heuristic. 
One persistent systematic divergence of reasoning from the entailing norm is the 
conjunction fallacy. This is taken as evidence of the use of a one-part heuristic – 
representativeness – for which the decision rule is: the option with the highest probability 
[of class membership] is that which is similar in essential characteristics to its parent 
population and which reflects the salient features of the process by which it is generated. A 
classic demonstration of this effect is known as the Linda case. Subjects were tested by 
being offered the following vignette: 
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken and very bright. She majored in 
philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of 
discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear 
demonstrations.  
(Tversky and Kahneman 1983: 297) 
And were then asked which of the following statements about Linda is most probable:  
Linda is a teacher in elementary school. 
Linda works in a bookstore and takes Yoga classes.  
Linda is active in the feminist movement. (F) 
Linda is a psychiatric social worker.  
Linda is a member of the League of Women Voters.  
Linda is a bank teller. (T)  
Linda is an insurance salesperson.  
Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement. (T&F)  
(Ibid.) 
For the three questions of most interest to the researchers, T, F and T&F, 85% of 
respondents ranked these in this order of probability: F>T&F>T. In a subsequent test, an 
even larger group of subjects was offered to choose the most probable between just these 
two possibilities: 
Linda is a bank teller. (T)  
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Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement. (T&F)  
(Ibid.: 299) 
Once again, 85% of the respondents indicated that, given the description of Linda, T&F was 
more probable than T alone. 
The subjects in both studies concluded that a conjunction of possibilities, T&F, was more 
probable than one of the individual conjuncts, T. By the laws of probability this is not 
possible. T&F could, conceivably, be as probable as T, but not more so. The respondents 
have committed the conjunction fallacy. This has been taken as evidence both of people’s 
general lack of facility with probabilities (see Chapter 2, this thesis) and of their tendency 
to reason heuristically; by applying the representativeness heuristic, the subjects have found 
the description of Linda more representative of the category “feminist bank teller” than of 
the category “bank teller” on its own. 
Consider, however, a further demonstration of the conjunction fallacy from Tversky and 
Kahneman (1983: 302): 
Suppose Bjorn Borg reaches the Wimbledon finals in 1981. Please rank in order 
the following outcomes from most to least likely.  
a) Borg will win the match. 
b) Borg will lose the first set. 
c) Borg will lose the first set but win the match 
d) Borg will win the first set but lose the match.87 
Seventy-two per-cent of respondents rated option c), “Borg loses the first set and wins the 
match” more likely than option b). As with the Linda vignette, the conjunction was deemed 
more likely than one of its conjuncts. Once again Tversky and Kahneman take this as 
evidence of the use of the representativeness heuristic. The question is, representative of 
what? Of Borg’s five consecutive Wimbledon wins (1975-1980) he lost the first set three 
times and won the first twice. Was this the overwhelming impression of the man who 
dominated the final at SW19 for those years?88  
                                                
87 This was presented in October 1980, three months after Borg had won Wimbledon for a record fifth consecutive time, 
88 Historical note: Borg did reach the Wimbledon final in 1981, won the first set but lost the match in four to McEnroe. 
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Consider, however, that losing the first set and then coming back to win follows a traditional 
story arc in which the hero or protagonist overcomes initial adversity to restore balance 
by coming out victorious at the end. A hero who is invincible, start to finish, is no kind of 
story. Little wonder that subjects who have been exposed to story after story that follows 
such a pattern would deem this likely – or at least compelling. 
Either the representativeness heuristic includes “what kind of story is this like” or we have 
a specific heuristic for narrative acceptability. Tversky and Kahneman sought to eliminate 
several kinds of probabilistic and linguistic connotations from their studies of the 
conjunction heuristic. It would be useful to know, given all of the thoughts examined above 
on the importance of narrative structures to our ordering of experience, whether we have a 
narrative heuristic that compares scenarios to our accepted narratives and makes judgements 
based on this comparison.  
Defining a narrative heuristic would involve specifying the process rule the (basic and 
simple) capacities that the rule exploits and the kinds of problems the heuristic can solve. 
(Gigerenzer 2008: 24). Among the process rules would be a search rule such as “what kind 
of story is this?”, a stopping rule akin to “stop when I find an archetype that seems to match 
the story I am reading/hearing/viewing” and a decision rule which might take the form 
“accept stories with elements that most closely match the archetype in content, form and 
emotional resonance”. In the Bjorn Borg scenario (b) would be judged most acceptable (and 
so likely) a story because it matches a traditional heroic quest. The environment would be 
any time we are presented with information, testimony etc. from a human source. It would 
be a matter of empirical psychological investigation to establish which capacities the 
heuristic exploited.  
Note that a narrative judged as acceptable, by means of a narrative heuristic, is being judged 
by a standard of “narrative truth” or Bruner’s (1990) “verisimilitude” rather than by a truth-
standard based on correspondence with the facts, or (in the case of a predicted result) against 
a set of calculated probabilities. In common with all heuristic judgements, its outcome is 
not entailed or constrained by the standards of logical inference. It is judged by whether it 
is a good story, whether it has meaning for us and, at base, whether it is like other stories 
that we have heard. 
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Empirical investigations – including simulations – could also establish whether such a 
heuristic would work and whether people use it. Given the ubiquity and power of narratives, 
it seems reasonable to speculate that we might. 
4.9 Chapter Summary  
Narratives are indispensable as a way for people to make sense of events and the stream of 
experience (section 4.3). They are ubiquitous, occurring in all cultures and in a variety of 
forms (4.1). In virtue of their central role in cognition, the narratives that we encounter have 
a powerful hold on us (4.3-4). 
Narrative psychology (4.3) makes use of the narrative features of our mental organisation 
in order to construct useful pictures of the ways people process information. Narrative 
therapeutic approaches (4.4) use the idea that alterations to the narratives that individuals 
habitually apply can have beneficial effects. 
Narratives, including narratives of action, are not only possible without allusion to the 
mental states of the actor, they might even be preferable (4.6). If the Junin Quechua people 
can have such rich narrative lives without terms equivalent to “belief” and “desire” and if 
one of the foundation texts of Western literature – Homer’s Iliad – can manage to give an 
impression of intentional action without reference to the mental states of actors, then 
elimination of propositional attitudes from causal accounts need not present a major 
problem for our understanding of action. 
Propositional attitude ascriptions are not a desirable feature of narratives because they divert 
attention from the action and the choices under pressure which are the traditional ways of 
revealing character through story (4.6). Narratives that include unnatural insight into a 
person’s “inner life” are far removed from the way that we understand the people we 
encounter in everyday life. To the extent that they do appear in narratives, ascriptions of 
belief and desire are not core elements of the story (4.2); it is possible to render any story 
in which they feature without them and still tell the same story. They have become a part of 
our vocabulary of story only recently. 
Once established as regular features of our common stories, propositional attitude 
ascriptions are accepted on the basis that they are like the other stories that we know. We 
use heuristic reasoning to judge whether an individual story is acceptable rather than 
deducing any entailed inferences about the truth of its components (4.5 & 4.8). We judge 
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stories by this standard of “narrative truth” (4.5) rather than by any objective standard of 
truth. Accepting this distinction is essential if the elimination of “belief” and “desire” from 
causal accounts of action is to be possible. 
Narrative therapy (4.4) works by changing the stories that people habitually use to describe 
themselves and their situations in order to improve their psychological well-being. In this 
chapter I am suggesting that the “persistence of the attitudes” (Fodor 1993) owes much to 
the story-structure that is prevalent in our culture. Judgements of the acceptability of stories 
that feature propositional attitudes are based on their resemblance to other stories rather 
than on deductive reasoning (4.7).  
Finally I speculate that because our judgement of the acceptability – or meaningfulness – 
of a narrative has features in common with heuristic judgements in other fields, it is 
conceivable that when doing so we apply a narrative heuristic (4.8). Empirical 
investigation will be required to determine whether such a heuristic is in play and what its 
features would be. 
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5 Chapter Five:  
Excuses, Testimony, Mens Rea and Causes 
Abstract: Two classes of locution are sometimes deployed to avoid 
embarrassment or save face, to divert moral opprobrium or to avoid legal 
censure: justifications and excuses. On occasion, both of these uses are 
couched in terms of the beliefs, desires or other propositional attitudes of the 
speaker. J.L. Austin’s distinction between justifications and excuses is 
developed here, concluding that propositional attitude ascriptions are, 
despite appearances to the contrary, only ever used as excuses, since 
justifications depend on a definition of the act itself and are therefore 
independent of the mind of the actor. I examine whether excuses that feature 
beliefs and desire are ever assessed with reference to the causal efficacy of 
those attitudes, together with the legal requirement of mens rea: since this 
concept requires that the state of mind of an accused person is considered in 
assessing culpability, we might expect to find mentalistic terms such as 
“belief” and “desire”. Instead, as two case histories illustrate, a much more 
holistic standard of reasonableness plays a crucial role in establishing guilt. 
In the final analysis, I can only say that I did what I believed to be the right 
thing. 
    Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, testifying to the 
Chilcot enquiry into the 2003 invasion of Iraq, (14th January 2011) 
Frequently, we have to account to others for our actions. We have to offer justifications; we 
have to offer excuses. There is an important social dimension to these two functions. 
Whether the objective is to accept responsibility but claim that the action was justified, or 
to deny responsibility, the ability to avoid censure or gain the agreement of our peers is an 
important factor in achieving and maintaining social cohesion. There are at least three 
circumstances in which the need for such a description arises: 
a) When the action or behaviour is unexpected, puzzling or incomprehensible given 
the circumstances or what is generally understood about the agent’s character traits 
or dispositions. 
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b) When the action transgresses a moral norm; when a prohibition or taboo appears to 
have been violated or when the standard expectations of the social setting have not 
been met. 
c) When a law is broken; when the action itself or its result is prohibited by law or 
when the agent fails to act in a way mandated by law in the circumstances (crimes 
of omission). 
These are not exhaustive nor mutually exclusive. A great many violations of the law would 
also be abuses of moral precepts and some instances of puzzling or incomprehensible 
behaviour might be immoral or illegal or both. Conversely, one potential defence against a 
charge of having broken a law would be to claim that one was observing a moral standard 
that trumped the “letter of the law”. One does not have to delve too deeply into imagination 
or history to find examples where obeying a particular law would be an example of a moral 
failure.  
Claiming that the moral rule overrides the legal prohibition would be an example of a 
justification for the illegal act. A person who breaks some expected norm, moral or 
otherwise, might offer an excuse for their behaviour on the grounds that they were 
intoxicated or suffering from some other temporary defect of reason. This would not justify 
what they did but it would be expected to reduce their culpability or make their behaviour 
more understandable (in the case of divergence from expected behaviour). We even permit 
defences on the basis of failure of reason (although not usually in cases of intoxication) in 
serious legal cases.  
An individual charged with an offence might use the claim that a particular action was “out 
of character” in mitigation. This would be neither a justification or an excuse. 
The present chapter is concerned with justifications and excuses in one or more of these 
categories; in particular, with justifications and excuses that make use of claims or 
attributions of specific beliefs and desires. To begin, we should be clear about the meaning 
of “justification” and “excuse” and the distinction between them. 
5.1 Justifications and Making Excuses 
Austin (1979a: 176) offers an influential distinction between justification and excuse: 
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In one defence, briefly, we accept responsibility but deny that it was bad: in the 
other, we admit that it was bad but don’t accept full, or even any, responsibility.  
Justifications are what we offer when we argue that the facts warranted the act. As a 
warranted act, either no legal or moral liability should be attached or any remaining such 
liability should be diminished. Neither should the act be regarded as anomalous since the 
circumstances justify that choice of action, however out of sorts it might appear before the 
justification is known. 
Excuses, on the other hand, indicate that although the agent acknowledges that the act itself 
was unwarranted, they did not act of their own free choice – they were restricted, in other 
words, as to what choice of action was available to them. Examples would include coercion, 
involuntary movements, hypnotic states or any other circumstance in which an individual 
acts outside of their own rational control.89  
If beliefs, for example, are fundamental to our understanding of how actions come about, 
then this distinction would raise two related questions, as Zimmerman (1997) points out: 
Can one do objective moral wrong and yet not act in the belief that one is doing 
objective moral wrong? 
Can one act in the belief that one is doing objective moral wrong and yet not do 
objective moral wrong? 
In practice, as Zimmerman concedes, such questions are sidestepped. In order for self-
ascriptions of specific beliefs to figure when offering excuses or justification their must, 
first, be some kind of accusation. The excuse serves the purpose of trying to deflect that 
accusation. 
For example, a bank manager is accused of aiding a gang in robbing his own bank by 
opening the vault. He offers an excuse of coercion: he believed that the gang had taken his 
family hostage and that they would do harm to his loved ones if he failed to comply. The 
basis of his belief was that the lead robber had handed him a mobile telephone and he had 
heard his wife’s voice telling him that a group of masked men with firearms were 
threatening her and his children at that moment. The bank manager would not deny that 
                                                
89 It is, of course, a definitional question as to whether an event that takes place outside of an agent’s rational control can 
ever be an action at all. 
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opening the vault to the robbers made him complicit in their crime. He would ask that we 
take into account his excuse of coercion – made credible by his reasonable belief that his 
family would suffer harm if he did not help them. If the reality of the situation was that his 
wife had arranged to abscond with the gang leader and the proceeds of the robbery, the bank 
manager’s excuse still stands on the basis of his belief in the coercion. It does not have to 
be real: all that we would demand in order to find his excuse acceptable is that he had 
reason to believe it, reason to find the coercion compelling and that he desired to keep his 
family safe. His excuse, that rests on his belief, deflects the accusation. 
The question is whether this success depends on an assumption of the causal efficacy of his 
beliefs and desires? 
In another example, a police officer is despatched to investigate an alleged break-in at an 
unoccupied house on a residential street. The call to the police has come in from a member 
of a neighbourhood watch association. Part of the association’s service is to alert all of its 
members by SMS (text-message) whenever there is a suspicion that burglars might be in 
the area. Unfortunately, the investigating police officer misreads the address and enters a 
different house nearby. He makes a stealthy entry, hoping to catch the miscreant red-handed. 
The householder at this property is alert to the threat thanks to the message from the 
neighbourhood watch operation. She becomes aware of an unidentified person creeping 
about her house and opens fire with a handgun, shooting the unfortunate police officer dead. 
Her defence, when accused of the grievous crime of killing a police officer, is that she 
believed that the police officer was a burglar. She has both the SMS from the neighbourhood 
watch and the police officer’s method of entry and stealthy movements through her house 
to thank for this belief. Her defence would be one of justification – self-defence – had she 
shot the burglar. However, having in fact shot the police officer, (undoubtedly an illegal 
act) she is effectively, like the bank manager, offering an excuse, which again rests on her 
belief – in this instance that there was a burglar in her house. 
Does the acceptability of her excuse rest on her belief, albeit erroneous, being the cause of 
her having opened fire? Or is our standard really one of the reasonableness of an action 
under the circumstances? Given that the same actions on the part of the householder might 
conceivably had led to the death of a burglar – for which she might have offered the 
justification of self-defence – where is her belief in relation to the distinction between 
excuse and justification? 
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We should not lose sight of the fact that in both of these examples we would presume that 
the subjects would have experienced considerable fear. The bank manager was afraid that 
his family was in danger, the householder that there was a burglar in her house. In fact, if 
in the householder case a prosecutor asked why she did not challenge the intruder by calling 
out, which might have given the police officer time to establish identity before the fatal shot 
was fired, she would be likely to cite her fear as an excuse. She was too afraid to make a 
sound.  
This is reflected by the legal theorists Alexander and Kessler Ferzan (2009) in arguing for 
a new theory of criminal law that places the establishment of culpability as the central matter 
of contention. Traditional models suggest that justifications focus on the wrongfulness of 
the act and so should be mind-independent whereas excuses centre on the blameworthiness 
of the actor – and so may be supported by the actor’s description of their subjective mental 
states, including beliefs. According to the model proposed by Alexander and Kessler 
Ferzan: 
...whether the actor's conduct is justified because of the facts that actually exist 
or alternatively [excused] because of his beliefs about such facts will not matter 
because his culpability is not affected by any mistaken beliefs. 
(Alexander and Kessler Ferzan 2009: 92) 
The motivation behind these authors’ attempt to exclude discussion of an actor’s beliefs 
from considerations of culpability, from the distinction between justifications and excuses 
and from the acceptability of either is the central question of this chapter -  how much we 
need to regard beliefs as causal in order to take them into account in evaluating an excuse. 
This is made especially acute when other factors – fear, for example – loom large in the 
account. Alexander and Kessler-Ferzan’s contention that we measure culpability according 
to the reasonableness of a given action under the circumstance is one to which this chapter 
will return. 
Despite their doubt about the distinction, this chapter is principally concerned with excuses, 
because it is in the making of excuses that the beliefs and/or desires of the actor are most 
often expressed and considered. Justifications are concerned with the question of whether 
the relevant act was legitimate, given the factual circumstances under which it occurred. If 
an individual suggests that they believed, at the time of the act, that their action was justified, 
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then they have accepted that the act or its outcome is not justified and so are offering their 
(erroneous) belief as an excuse. The mental state of the actor might excuse an illegitimate 
act, but it cannot justify it. 
5.2 The Epistemology of Testimony Applied to Excuses 
Excuses and justifications are particular manifestations of testimony, with particular 
purposes. This gives rise to the question of what we know when we are offered testimony – 
the general question of the epistemology of testimony – and, more specifically, what we 
need to know in order to assess excuses couched in terms of an individual’s specific beliefs 
and/or desires. 
According to Coady (1992), testimony is a philosophically neglected source of knowledge. 
Kusch and Lipton (2002) count testimony among four sources of knowledge, along with 
perception, reasoning and memory; the distinction is that unlike testimony, these three are 
taken to be non-social capacities, knowable by an individual knower in isolation whereas 
testimony requires a testifier and a hearer. It is this, Coady claims, and Lackey (2006) 
concurs, that has led to the philosophical neglect of testimony as a source of knowledge. 
Philosophers have been prone to an “underlying assumption of epistemic individualism, 
according to which whatever it is possible to know, it is possible for an individual to know 
on her own” (Lackey 2006: 2). 
Nevertheless, without an ability to give and to accept testimony, much of our life – 
especially social life – would be impossible. Learning is just one example of the way that 
we depend on the transmission of knowledge. Other information, such as travel directions, 
historical facts, recipes or even our own names and dates of birth come to us not from direct 
experience but from the testimony of others in the course of social interactions. 
We rely on the reports of others for our beliefs about the food we eat, the 
medicine we ingest, the products we buy, the geography of the world, 
discoveries in science, historical information, and many other areas that play 
crucial roles in both our practical and our intellectual lives. 
(Lackey 2006: 1) 
Whether testimony should be regarded as a source of knowledge on a par with experience 
and reason (and if not, why not) is the central concern of the epistemology of testimony. 
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This field of philosophical enquiry has expanded since Coady published his book Testimony 
in 1992, possibly the first to attempt a definitive treatment of the foundations of testimonial 
knowledge for generations. Previous examinations – Coady cites David Hume, H. H. Price, 
Bertrand Russell and Thomas Reid – have principally been concerned with the sceptical 
paradox between our apparent reliance on testimony and our ability to judge its veracity. 
As well as Coady’s investigations, recent work in the field has drawn upon social 
psychology on the nature of trust and interpersonal heuristics – for example Chaiken (1980) 
and M. K. Johnson et al. (1998). 
As with “narrative” (Chapter 4), in spite of – perhaps because of – its ubiquity and social 
necessity, a definition of “testimony” seems elusive. Lackey (2006) offers this “rough 
characterisation”: 
S testifies that p by making an act of communication a if and only if (in part) in 
virtue of a's communicable content, (1) S reasonably intends to convey the 
information that p, or (2) a is reasonably taken as conveying any information 
that p. 
In using the phrase “in virtue of a’s communicable content” Lackey intends to exclude cases 
where an utterance demonstrates some fact rather than testifies to it. If, when asked “do you 
speak French?” an individual responds with a recitation, in the original, of their favourite 
passage from Baudelaire, they are not testifying, but demonstrating. The answer “yes” 
would be testimony, while “oui, bien sûr!” might be simultaneous testimony and 
demonstration. It is the affirmative communicable content that picks out the utterance as an 
instance of testimony. 
Taken at face value, this would suggest that an excuse that adverts to the beliefs of the actor 
at the time of the act includes testimony as to the mental state of the actor at that time. The 
utterer “intends to convey” information about their belief and is “reasonably taken as 
conveying” that they entertained this attitude at the relevant time. We shall see in the coming 
discussion whether this is how such testimony is treated in, for example, the formal 
environment of the courtroom and in general discourse of excuse-making. Of critical 
importance will be consideration of the purpose to which such a statement is put. 
Coady (1992) begins his examination of testimony in the legal setting and seeks to 
extrapolate from there to the more flexible kinds of utterance through which individuals 
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offer testimony in everyday discourse. Court procedures include codified rules about what 
is and is not acceptable as testimony. These rules are, he argues, a structured version of the 
more informal ways that we ordinarily judge testimony. The formal setting should thus give 
us a clear rule-set through which to analyse the messier styles of everyday speech. 
Much of what we know is socially based and testimony is the principal method by which 
knowledge is transmitted from one knower to another. Coady’s view, for which he 
acknowledges a debt to the 18th Century Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid, might be 
characterised as reliabilist non-reductionism: the hearer of testimony knows what they are 
told, provided the testifier is reliable and the propositional content of the testimony is true. 
For the recipient of testimony to acquire knowledge he need not know, or verify that the 
testifier is reliable; reliabilism implies that the justification for the information they require 
to count as knowledge is external to the new knower. 
Austin (1979b: 82) offers a similarly non-reductive view of the epistemic value of 
testimony: 
The statement of an authority makes me aware of something, enables me to 
know something, which I shouldn’t otherwise have known. It is a source of 
knowledge. 
“An authority” in this context implies a trusted testifier. Since Austin is silent on how we 
are to judge whether a particular testifier is to be trusted, we should perhaps take him to be 
externalist about the justification of knowledge acquired in this way. It is a sound 
description of the way that we treat everyday testimony. If someone that we trust tells us 
something and we have no reason to doubt what we are told – no defeater, in the language 
of epistemology – then we tend to regard to content of the testimony as new knowledge. 
The reductionist view of testimonial knowledge suggests that in evaluating testimony we 
are compelled to take account of other, non-testimonial background features, both to assess 
the degree of trust to place in the testimony (the likelihood that the content of the testimony 
is true) and the degree of trust that we have in the testifier (has this person ever lied to us 
before? What would they have to gain by lying about this? Could they be mistaken? 
Reductionists suggest that “knowing because we have been told” is always reducible to and 
dependent upon non-testimonial knowledge; even if that knowledge amounts to a simple 
rule like “people [that person] usually tell[s] the truth, unless they have a reason to lie”. 
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The distinction is further developed by Pritchard (2004) who writes that reductionists 
“argue, roughly, that the justification of an agent’s [testimony based belief] is always 
dependent upon that agent possessing further independent grounds – i.e., at the very least, 
grounds that are independent of the instance of testimony in question”. Non-reductionists 
like Coady – Pritchard dubs them defaultists or credulists – on the other hand, maintain that 
“the epistemic status of a testimony-based belief need not depend upon the agent possessing 
any independent grounds in favour of that belief. Just so long as there are no grounds for 
doubt …” (emphasis added). 
Lackey (2006) subdivides the reductionist view into global and local. The global 
reductionist takes all testimony-based knowledge to be dependent on positive, non-
testimonial reasons for accepting a report. The local reductionist demands that “in order to 
justifiably accept a speaker’s testimony, a hearer must have non-testimonially based 
positive reasons for accepting the particular report in question. 
Bearing in mind the overwhelming role that testimony plays in our epistemic lives perhaps 
we ought to default to acceptance – in fact perhaps, in accord with Austin’s suggestion 
above, we do default in that direction.  This is the basis of the “acceptance principle” 
suggested by Burge (1993: 467): 
A person is entitled to accept as true something that is presented as true and that 
is intelligible to him unless there are stronger reasons not to do so. 
This normative statement could be a manifesto for non-reductionism, in which testimony is 
to be accepted unless there is a defeater for acceptance – a reason to doubt. 
In the case of excuses, however, there is always reason to doubt. Those reasons lie in the 
purposes to which people put justifications or excuses which always entail avoiding 
censure, deflecting criticism or saving face – purposes over and above that of getting the 
hearer to accept the testimonial content of their utterance or to relay knowledge. We should 
analyse a typical use of claims of specific beliefs and desires in offering excuses against the 
various theories of the philosophy of testimony to determine whether: 
a) The reason-giver’s specific belief claims are offered as testimony. 
b) The reason-giver’s specific belief claims are considered as testimony. 
c) The reason-giver’s specific belief claims are offered or considered as causal claims. 
d) What other purposes they might serve. 
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We might think of the transmission of testimonial knowledge as like a “bucket brigade” 
(Lackey 2006: 6) whereby full buckets of water are passed along a chain of people to reach 
a fire. Each person in the chain can pass a full bucket to the next only if they have a full 
bucket to begin with. In order for a hearer to be passed knowledge in the form of testimony, 
the speaker must have that knowledge to begin with.  
On occasion we do include ascriptions of specific beliefs and desire when seeking to excuse 
a third party’s anomalous behaviour. According to the bucket-brigade simile, a person 
hearing this only gains knowledge of that third party’s beliefs and desires if the person who 
tells them has knowledge of those mental states. However, their understanding of the mental 
states of a third party must be limited to: 
a) The third-party’s verbal statement of what they believed and desired. 
b) Inferences based on something like the belief-desire law. 
Both of these sources have limited value as a source of testimonial knowledge: a) because 
first-person excuses are illocutionary acts which always perform functions other than 
making a claim about the actor’s mental states (see below) and b) because such inferences 
are only ever “as if” explanations; any number of potential belief-desire pairs might fit any 
particular action according to the belief-desire law. 
Some impressions of a third-party’s performance of an act might be salient. For example, 
some features of the performance – how rapidly it was performed and with how much care, 
for example, might lead the observer to make inferences about how deliberately it was done. 
Acting deliberately, according to Austin (1979c: 286) implies deliberation, or a weighing 
of the alternatives and a choice between them – including the option to refrain from 
committing the act at all. Deliberation requires time and the opportunity to reflect.  An 
observer might also take into account the agent’s actions leading up to the event, for 
indications of pre-meditation or planning. The circumstances will always play apart 
(situational attribution); was the lighting good, for example? Was the agent in an unfamiliar 
place? Were they familiar with the customs or routines of any other participants? 
These inferences are always subject to revision in the light of new information – such as 
when we ask an agent whether they acted on purpose. We might also learn more about the 
individual to make sense of their behaviour. If we witness a person lash out in panic at the 
sudden appearance of a dark shadow on a wall, we might consider them a nervous type – 
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until we learn that they had recently been the victim of a violent assault. In this light we 
revise our opinion and find the behaviour more understandable. 
When confronted with behaviour that is criminal, morally reprehensible or anomalous we 
typically seek reasons for the action. We would ask questions. The answers would not 
usually include allusions to specific beliefs and desires. 
Q. Why did Sheila take up ballroom dancing? 
A. She desired to improve her fitness and believed that dancing would be an 
enjoyable way to get fit. 
Q. Why did Gary kick the dog? 
A: He desired to avoid suffering an allergic reaction and believed that a kick would 
discourage the animal from bothering him. 
Q. Why did Louie murder Stan? 
A. He believed that Stan was an informer and desired to cut off the flow of 
information to the authorities and to discourage others. 
These are all unnecessarily awkward constructions. In the first two examples more usual 
responses would be simply “To get fit” or “He’s allergic to dogs”. It might be argued that 
the propositional attitudes are tacit, or assumed; but the specific thought processes of the 
agents are not directly alluded to and might conceivably be different – Sheila might take up 
ballroom dancing because she fancies the instructor and Gary might kick the dog because, 
perhaps as a result of his allergy, he hates dogs. Only in the third example is a specific 
epistemic condition implied – Louie thought that Stan was an informer. In each case, the 
usual answer is in the form that we might expect if the question was couched as: 
Q: If I asked Sheila why she took up ballroom dancing what would she say? 
A: That it’s a fun way to get fit. 
Q: If I asked Gary why he kicked the dog, what would he say? 
A: That he’s allergic to dogs. 
Q: If I asked Louie why he killed Stan what would he say? 
A: That Stan was an informer.  
Very often, third party accounts like this are proxies for asking the agent themselves. They 
are the observer’s impression of what reason the agent would give if interrogated. Their 
actual motivations, in all their complexity, are unavailable. 
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This is why we exclude from court proceedings testimony about the beliefs or other 
propositional attitudes of third parties. A witness can testify about the actions that they 
witnessed, and even about the outward demeanour, facial expressions, gestures and speech 
that they saw and heard: speculation – or even deductions – about the mental states of the 
agent at the time the act was performed is not admissible as evidence. Like the person in 
the bucket brigade, legal testimony is limited by procedure to what the witness has to pass 
on – not hearsay, not speculation, but those things that they can legitimately claim to know. 
This brings out an important distinction between third party accounts of anomalous, 
immoral or unlawful behaviour and excuses that are offered by a person accused of such an 
action. The offering of an excuse has an illocutionary function other than explaining or 
describing the antecedents of the action. The person offering the excuse is always in some 
jeopardy. They might risk being socially ostracised for their “strange behaviour”, 
condemnation and distrust for their immorality or the loss of their liberty or even life for 
their illegality. The principal use of the excuse is to minimise the possibility or severity of 
these potential consequences. It is to this end that, on occasion, self-attributions of specific 
beliefs and desires sometimes feature.    
5.3 Are Belief-Desire Excuses Intended or Evaluated as Testimony? 
If a housemate takes and eats the last slice of a cake from the communal refrigerator in a 
shared house they might, when challenged offer the excuse that they thought (believed) that 
this slice was intended for them. They have acknowledged that the cake was not, in fact, 
their own but are offering their erroneous belief as an excuse. There are several elements to 
this statement, some of which are testimony and some of which are not. 
Statement: “Yes, I ate the last slice of cake. But I thought that it was meant for me!” 
The first sentence is both testimony to the fact and an acceptance of the accusation, a 
recognition that the accusation has a factual basis. 
The second sentence is an excuse. As well as offering the utterer’s reason for having eaten 
the last slice, it is suggesting that the owner of the cake ought to have left a slice for them. 
As well as a reason, it is an attempt at a partial justification – suggesting that since the cake 
should have been shared, in taking it they were doing no more than following that norm, at 
least in their estimation.  
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Recall that the first test of testimony contained in Lackey’s “rough characterisation”, 
testifying to a proposition (p) requires that “in virtue of [the statement’s] communicable 
content” the utterer reasonably intends to convey the information, p.  
The cake-eater is not testifying to the possession of a particular belief about the provenance 
of the sweetmeat. They are deflecting opprobrium and denying that they are the sort of 
person that would steal and eat somebody else’s cake under normal circumstances. They 
are less concerned that the information coded in “I thought that it was meant for me” is 
taken to be true than that they should avoid censure and that they should not be regarded as 
the kind of person to help themselves to someone else’s cake. This implies that the portion 
of their statement including an alleged description of their beliefs fails the first test to qualify 
as testimony. By stating this they do not intend, in virtue of the statement’s content, to 
convey information about their thoughts at the time the cake was eaten.  
The second possibility (Lackey offers these two either side of an “or” conjunction) is that 
the statement of p qualifies as testimony if it is “reasonably taken as conveying any 
information that p”. Is an excuse that features the erstwhile belief of the excuse-giver 
reasonably taken as conveying information about their beliefs? 
When the householder in the earlier example above finds herself in a court of law, charged 
with the unlawful killing of a police officer, she would offer as an excuse that she thought 
(believed), when she pointed a lethal weapon at a human target and fired, that her life was 
in danger from the presence of a burglar, that her action in deploying deadly force was 
justified by the imperative that she protect herself. Although she now recognises that the 
self-defence justification is not available since the police officer she killed presented no 
danger, she asks the court to accept her excuse because: 
a) She believed that her life was in danger. 
b) This belief was reasonable in the circumstances. 
c) Any reasonable person might have done the same. 
The third of these is highly significant. This would be the test that any court would apply – 
was the action of the accused reasonable in the circumstances? The court will not concern 
itself with the attribution of specific states of belief; it is just as likely that the householder, 
having been warned that a burglar was in the area and confronting a figure sneaking about 
in her darkened house was too terrified to think rationally or to entertain such detailed 
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thoughts as “I believe that person is a burglar and desire to rid myself of the threat that they 
represent and further believe that discharging my firearm is the best way to bring this 
about”. Panic is a better explanation of why she did not verbally challenge the police officer, 
or call the police, or even switch on a light.  
The information that she received from the neighbourhood watch is certainly pertinent to 
the reasonableness of her actions. This might be construed as a support to her claim of a 
specific belief. However, the attribution of a specific belief at the time she pulled the trigger 
is not the test that the court will apply. More significant is the question of reasonableness. 
In the same circumstances, including (but not limited to) the receipt of the text message 
from the neighbourhood watch, were her actions consistent with those of a reasonable 
person? If they are, her excuse stands; if not, it fails. 
Consider if another householder’s reaction to the neighbourhood watch text message had 
been to run into the road shooting wildly and maiming one of his neighbours. If his excuse 
was that he believed that the neighbour was a burglar, we would not accept it – not because 
we question his belief but because we question the reasonableness of his actions. And yet 
he had the same information, the same justification for his claim of belief as did the first 
householder. 
The belief-component of the excuse is a part of establishing reasonableness. As such in the 
case of an excuse, the claim of a specific belief is not assessed as testimony as to the belief 
of the person giving the excuse and as such the excuse-maker is not offering testimony as 
to the content of their belief. 
5.4 Are Excuses Assessed as Causes? 
In certain circumstances the belief and desire component of an excuse is accepted as 
evidence of the individual’s degree of culpability. This has the superficial form of a causal 
claim – that it was the beliefs and/or desires that the agent entertained at the time of the act 
that caused them to act in the way that is being considered. The question that arises from 
this is whether accepting or rejecting an excuse in those terms involves the assessment of 
those specific mental states as causes.  
There are a number of suggestions as to how we distinguish the causes of an event from 
other correspondences. For brevity, let us consider one – the idea of counterfactual 
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causation. Kim (1973) characterises the account of counterfactual causation that he finds in 
(Lewis 1973) in these terms: 
(1) An event (e) causally depends on an event (c) just in case if (c) had not 
occurred (e) would not have occurred.  
(2) An event (c) is a cause of an event (e) just in case there is a chain of events 
from (c) to (e), each event in this chain being causally dependent on its 
predecessor.  
Kim points out that this also entails that the counterfactual conditional “If (c) had not 
occurred then (e) would not have occurred” describes a situation (on Lewis’ reading) in 
which (c) causes (e). 
For the purposes of this thesis, I can leave aside the metaphysical questions of causation 
and the application of Lewis’ possible world semantics to the consideration of 
counterfactual reasoning. The question at issue is whether we assess excuses couched in 
belief-desire terms against a counterfactual standard of causal reasoning. The specific 
question regarding excuses is: 
Q1: In judging the acceptability of an excuse couched in belief/desire terms do 
people apply counterfactual causal reasoning or apply some other standard? 
We can formulate the requirements of the belief-desire law into a counterfactual test 
of an ascription of a specific belief-desire set: 
A specific intentional action, performed by an actor, is caused by that actor’s 
specific beliefs and desires at the appropriate time,90 iff had that actor not 
possessed those specific beliefs and desires at that time then they would not 
have performed that action. 
An actor’s specific beliefs and desires at the appropriate time is the cause of 
their specific intentional action iff there is a chain of events from that belief-
desire set to the action, each event in that chain being causally dependent on its 
predecessor. 
                                                
90 I am aware that “at the appropriate time” is question begging, since the “appropriate time” to cause the behaviour presumes 
that the behaviour is so caused. However, I will leave this consideration to one side for the present. 
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Excuses couched in belief-desire terms might take these forms: 
a) I did not believe that acting as I did would bring about the culpable result that 
in fact occurred. 
b) My desire to bring about a good (non-culpable) result inadvertently resulted 
in the culpable action that I am accused of 
c) I believed that I was (legally, morally, etcetera) obliged to act in the way that 
I did. 
d) Given what I believed about the situation, any reasonable person would have 
acted as I did. 
All of these imply error, although of different kinds. Excuses of the kind a) comprise a 
failure to foresee the consequences of the action. The second kind, b) is also a failure to see 
the consequences but is principally a claim as to the motivation of the action, an assertion 
that the individual’s intentions were good. The third, c) suggests an error as to the 
expectations under which the individual was acting; again the utterer is claiming good 
intentions – compliance with a norm or a law – but admitting that they might have been 
mistaken as to their obligations. The fourth, d) suggests that although the information 
(content of their belief) might have been wrong or inadequate, had any “reasonable person” 
been similarly informed, then they would have acted similarly. 
The counterfactual test of all of these would be to ask: 
Had this accused person, or any reasonable individual, not possessed the precise 
belief or desire described in the excuse, would they have behaved differently? 
If one accepts both the causal efficacy of specific beliefs and desires and the application of 
counterfactual causal reasoning to the assessment of an excuse that makes use of those 
terms, then we should expect the rejection of an excuse to take one of these forms: 
i) The actor did not entertain the precise belief and/or desire specified in their 
excuse at the appropriate time. 
ii) The relationship between the specific belief and/or desire claimed in the excuse 
and the action taken is not plausible. 
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iii) Had the actor possessed a different specific belief and/or desire to those specified 
in the excuse, then they would not have acted substantially differently. (that is, 
the claimed beliefs and desires offered as an excuse made no difference to the 
outcome.  
In practice, I suggest, none of these is the standard against which we usually assess such 
reasons. In the case of a) for example, the starting point of such an assessment is concerned 
not with whether the action was caused by the belief but with whether the person should 
have had that belief at all. At b) the question at issue is not whether or not had the accused 
person not had that desire (to do good, or to avoid a potentially worse outcome) would they 
have acted the same way but whether it is conceivable that a well-motivated person could 
have carried out that action, regardless of the specific desire or its presumed causal 
relationship to the action. When judging c), our principal concern is not with the 
relationship between the belief and the action but with whether the belief claimed was 
reasonable. It might be claimed that this presumes a causal relationship between the belief 
and the act, but we do not determine the acceptability of the excuse on the basis of whether 
the person would have acted differently had they entertained a different belief. 
The final example, d), might also be taken to suggest that had the information, or belief, 
been different then the actor would have taken a different course. However, our assessment 
of the acceptability of this kind of excuse does not turn on this relationship but on what is 
meant by reasonable. We apply a standard of reasonability to actions not on the basis of any 
relationship between beliefs or desires and an action but on the basis of the totality of the 
circumstances, the features of the actor and, crucially, on the degree of risk attached to the 
circumstances of actions. This, in turn, directs us to accept or reject an excuse based on 
what is at stake. Our condemnation of the person offering the kind of excuse at d) will 
depend on whether we think that they should have taken more care – whether they were 
being reasonable in the situation – rather than on whether people would always be caused 
to act that way given the same content of their beliefs. This distinction, the notions of risk 
and reasonableness, will be developed further in what follows. 
One reason to reject the automatic acceptance of excuses as a source of testimonial 
knowledge is that we always have a defeater for the truth of an excuse – the giver of 
an excuse has other motives for offering it. These are the socially significant functions 
of diverting blame or the opprobrium of peers. In the case of excuses given in the 
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formal environment of a courtroom, the jeopardy faced by a defendant might be even 
more pressing. If held fully accountable for the action under examination, such an 
individual faces the possibility of being fined, a loss of liberty or even, in some cases 
in some jurisdictions, a loss of life. We can ask another question: 
When someone is accused of some anomalous, reprehensible or culpable 
behaviour and offers an excuse that refers to specific beliefs and desires that 
they say they possessed at the time of the act, would they offer the same beliefs 
and desires to explain their behaviour were they not in jeopardy?   
This is a different kind of counterfactual question, enquiring not about the causal efficacy 
of specific beliefs and desires but about why people might offer them in excuses. For any 
action, there might be any number of reasons. Some of these will advert to situational 
attributions as suggested by attribution theories in social psychology. Some, exhibiting the 
fundamental attribution error (Chapter 3, section 3.4) might call on the stable trait 
characteristics of the actor even though situational factors are sufficient to explain it. Most 
of the time we leave beliefs and desires unspoken. However, when there is anomalous 
behaviour to be explained – or when we need an excuse – we sometimes offer these kinds 
of ascriptions. 
This goes beyond the fundamental attribution error into unstable personal attributions. If 
our expectation is that excuses will provide additional information about the causes of a 
particular action, then we have lost sight of the purpose for which reasons are offered. When 
John Dillinger, an infamous outlaw of the US in the 1930s, was asked why he robbed banks 
he answered “that’s where they keep the money.” This is a resolutely situational attribution. 
Dillinger was also offering no excuses. Neither did he suggest additional causes of his 
choices. 
If the causes of an action are adequately understood before an excuse is given and we must 
judge an excuse adverting to beliefs, desires or other propositional attitudes by some causal 
standard, then we are in danger of admitting an overdetermination of causes. Why should 
it be that when a person in jeopardy offers an excuse we now have additional causes to 
consider? Bear in mind that the original causes have not gone away – they are still salient 
to our understanding of the event. We still recognise that what happened was caused by the 
intentional actions of the agent. When we invite an excuse by asking the question “why did 
you do that?” we are not looking for more causal-explanatory information but for better 
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understanding of the individual, for them to tell us why we should not condemn them. 
Superficially we may be confused by the use of “why” in the question, in that it looks similar 
to an appeal for a causal explanation. This was a source of confusion of which Wittgenstein 
was well aware. 
The double use of the word “why”, asking for a cause and asking for the motive, 
together with the idea that we can know, and not only conjecture, our motives, 
gives rise to the confusion that a motive is a cause of which we are immediately 
aware, a cause ‘seen from the inside’, or a cause experienced. 
Wittgenstein, The Blue Book, (1958: 15) 
5.5 Guilty Acts and Guilty Minds: Mens Rea and the Law 
Under many of the laws administered within common-law91 jurisdictions there is an explicit 
reference to the intentional states of the defendant. This is the notion of mens rea. In the 
case of certain common law offences, and even some statutory requirements, the presence 
or absence of mens rea is a determinant not just of the guilt of the defendant but also of 
whether the offence has, in fact, been committed. The clearest example is the common law 
conception of murder. The principal difference between what was once known as “wilful” 
murder and lesser offences of unlawful killing is the mens rea of the defendant. Murder is 
the killing of a person where the intention is to kill or to cause serious harm. Absent the 
intention, the crime of murder has not been committed. 
The phrase in mediaeval Latin that captures the intentional aspect of this requirement is 
“actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea” (Sayre 1932) which translates as “the act is not 
made guilty unless the mind is guilty’. Culpability for an offence with a mens rea 
requirement has two components: 
i) The event which transgresses the legal prohibition – the actus reus. 
ii) The concurrent intentional state of mind that renders the transgressor culpable – 
the mens rea.  
                                                
91 Throughout the discussion of legal procedure, I am taking the example of those jurisdictions that base their approach on 
the Common Law. This includes the United Kingdom, most of the Commonwealth including India, the United States (except 
Louisiana) and so includes a considerable proportion of the global population. 
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Philosopher of law Michael S. Moore points out that this distinction is less clear cut when 
one considers that the identification of any event as an act implies that it is intentional, that 
the actor must will his own movements. That is not, however, sufficient for the mens rea 
requirement: 
…the intention required to act at all – the intention to move one’s limbs – is not 
the same in its object as the intention described in the mens rea requirement. 
The latter intention has as its object complex act descriptions like ‘killing’, 
‘disfiguring’ or ‘recording a confidential communication’; it does not have 
basic act descriptions like ‘moving my finger’ as its object.   
(Moore 1993: 173) 
This excludes simple accidents. If an engineer reaches for a tool and catches his sleeve on 
the handle of his toolbox, causing it to fall into the aero engine on which he is working, the 
act of moving his arm was clearly intentional but the costly damage to the engine was not. 
He is not responsible in the same way that would be had he thrown the toolbox into the 
engine, causing similar damage. 
Mens Rea has two categories. General mens rea is the requirement that the transgressive 
outcome of the action must not be inadvertent or accidental – such as the the engineer 
inadvertently causing his toolbox to fall into the engine. General mens rea gives insanity or 
diminished responsibility defences their traction: even though an act and its outcome might 
be willed certain individuals are considered to be lacking in control to the extent that they 
are deemed incapable of choosing to act differently (Morse 1999; Phillips and Woodman 
2008). 
Specific mens rea is that component of certain crimes that specifies an intent to commit 
precisely the prohibited act as part of the definition of the offence. The most famous 
example of specific mens rea is the intent to kill component of murder. 
Sayre (1932) wrote that “No problem of criminal law is of more fundamental importance 
or has proved more baffling through the centuries than the determination of the precise 
mental element or mens rea necessary for crime.” Almost sixty years later, according to 
Morse (1991) the situation had not been clarified: “Few legal terms confuse behavioural 
scientists and mental health professionals more than mens rea (guilty mind), largely because 
the law employs the term in diverse and often inconsistent ways.” 
A Therapeutic Elimination… 
Mark Curtis, UEA June, 2016  196 
This confusion prompted the American Law Institute to attempt a clarification of the term 
“mens rea” in their Model Penal Code. For the purposes of framing the mens rea component 
of an offence the following key terms are defined: 
Purposely. A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an 
offence when: (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct result thereof, 
it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a 
result; and (ii) if the element involves that attended circumstances, he is aware 
of the existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist. 
Knowingly. A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an 
offence when: (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the 
attendant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that 
such circumstances exist; and (ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, 
he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result. 
Recklessly. A person acts recklessly with respect to the material element on 
offence when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that 
the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of 
such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s 
conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross 
deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe 
in the actor's situation. 
Negligently. A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an 
offence when he should be aware of the substantial and unjustifiable risk that 
the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of 
such a nature and degree that the actor's failure to perceive it, considering the 
nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to him, 
its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a 
reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation. 
(American-Law-Institute 1985 Sec. 2.02) 
(Emphasis added) 
According to Alexander and Kessler Ferzan (2009: 23), this model attempts to reduce the 
“proliferation” of “mental state concepts” in the mens rea components of offences in various 
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jurisdictions to just these four. Morse (1991: 212) and Yeager (2006) independently point 
out that these are presented in descending order of culpability. At all levels, the nature of 
the risk determines the degree to which a transgressor should be regarded as culpable. This 
echoes Austin’s observation that: 
The extent of the supervision we exercise over the execution of any act can 
never be quite unlimited, and usually is expected to fall within fairly definite 
limits (‘due care and attention’) in the case of acts of some general kind, though 
of course we set very different limits in different cases. We may plead that we 
trod on the snail inadvertently: but not on a baby – you ought to look where you 
are putting your great feet. 
(Austin 1979a: 194) 
The usual way in which we assess culpability is three fold: the degree to which the action 
under consideration was intentional, the degree to which it was the accused person’s 
intention to cause the harm and an assessment of what is at stake. In Austin’s example, a 
person who inadvertently steps on a snail might have the same thought processes as one 
who steps on a baby: where a baby, rather than a snail is at risk, we demand a higher standard 
of attention to the risk (Yeager 2006: 60). 
An understanding of this distinction prompts legal theorists Alexander and Kessler Ferzan 
to propose an interpretation of criminal law under which culpability is assessed according 
to an appreciation of risk rather than more vague and less easily determined measures such 
as responsibility or intention.92 “an actor's culpability consists in his imposing a risk to 
others’ legally protected interests for reasons that do not justify imposing the risk (as he 
assesses it)” (Alexander and Kessler Ferzan 2009: 86). Their approach entails that the role 
of the court is to assess a defendant’s offer of a justification or an excuse against a standard 
of the reasonableness of their assessment of risk, rather than any evaluation of the truth of 
any ascriptions of specific beliefs or desires that might accompany the justification or 
excuse. They write: 
                                                
92 For much the same reason that an ascription of specific beliefs and desires is explanatorily inadequate, using these notions 
to assess culpability implies an unattainable degree of access to an agent’s thought processes. 
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Whenever the actor's reasons are sufficient to justify the risk, the actor is 
justified. Even if the actor's actions were not justified, if she has lived up to all 
that we can really expect of her, then she is excused.  
(Ibid.: 87) 
As well as distinguishing accidental or incidental events from intentional actions, an 
important additional function of mens rea components in the drafting of criminal law is to 
leave open mens rea defences (Morse 1991). If a defendant can establish that, at the time 
the alleged offence was committed (or in the moments immediately prior to its commission) 
they did not have the requisite guilty mind, then they have a defence, or at least a partial 
defence. This defence is based on the failure to prove, to the required standard (“beyond a 
reasonable doubt”, for example) that the defendant possessed mens rea. It is not a 
requirement that they prove possession of alternative thought processes at the time: only 
that their circumstances, behaviour, understanding, and so on raise reasonable doubt that 
their thinking constituted mens rea. 
In such a circumstance, a defendant might wish to offer a defence based on the self-
ascription of specific beliefs and desires coinciding with the actus reus. It is not for the 
defendant to prove that this alleged combination of states was true or causally efficacious: 
it is sufficient for their defence to succeed if their suggestion of these specific propositional 
attitudes introduces reasonable doubt of their mens rea. The adversarial nature of criminal 
proceedings in common law jurisdictions seeks to establish whether any doubt so 
engendered is reasonable, in the view of the judge or the members of the jury. 
The task for the prosecution in a common law criminal trial is to establish, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that the defendant not only physically transgressed the bounds of the law 
– that there is an actus reus to be answered93 – but also that they did so deliberately, wilfully, 
volitionally or, in some cases, maliciously (Edwards 1955). Mens rea cannot be established 
forensically – thoughts leave no fingerprints – or by any other fact-based enquiry. Judges 
and juries must infer the mens rea on the basis of cues to do with the salient features of the 
act (including the degree of risk), the defendant’s behaviour before, during and after the 
commission of the act and reports of their demeanour at the same times. Some features of 
the act may also indicate how deliberately the defendant acted. It would be reasonable to 
                                                
93 Defences of alibi, or disputes as to the facts of the defendant’s actions take precedence over mens rea defences. 
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presume that a defendant who used a hypodermic to lace a cream cake with weedkiller, then 
offered it to their victim over tea, has shown sufficient planning to fulfil the mens rea 
requirement for a charge of murder – what used to be known in English law as malice 
aforethought. 
This antique phrase does capture something of the specific mens rea component of this most 
serious of crimes. For a murder (rather than manslaughter or some other class of unlawful 
killing) to have been committed, it is not sufficient that the defendant intended the act that 
led to the death of another. They must intend harm – to the actual victim or to some other 
person (as in cases of mistaken identity, or if someone other than the intended target eats 
the poisoned cake). For example, if somebody steals the cabling at the side of a railway line 
and, as a direct result, a motorist is killed on a level crossing some miles from the incident, 
the thief is unlikely to be accused of murder. The theft was a deliberate act, but there was 
no direct intention to kill or to cause harm to persons. 
In some cases, facts about the offence are sufficient to establish mens rea. If a burglar enters 
a property and is tackled by the householder, who is killed by a bullet from the burglar’s 
gun, a court is unlikely to accept a mens rea defence on the grounds that the burglar intended 
only theft, that the discharge of the firearm was accidental. By taking a weapon into the 
commission of a crime the burglar has exhibited mens rea to the extent that they came 
prepared to use deadly force to resist capture (Carson and Felthous 2003). If the gun 
belonged to the householder, however, a mens rea defence might be available – so long as 
the burglar had not gained full control of the weapon. 
Despite the assertion in Morse (2007 emphasis added) that “The law’s view of the person 
is a creature capable of practical reason, an agent who forms and acts on intentions that are 
the product of the person’s desires and beliefs”, which is a rehearsal of the view from 
philosophical folk psychology, ascriptions of specific beliefs and desire do not figure in the 
mens rea components of prohibited acts, or of unlawful omissions. According to Edwards 
(1955) the mens rea components of statutory offences include adverbs such as 
“maliciously”, “wilfully”, “knowingly” or “fraudulently” or verb-forms that imply 
responsibility, such as “causing”, “permitting”, “suffering” or “allowing”. “Belief” and 
“desire” might feature in a defendant’s attempt at exculpation, but not in the mens rea 
requirements of the relevant law. 
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The mens rea components in the drafting or understanding of laws exist to excuse accidents 
and mistakes (Morse 2003) to distinguish wrongful from harmful (Yeager 2006: 86) and to 
allow room for defences in which the intentions of the accused serve to justify or excuse 
the action (Morse 1991). Conceivably, excuses might involve self-ascriptions of specific 
beliefs and desires; however, these are assessed for whether they introduce reasonable doubt 
as to the defendant’s mens rea, rather than as claims of the causes of their actions. 
In support of the claim that the law expressly treats the thoughts of an accused in the way 
that I have suggested, we should consider two rather different cases, each turning on the 
mens rea of the defendants. 
5.6 Case Study: R v Morgan et. al (1975) 
In 1975, three men were convicted of rape and, along with a fourth, the eponymous Morgan, 
of being a party to rape,94 The circumstances of the incident were that Morgan, an RAF 
officer, after a night of heavy drinking, invited three companions to his home where the 
three were to engage in sexual activity with his wife while Morgan watched. When charged 
with rape, the three based their defence on an assertion that Morgan had told them that his 
wife would enjoy the experience and that her resistance and protestations were merely her 
way of enhancing her enjoyment. As a result, they claimed, they had no mens rea for rape. 
They had believed that Mrs Morgan had consented and that the act, therefore, did not 
constitute rape. The three maintained this defence in spite of the fact that the victim had 
suffered considerable physical injury and had cried out to her 11-year-old son, who was 
asleep in the next room, to call the police (Curley 1976). 
The three men were convicted of rape and lost their appeal on the grounds that the jury was 
deemed right not to have accepted their testimony. However, the appeal court justices noted 
that the case had raised a significant issue over the mens rea component of the crime of 
rape. As the law was then formulated, the crime of rape included a specific mens rea 
component that the accused had to intend to engage in sexual intercourse with a person 
against that person’s wishes. This would entail that an “honest belief” that the alleged 
victim had consented would be a defence, in that it would exclude the specific mens rea of 
an intent to rape. 
                                                
94 The legal reference for this case: Sub. Nom. R. v. Morgan [1975] 1 all ER 8 
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At the original trial the judge had directed the jury that: 
…his belief must be a reasonable one; such a belief as a reasonable man would 
entertain if he applied his mind and thought about the matter. It is not enough 
for a defendant to rely upon a belief, even though it be honestly held, if it was 
completely fanciful; contrary to every indication which could be given to carry 
some weight with a reasonable man. 
(Curley 1976) 
The problem was that the standard of reasonableness – that a “person of reasonable 
firmness” (Morse 2007) would act the same way – was not, at that time, enshrined in the 
law. For this reason, the three men had based their appeals on a contention that the trial 
judge, in so directing the jury, was in error. Although rejecting the appeal on the ground 
that the jury would have found the three guilty even in the absence of this direction, the 
Court of Appeal allowed the case to go on to the House of Lords95 so that this anomaly 
could be addressed at the highest level. 
The House of Lords also rejected the appeal because, they ruled, a properly directed jury 
would have found the men guilty –their testimony as to what they had believed at the time 
of the act would have been rejected. In their judgement, however, the Law Lords conceded 
that the original trial judge had misdirected the jury as to the specific mens rea component 
of the crime of rape. One of the sitting judges, Lord Cross, wrote in his judgement that: 
... the question to be answered ... is whether according to the ordinary use of the 
English language a man can be said to have committed rape if he believed the 
woman was consenting to intercourse and would not have attempted it but for 
his belief, whatever his grounds for so believing. I do not think that he can. 
Another, Lord Hailsham, set out his concern with the law: 
…the prohibited act in rape is non-consensual sexual intercourse, … the guilty 
state of mind is an intention to commit it, it seems to me to follow as a matter 
of inexorable logic that there is no room either for a "defence" of honest belief 
or mistake, or of a defence of honest and reasonable belief and mistake. Either 
                                                
95 The highest UK court, at the time. 
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the prosecution proves its case or it does not. Either the prosecution proves that 
the accused had the requisite intent, or it does not. In the former case it succeeds, 
and in the latter it fails. Since honest belief clearly negatives intent, the 
reasonableness or otherwise of that belief can only be evidence for or against 
the view that the intent was actually held ... 
This signifies that the law would allow as a defence against rape the defendant’s belief that 
the other party had consented, whatever procedure the accused had used to arrive at that 
belief. The only grounds for rejecting that defence and convicting would be the rejection of 
the claim of the specific belief. This would make rape convictions even harder to achieve 
because the onus would be on the prosecution to prove that the defendant did not believe 
what they claimed to believe. If a jury had reasonable doubt as to whether the prosecution 
had proved this, then they should acquit. 
Would it ever be possible for a prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a 
defendant did not believe what they claim to have believed?96 
In response to this controversy, the UK parliament rushed through the Sexual Offences 
(amendment) Act, 1976. In Section 1, part 1 this provides that: 
(1) For the purposes of section 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 (which relates 
to rape) a man commits rape if - 
(a) he has unlawful sexual intercourse with a woman who at the time of the 
intercourse does not consent to it; and 
(b) at the time he knows that she does not consent to the intercourse or he is 
reckless as to whether she consents to it; 
The inclusion of the standard of recklessness is allows the jury to decide whether or not a 
mens rea defence against rape is reasonable. The prosecution does not have to prove that 
the defendant did not believe that consent had been given, only that his behaviour indicated 
a recklessness as to whether the victim had consented. 
Almost thirty years later the specific mens rea component of rape was further clarified under 
the Sexual Offences Act (2003), which at Chapter 42, Part 1 defines rape: 
                                                
96 Which is a central problem with the idea that actions can be explained or predicted by the ascription of specific propositional 
attitudes. 
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(1) A person (A) commits an offence if— 
(a)  he intentionally penetrates the vagina, anus or mouth of another 
person (B) with his penis,  
(b)  B does not consent to the penetration, and  
(c)  A does not reasonably believe that B consents.  
(2) Whether a belief is reasonable is to be determined having regard to all the 
circumstances, including any steps A has taken to ascertain whether B consents. 
This allows room for the mens rea defence of “I believed that the other party had 
consented”, but ensures that the belief is judged not on an impossible standard of truth or 
falsity, nor of causal efficacy but against a standard of reasonableness. The best way to 
ensure that someone has consented is to ask the question: in the absence of that polite 
enquiry a jury would be justified in rejecting their subsequent defence on the grounds that 
they believed that they had consent. The action has to be reasonable in the circumstances, 
including asking for consent:  considerations of whether their belief is actual, honestly held 
or causally efficacious do not enter into the deliberation.  
5.7 Case Study 2: “Let him have it Chris!” 
The notorious killing of Police Constable Sidney Miles in November 1952 gave rise to what 
many regard as a grave miscarriage of justice (Yallop 1971).97  
On the evening of Sunday 2nd November 1952 two teenaged petty criminals, Christopher 
Craig (aged 16) and Derek Bentley (19), having failed to break into a confectionary 
warehouse in Croydon, found themselves on the roof of the building. Neighbours had 
already called the police after seeing the pair climb over the fence into the premises. Within 
minutes of the call a detective constable Frederick Fairfax had arrived accompanied by two 
uniformed officers, constables Pain and Bugden. Almost simultaneously two more 
uniformed policemen arrived, constables McDonald and Sidney Miles.   
The two would-be burglars were trapped on the seven-metre high roof, unable to escape the 
way they had come without running straight into the police and immediate arrest. They hid 
behind the head of a lift shaft, which was the larger of two features on the otherwise flat 
                                                
97 I have relied on Yallop’s detailed account for much of the factual detail here. I have avoided much of the commentary 
Yallop offers as this was directed at highlighting the perceived wrong done to the defendant, Bentley. 
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roof. DC Fairfax climbed to the roof the same way that Bentley and Craig had and called to 
them to come out from their hiding place. Bentley emerged and Fairfax took hold of him. 
As Fairfax tried to round the lift head, still holding Bentley, Craig stepped out, produced a 
revolver and fired. The bullet struck Fairfax superficially in the shoulder and he fell to the 
ground. Bentley, the detective would later testify, pulled back the shoulder of his coat and 
asked “You all right?”. The shocked officer regained his composure and ran to the edge of 
the roof to warn his colleagues that one of the burglars was armed. Craig fired another shot. 
Fairfax, still with Bentley in tow, retreated behind the only other structure on the roof, the 
opening from the staircase, some 30 metres from Craig.  
There, Bentley surrendered his own weapons, a spiked knuckleduster and a small knife. 
Fairfax would later testify that Bentley told him “That’s all I’ve got, guv’nor. I haven’t got 
a gun.”  
Within minutes a large police presence and around one hundred onlookers gathered at the 
warehouse. Some of the police officers were armed although there are no accurate records 
of how many guns were taken to the scene (Yallop 1971: 61). PC Miles acquired a set of 
keys to the building and made his way to the roof via the internal staircase. As he emerged 
from the doorway, Miles was struck in the head by a bullet and fell, dying, almost at the 
feet of Fairfax and Bentley. 
The standoff continued for several minutes. The police acknowledged firing at Craig but no 
accurate records were kept of which police guns were fired or of how many rounds were 
discharged. Bentley was taken from the roof down the same staircase that PC Miles had 
ascended. The police reported that he shouted “Look out Chris, they’re taking me down!” 
(Yallop 1971: 70). Craig continued firing and yelling taunts and obscenities at the police 
until, his ammunition spent, he jumped from the roof. His fall was broken by a greenhouse 
in a neighbouring garden and he survived with a few broken bones. 
The trial of Bentley and Craig began on the 9th December. Both were charged with the 
murder of PC Miles, both pleaded not guilty. Craig offered a mens rea defence – although 
he accepted that he had fired his pistol towards the police he had not intended to kill. Bentley 
claimed that he had not known that Craig had a gun and that he was already in police custody 
at the time of the fatal shot. The trial lasted just two days: ten hours of court time in total. 
The jury found both guilty, but made a recommendation of mercy in the case of Bentley – 
an educationally subnormal, epileptic young man, estimated by later psychiatric reports to 
A Therapeutic Elimination… 
Mark Curtis, UEA June, 2016  205 
have a mental age of 11. As Craig was just 16, the judge imposed a sentence that he be 
“detained until her majesty’s pleasure be known”. Bentley was sentenced to death. 
Following a summary appeal, he was hanged at Wandsworth Prison on the morning of the 
28th of January 1953. 
Decades of controversy raged over the fact that Bentley was put to death despite having not 
fired a shot and having been in custody at the time PC Miles was killed. Bentley was given 
a posthumous pardon in 1990. His original conviction was set aside by the court of appeal 
in 1998. The grounds of his conviction, the rejection of his original appeal (and the disregard 
of the trial jury’s appeal for mercy) and the reasons for the successful appeal 45 years after 
his death are relevant to our discussion of the role of specific beliefs and desires in 
establishing motives and mens rea. 
Bentley’s guilt rested on two contentions, both of which allude to what he knew and to his 
intentions while on the roof. 
a) that Bentley knew that Craig was armed and that the younger man intended to use it 
to resist arrest. 
b) The intention behind Bentley’s alleged utterance of the phrase “let him have it 
Chris!” 
The Lord Chief Justice of the day, the Lord Goddard, had been the original trial judge and 
had directed the jury that: 
… where two people are engaged on a felonious enterprise – and warehouse-
breaking is a felony – and one knows that the other is carrying a weapon, and 
there is agreement to use such violence as may be necessary to avoid arrest, and 
this leads to the killing of a person or results in the killing of a person, both are 
guilty of murder, and it is no answer for one to say “I did not think my 
companion would go as far as he did”. 
(Yallop 1971: 290) 
At his trial, Bentley denied knowing that Craig had a gun. The police contradicted this. PC 
McDonald claimed that when he asked Fairfax about the gun, Bentley had interjected “It’s 
a .45 Colt and he has plenty of ammunition for it”. Fairfax corroborated this (with some 
variances) although Bentley denied ever saying it (Yallop 1971: 63). If he had said this, 
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while with Fairfax some distance from Craig, it would be fair to infer that he must have had 
prior knowledge; how else could he know the type of weapon and of the presence of “plenty 
of ammunition”? 
The phrase “Let him have it Chris” has been central to the case’s notoriety and was even, 
in part, chosen for the title of Peter Medak’s 1991 feature film dramatisation of the case. 
Yallop (1971: 59) sums up the controversy: 
No one has been able to agree on the exact meaning of the words, “Let him have 
it, Chris”. Did Bentley mean that Craig should give up his gun, or did he mean 
that Craig should offer violence? The phrase has indeed become a classic 
example, frequently quoted, to show the ambiguity of our language. 
Lord Goddard described this alleged remark as “the most serious piece of evidence against 
Bentley”. It implied, if interpreted as an instruction to shoot, that Bentley both knew about 
the gun and encouraged his accomplice to use it. Even if interpreted as an instruction to give 
up the weapon, it would mean that Bentley knew that Craig had it. It does not concern us 
here whether it was ever said – Bentley denied saying it and Craig, years after being released 
from jail, denied hearing it. The concern in this thesis is with how the courts interpreted the 
alleged remark and the inferences that were drawn about Bentley’s epistemic states on the 
night of the shooting. 
Other than alleging that Bentley had said both “Let him have it Chris” and made the remark 
about the gun and ammunition, the police officers were not asked in evidence to make 
ascriptions of specific propositional attitudes to either defendant. The evidence was 
restricted to what they saw, heard and said themselves. The jury was expected to infer, from 
the police reports of what the miscreants said and how they acted, the intentions and 
foreknowledge (in Bentley’s case) of the existence of a firearm. In his summing up, Lord 
Goddard further directed the jury that: 
The great virtue of trial by jury is that jurymen can exercise the common sense 
of ordinary people. Can you suppose for a moment, especially when you have 
heard Craig say that why he carried a revolver was for the purpose of boasting 
and making yourself a big man, that he would not have told his pals he was out 
with that he had got a revolver? Is it not almost inconceivable that Craig would 
not have told him, and probably shown him in the revolver which he had? … I 
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should think you would come to the conclusion that the first thing, almost, Craig 
would tell him, if they were going off on a shop-breaking expedition, was: "It's 
all right. I've got a revolver with me." 
The judge was suggesting that the jury need not ascribe any deep insights to Bentley in 
order to conclude that he must have known that Craig had a gun. His suggestion is that 
“common sense” suggests that a boastful youth like Craig would have told him so. Lord 
Goddard expressly avoids the suggestion that Bentley’s “common sense” would have led 
him to assume that Craig would be armed. He also seeks to absolve the jury of any need to 
interpret “Let him have it Chris” in belief-desire terms. 
Following decades of campaigning, Bentley’s case was referred to the Court of Appeal for 
a second time in 1997. The practice in hearing appeals of long-past cases is to apply the 
legal standards of the time of the original trial. In their findings, the appeal court judges 
stated that: 
In order to determine the appellant’s guilt, the jury had to resolve a number of 
issues. They included in particular the following:  
1. What was the nature and scope of the joint enterprise on which Craig and the 
appellant embarked? 
2. When did the appellant get to know that Craig had the gun with him? None 
of the observations allegedly made by him were inconsistent with the 
knowledge having been acquired when the two were on the roof. The trial judge 
in the course of his summing-up to the jury suggested … that it was 
inconceivable that Craig would not have told the appellant when they were 
going on a shopbreaking expedition that he had the gun. We do not think that 
that is necessarily so. The appellant had no record of violence and Craig may 
not have wanted him to know he was armed in case he refused to accompany 
him. 
3. Did the appellant shout out "Let him have it, Chris"? If he did, what did he 
intend by the words he used? In particular, it could be argued that his actions 
and words while on the roof thereafter were consistent with his not having 
wanted to incite Craig to shoot any officer and that Craig's display of hatred 
towards the police suggested that he was engaged on an enterprise of his own. 
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4. At the time P.C. Miles was shot, was the appellant participating or had he 
withdrawn from any joint enterprise that could be inferred from the evidence? 
Here again his actions and words on the roof were relevant and the jury would 
have to determine the intention behind his shout "They're taking me down, 
Chris”. 
(Bingham of Cornhill et al. 1998: 9-10) 
Ultimately, the supreme court Justices, led by the Lord Chief Justice of that year (and so a 
successor to the original trial judge) concluded that: 
For all the reasons given in this section of the judgment we think that the 
conviction of the appellant was unsafe. We accordingly allow the appeal and 
quash his conviction. It must be a matter of profound and continuing regret that 
this mistrial occurred and that the defects we have found were not recognised at 
the time. 
(Ibid.: 25) 
The appeal was allowed explicitly not because the appeal court had concluded that the 
police officers who reported hearing Bentley say “Let him have it Chris” were lying nor 
because they interpreted those words in a particular way. The appeal was allowed because 
of the evidence of Bentley’s behaviour, demeanour and attitude to the police on the roof 
that night cast reasonable doubt that he had any intention to resist arrest with force. This 
doubt would have been sufficient, the Supreme Court concluded, that had the trial judge 
correctly directed the original jury as to the burden of proof, they might have found 
differently. 
The reductionist view of the epistemology of testimony has some bearing here. We are 
expected to determine whether or not we accept what we are told (the interpretation of the 
police officers of Bentley’s intentions) on the basis of a panoply of circumstantial and 
background considerations (Bentley’s behaviour, etcetera). The Supreme Court finding 
suggests that in assessing a defendant’s denial of mens rea, we should judge whether this 
denial induces reasonable doubt not in isolation, nor even on the basis of inferences about 
their epistemic states (or their belief-desire states) from what they said, or the nature of their 
joint enterprise (Lord Goddard’s “common sense”). We should also take into account the 
other salient details. 
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This is also true of the Morgan case. The revision of the definition of the crime of rape 
under the Sexual Offences Act, 2003 expressly directs that other features of the case are 
taken into account when assessing the value of a defendant’s mens rea defence that they 
believed that the alleged victim had consented – including, but not limited to, whether the 
question had ever been asked and answered.   
In establishing the mens rea, or evaluating a defence on that ground, the courts take a more 
holistic view of testimony than is suggested by Burge’s “acceptance principle”. Both the 
prosecution’s allegation that mens rea was present, appropriate to the indictment and the 
defendant’s denial that it was on the basis of their conflicting beliefs and desires, each stand 
or fall on their coherence with other evidentiary submissions. This has some bearing on how 
we do and how we should evaluate – our “linguistic acceptance” (Graham 2000) – of 
testimony about “beliefs” and “desires” when we need to establish intentions.  
5.8 Chapter Summary 
In two socially important areas of discourse, justifications and excuse-making (section 
5.1), individuals occasionally advert to their own beliefs and desires at the time of 
committing the act. The kinds of act that require justifications and excuses might be simply 
unexpected – out of the ordinary or out of character for that individual – in contravention 
of some moral norm, or against the prevailing law. 
Excuses are distinguished from justifications by the fact that an act can be justified only by 
some feature pertinent to the act and the circumstances in which it occurs. An act is justified, 
therefore, only when, despite initial appearances, it is in fact not anomalous, immoral or 
illegal. When a statement adverts to some feature of the actor’s thought processes, this is an 
attempt to excuse the behaviour. Excuses accept the nature of the act but claim that some 
feature of the actor, of the information at their disposal or of their understanding of the 
circumstances (rather than the circumstances themselves) make their behaviour 
understandable or reasonable and so not anomalous, immoral or culpable to the same degree 
as it might have been had the act been fully intentional. 
When an excuse is offered in belief-desire terms responsibility for the action is not usually 
assessed against the assumption that those beliefs and desires would have caused the action 
under examination (5.2-4). For example, no counterfactual test – “had the subject believed 
differently would they have acted differently?” – is usually applied. It is more usual that a 
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standard of reasonableness is applied – not only whether it was reasonable for the subject 
to have believed what they claim but whether their overall behaviour was in accord with the 
expectations of a reasonable person under the circumstances – including whether they had 
taken sufficient care given the risks.  
The idea that care commensurate with risk plays a central role in assessing culpability is 
key to an understanding of the mens rea component of certain common law offences (5.5). 
Indeed, the mens rea component exists, according to some legal theorists, expressly so that 
defences can draw on the excuse that the defendant took reasonable care, despite the fact 
that the outcome was an illegal act (or failure to act). This point was further illustrated by 
means of two examples, one of which led to a change in the law (5.6) because the prior 
formulation permitted a defence based on what a defendant believed, alone. In the second 
(5.7) an infamous miscarriage of judgement resulted from a judge’s failure to direct a jury 
to take into account the totality of a defendant’s behaviour rather than to assume that the 
question of culpability rested on establishing what he knew or believed during the 
commission of a crime. 
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6 Chapter Six: 
Hedges and Non-Causal Mental State Terms 
The notion of hedges and the linguistic function of hedging are examined by 
means of a number of examples. Certain uses of “believe” – especially in the 
first person form “I believe that …” are shown to fulfil both the criteria for 
being regarded as hedges and to fulfil the functions of hedges in practice. 
Through an examination of a second linguistic act – that of assertion – it is 
suggested that the “I believe that…” part of a hedged statement constructed 
this way, despite having the superficial form of an assertion, does not assert 
any additional content. Its role should be understood as modifying the 
utterer’s commitment to the proposition. As such, it might be taken as 
referring to a mental state possessed by the utterer – perhaps that mental 
state could be defined similarly to a “propositional attitude”. However, 
where this significantly differs from the view of philosophical folk-
psychology is that the attitude is defined by the expressed degree of epistemic 
commitment and not by any specific functional or causal role in that it plays 
in bringing about a particular behaviour.  
The word ‘belief’ is a difficult thing for me. I don’t believe. I must have a reason 
for a certain hypothesis. Either I know a thing, and then I know it – I don’t need 
to believe it.  
[asked whether he believed in God]:  
Difficult to answer… I know. I don’t need to believe, I know. 
Carl Jung, interviewed by John Freeman on the BBC’s 
Face to Face television programme, 195998  
6.1 The Phenomenon of Hedging and Hedges 
The contention of the second half of this thesis is that many utterances of phrases such as 
“I believe that …” or “I desired to do good and believed that my action was the best way to 
do good,” serve purposes other than the expression of an attitude to a proposition. In this 
                                                
98 The entire programme is available online at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eTBs-2cloEI. 
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chapter I deal with another family of uses which, although they might have the form of 
modifying the degree to which a speaker commits to the truth of a proposition, are 
principally used for other purposes. Utterances in this class are known as hedges and the 
practice of using them as hedging. Hedging is the use of modal adjuncts or pragmatic 
markers (defined below) which make a proposition, categorization or assertion more or 
less fuzzy. “I believe that …” might be used to hedge a statement for several reasons. 
Supporting these contentions requires that we look at hedges in three ways. First, I will 
establish three of the purposes that hedges often perform. Second, by examining how the 
use of hedges is described from within a neo-Gricean reconstruction of conversational 
implicature to illustrate how the addition of “I believe that” to a statement modifies the 
implicature in ways consistent with these purposes. Third, examining the speech act of 
assertion and its norms illustrates how the addition of a hedging-phrase – in particular “I 
believe that” – violates those norms if we assume that this phrase asserts some additional 
information, such as information about the specific beliefs of the utterer. 
Since analytic philosophy prides itself on its commitment to precision, to entailment, and 
to truth, incorporating the uncertainty that characterizes so much everyday life and 
language-use is a challenge. Philosophy shares this challenge with linguistic pragmatics, 
which seeks to bring the nuances of language in the real world under some systematic 
description while simultaneously avoiding a proliferation of definitions. 
Insights from Wittgenstein and Austin alerted some philosophers and some linguists to the 
expectation that language in everyday use is seldom as precise as traditional logic and 
grammars would demand. Inspired by Wittgenstein’s remarks on family resemblances in 
the Philosophical Investigations (§67-77), theorists started to adopt the view that category 
membership might not be a binary question, that category boundaries might be fuzzy. It is 
always possible to make a more clear-cut case for the inclusion of some items than for 
others.  
Zadeh (1965) both introduced the adjective “fuzzy” to describe sets to which membership 
was a matter of degree, and began to propose a systematic way that the resulting uncertainty 
could be handled. A fuzzy set was defined as a class or category of objects with a continuum 
of grades of membership. Since Zadeh, fuzzy logic (J. F. Baldwin 1979) and fuzzy grammar 
(Aarts et al. 2004) have become part of the landscape of investigation and of scholarship in 
logic and linguistics. 
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Directly referencing Zadeh’s work, Lakoff drew attention to an established linguistic 
phenomenon through which language users handle fuzziness. He suggests that: 
Some of the most interesting questions are raised by the study of words whose 
meaning implicitly involves fuzziness - words [or phrases] whose job is to make 
things more or less fuzzy. I will refer to such words as ‘hedges’. 
Lakoff (1973) 
The word “hedge” can sometimes be used as a noun to refer to a precise word or form of 
words that perform the hedging-function or, as a verb, to an instance of performing that 
speech act (Schröder and Zimmer 1997). Similarly, “hedging” is sometimes used to pick 
out the deployment of a particular word or phrase recognised as a hedge – Lakoff (1973) 
included a list – or the act of making a statement more or less fuzzy (as explained in what 
follows). For clarity, throughout this chapter I will use “hedge” only as a verb and “hedging” 
to refer only to the act. When I want to refer to a particular word or form of words I will use 
the form “hedging-word” or “hedging-phrase”. This might lead to the occasional clumsy 
construction but will avoid any potential for confusion.  
Lakoff’s list of hedging-words and phrases ranges from “sort of”, “roughly” and “for the 
most part” to “virtually”, “practically” and “in a real sense”. These are modifiers that admit 
of uncertainty about the locution that they modify.  
To take Lakoff’s example, the category “bird” has an enormous number of members. We 
might be happy to admit without hesitating that a robin is a bird – it is a definitive member 
of that category. Other examples are less typical. A chicken is certainly a bird but is less 
likely to be thought of as the most representative example. Penguins, emus and kiwis are 
even further from the most readily categorised members of the set.  
Interesting effects arise when a typical set member is modified with a hedging-phrase. 
Consider the example: 
A robin is like a bird 
This example is less readily assented to than the unmodified statement “a robin is a bird”: 
the hearer is likely to question the hedging phrase; in what sense is it like a bird? It just is a 
bird. When category membership is less clear cut, however, the addition of a hedging-word 
has the opposite effect; 
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A kiwi is like a bird. 
Is more readily assented than “a kiwi is a bird” – especially if the hearer is unaware of the 
biological classification of kiwis and is simply looking at an example or an image of this 
rather un-bird-like creature. The addition of the hedging-word makes it clear that we are 
making an allowance for the fuzziness of the category. This is especially the case when the 
category is being extended by metaphor or simile. 
A bat is a bird. 
Is manifestly not true. Giving this information to someone unfamiliar with the biology of 
bats would be to mislead them. However: 
A bat is like a bird. 
Is true, at least in the sense that it is a small creature with wings and that flies. The hedging-
word “like” is here acting as a pragmatic marker, drawing attention to the fact that the 
unmodified statement is not literally true but, suitably modified, the comparison is 
informative. Imagine describing a bat to a small child: “A bat is like a bird except that it has 
fur instead of feathers and gives birth to live young instead of laying eggs”. Omitting the 
hedging word “like” would render this explanation as misleading, contradictory nonsense. 
When Lakoff describes hedging as the act of making a statement more or less fuzzy, the 
effect depends on the degree to which the starting, unmodified statement is definitive. If we 
express the likelihood of assent to category membership as a scale from 0 – definitely not a 
member – to 1 – definitely a member – then the addition of a hedging-word or hedging-
phrase renders statements that in their unmodified are closer to 1 less acceptable. This 
describes the effect of modifying “a robin is a bird” (close to 1) to “a robin is like a bird” 
(less likely to gain immediate assent). Objects in the middle of the range have their 
likelihood of attracting assent enhanced by the addition of a hedging-word. Thus “a bat is 
like a bird” is more likely to be assented to than “a bat is a bird” precisely because a bat’s 
characteristics place it somewhere in the middle of that continuum from “certainly not a 
bird” to “certainly a bird”: a bat is in fact not a bird, but we understand why somebody 
might think that it was like one. In the case of objects for which the likelihood of assent to 
category membership is close to 0, the value is unaffected by hedging. “A cow is like a 
bird” is just as untrue as “a cow is a bird” unless we provide additional justification for the 
simile. 
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Consider fuzzy predicates like “tall”. “Simon is tall” is placed on the scale of acceptability, 
between 0 (Simon is definitely not tall) and 1 (Simon is certainly tall) according to facts 
about Simon. If he were 190cm from sole to pate we would tend to place “Simon is tall” 
somewhere close to 1.  If on the other hand, if Simon were less than 150cm tall we would 
tend to place the acceptability of the phrase “Simon is tall” closer to zero. If Simon’s height 
was measured somewhere in the mid-range, for example 175cm, then, subject to context, 
we would judge the acceptability of the statement somewhere in the middle of the range. 
Now consider the addition of the hedging-phrase “sort of”. At 150cm or less, Simon is no 
more “sort of tall” than he is “tall”. The addition of a contextualising hedging-phrase can 
increase the acceptability – as in “Simon is tall for a pygmy” – but for the purposes of this 
discussion, consider the effect of the single hedging-phrase “sort of”. Simon at 190cm or 
more is not “sort of tall”; he is just plain tall. The only circumstance under which “Simon 
is sort of tall” is acceptable would be when other pragmatic features make it plain that the 
speaker is being ironic or sarcastic. On the other hand, if Simon is around 175cm in height, 
we might quibble at the statement “Simon is tall”, whereas “Simon is sort of tall” makes it 
clear that we are allowing for comparisons that can remain unspoken and so assent is more 
readily given to the hedged statement than to the unmodified form. To set out this function 
schematically: 
Case: Simon is 190cm in height. 
Acceptability of “Simon is tall” ≈ 1; “Simon is sort of tall” ≈ 0 
Case: Simon is 150cm in height. 
Acceptability of “Simon is tall” ≈ 0; “Simon is sort of tall” ≈ 0 
Case: Simon is 175cm in height. 
Acceptability of “Simon is tall” ≈ 0.5; “Simon is sort of tall” ≈ 1 
As any lexicographer knows, natural language concepts are fuzzy; the 
boundaries are not clear-cut. Zadeh has suggested that such fuzziness should be 
manageable, formally, in terms of what he calls fuzzy set theory. In a fuzzy set, 
an individual is not simply a member or a non-member, but may be a member 
to some degree, for example, any real number between 0 and 1. 
(Lakoff 1989) 
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This describes the approximator function, which is only one of the purposes to which 
hedges are put. I will describe this function in more detail in what follows but first we should 
look at the proposed linguistic role that hedging-words and hedging-phrases perform. 
6.2 The Roles that Hedges Perform 
Hedging-words and hedging-phrases, inserted into a sentence that otherwise asserts a 
proposition, can be thought of as modal adjuncts, which is to say that they alter the degree 
to which the utterer wants to commit to the truth of the proposition. For example: 
On a scale of commitment to a proposition, we might have certainly at the 
positive end and certainly not at the negative end, with such items as probably, 
possibly, conceivably at various points along the line, along with expressions 
like perhaps, maybe, indisputably, without doubt, imaginably, surely. 
Bloor and Bloor (2004: 55-56) 
Fraser (2010) suggests that hedging should be regarded as an essential element in 
pragmatic competence. This is, he argues, an important social skill that permits a language 
user to "… communicate your intended message with all its nuances in any socio-cultural 
context and to interpret the message of your interlocutor as it was intended." He laments 
that the skill of hedging is seldom explicitly taught to second-language learners. A lack of 
facility with hedges and so with pragmatic competence more widely distinguishes second-
language users from native speakers and writers. For Fraser, this restricts the ability of many 
language learners to convey and comprehend nuances. 
Another distinction that Fraser makes is that there is “no grammatical class of hedges”. 
Almost any word or phrase can perform one of the hedging functions, depending on the 
context and on the occasion in which they are deployed. We can recognise words and 
phrases fulfilling this functional role not on the basis of the syntactic category of the word 
or phrase but whenever we identify that it performs as a hedge. This process is a species of 
pragmatic inference – of which I will say more in what follows.  
In a nutshell, my contention in the rest of this chapter is that the addition of the phrase “I 
believe that …” to an otherwise assertive utterance is an example of a modal adjunct as 
described by Bloor and Bloor (2004) in that it serves to modify the speaker’s degree of 
commitment to the proposition. “I believe that …” also frequently marks a sentence as 
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communicating pragmatic inferences over and above the assertion of a proposition. It is 
more than the communication of a speaker’s attitude to that proposition.  
The objection to the widening of the definition of hedging and hedges from those words 
and phrases on Lakoff’s original list is that the terms might become so broad as to become 
almost meaningless. Schröder and Zimmer (1997) identify hedging as a “complex research 
area within the fields of pragmatics, linguistics, semantics, logic and philosophy,” They 
settle on a definition of the process of hedging as the use of language “for specific 
communicative purposes, such as politeness, vagueness, mitigation etc.,” (p249, emphasis 
added). 
From these three functions of hedges, which are paralleled in Hyland (1995a), I will 
examine the following three functions which hedging performs and which, I will argue, the 
phrase “I believe that” performs on occasions. These are: 
a) The approximator function (vagueness). This is the hedge function that alters the 
likelihood that an assertion or categorisation will be assented to (in the ways outlined 
above). This is the function of hedges described by Lakoff (1973). 
b) The shield function. Hedges of this kind serve to protect the utterer of from blame 
or censure should the asserted proposition or claim of category membership be 
subsequently shown to be false. This is perhaps closest to the ordinary meaning of 
the word “hedge” as in “to hedge one’s bets”. Kaltenböck (2010) argues that the 
shield function is the principal, although not the only, function of hedging. 
c) The politeness function. The purpose of these hedges is to respect social 
conventions. The bald assertion of a proposition as fact risks appearing arrogant or 
failing to take account of dissenting opinions or objections. A hedge is deployed in 
order to avoid the possibility of giving offence. Hyland (1994, 1995b) identifies this 
as the principal purpose for which hedges are widely used in scientific and academic 
writing. 
All three of these functions make use of the same effect of hedges as a modal adjunct: they 
all serve to alter the speaker’s commitment to the truth of an asserted proposition. All hedges 
have this in common. This is why Crompton (1997) is moved to suggest that research into 
hedges should restrict itself to "language avoiding commitment, a use which corresponds 
closely … with the ordinary use of the word".  However, this overlooks that the purpose 
that the speaker has in modifying their degree of commitment might be distinct, and that 
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the different purposes generate different pragmatic inferences. For example, by 
introducing vagueness to support the approximator function the speaker is implying either 
that “this is true to an extent” or “this is not to be taken as literally or definitively true”. By 
deploying a hedge in the shield function the speaker is reducing their commitment in order 
to communicate “please don’t blame me if this turns out to be wrong”. Under the politeness 
function, the apparent reduction of commitment serves as a social emollient; this kind of 
hedge user is implying that “I am right about this, but that doesn’t mean I won’t respect a 
dissenting view or that I regard myself as superior to my audience.” This explains why the 
use of this kind of hedge is so widespread in scientific and academic writing (Hyland 1998).  
There are two dimensions, therefore, along which we can judge whether a particular word 
or phrase is being used as a hedge. The first is the modal adjunct dimension: identifying a 
word or phrase as a hedge is a matter of asking “has the inclusion of this word or phrase 
modified the utterer’s commitment to the truth of the proposition, compared with the 
assertion of the proposition alone?’ If it has, the word or phrase is likely to be a hedge. The 
second dimension concerns the pragmatic marker role of the hedge. Here the relevant 
question is “what additional pragmatic inferences are generated by the inclusion of this 
word or phrase?” This identifies the hedging function of the overall sentence. 
6.3 “I believe that” as a Hedging-Phrase. 
The use of “I believe that” as a hedging phrase has not widely been expressly considered in 
the literature. Kaltenböck (2009, 2010) analyses the use of the closely related phrase “I 
think” as a hedge. He identifies four functions of hedges that make use of “I think”, three 
of which correspond to the functions identified above. “I think” is also, clearly, a modifier 
of the degree of commitment that an utterer admits.  Much of Kaltenböck’s observations 
about the use of “I think” apply equally to “I believe that”, as will be shown in the rest of 
this chapter. 
White (2003) draws attention to a difference in a speaker’s degree of commitment between 
pronouncements – such as “I contend” or “it is a fact that” – and instances of entertaining 
a proposition – where the speaker brings in modifiers such as “perhaps”, “it seems to me”, 
“I think” and “I believe”. This identifies the modal adjunct dimension of hedges and places 
“I believe” firmly in the camp of hedges, phrases that ameliorate the speaker’s certainty. 
White also recognises the social (pragmatic) functions of hedges as distinct from their 
modal function when he writes that “…stance and attitude are fundamentally social, rather 
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than personal, that when speakers/writers take a stand, when they construct for themselves 
a particular persona or identity, it is via a process of engaging with socially determined 
value positions”. Using a hedging-phrase, such as “I believe that …” is to take a stance 
relative to the hearer. This stance is distinct from that taken when the speaker wishes to 
reinforce their position, to make a pronouncement. It is also determined by situational 
factors under which the utterance takes place. 
Another theorist to recognise instances of “I believe” as a hedging-phrase is Skelton (1988). 
He writes that “There are a very large number of ways in which one can hedge in English. 
Among them, for instance, are the use if impersonal phrases, the modal system, verbs like 
‘seem’, ‘look’ and ‘appear’, sentence-introductory phrases like ‘I think’ and ‘I believe’, and 
the addition of –ish to certain (but not all) adjectives”. 
More systematically, Feltzer (2014) applied the techniques of corpus analysis to examine 
the distribution, collocates and linguistic functions of three first person cognitive verbs – “I 
think”, “I mean” and “I believe” – in contemporary political discourse. The objective of the 
analysis was to see how often these phrases coincided with more “obvious” hedges – such 
as “probably”, “maybe” etcetera. She concludes that: 
The local context of all three parentheticals shows a fine interplay of boosting 
and attenuating devices. It is characterized by the orchestrated interplay with 
other expressions of vagueness or fuzziness, such as pronouns with an 
indeterminate domain of references, adverbials or generic nouns, and with less-
fuzzy making devices. 
In none of Feltzer’s examples does “I believe” or “I think” serve to make a claim about a 
particular mental state or attitude of the speaker. Their function is to mitigate or reinforce 
the strength to which the speaker is committing to the asserted proposition. This is a 
significant divergence from the role of “belief” in the understanding of philosophical folk 
psychology. In the traditional view, to believe a proposition is to have a particular 
disposition to behave in a way directed or caused by that specific belief. A declaration of a 
belief is to declare the possession of that disposition. This is why the ascription of belief is 
taken as being explanatory and predictive of subsequent action. In the case of “I believe” as 
a hedging-phrase, the commitment is being modified and the direction, degree and nature 
of the modification are determined by features of the occasion and by the pragmatic 
implicatures of the utterance. 
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To support this, I will need to suggest how such implicatures are generated. 
6.4 The Pragmatic Interpretation of Hedges 
Pragmatics is the branch of linguistics that is concerned with the relationship between sign 
systems and their users, with due regard to the circumstances of their use.99 This entails that 
there may be meanings or significance to the signs that make up language that go beyond 
the things signified. Several researchers in the field of hedges – for example Clemen (1997), 
Fraser (2010), Kaltenböck (2010) and Schröder and Zimmer (1997) – characterise hedges 
as pragmatic markers, which is to say units of speech that draw attention to the fact that the 
meaning of the utterance may go beyond the usual meaning of the signs (words and syntax) 
that make it up. 
The utterance is the unit of language that pragmatics analyses. It is an individual instance 
in which language is used. The same sentence of a given language might be deployed on 
different occasions, in different contexts by different users and with correspondingly 
different purposes and meanings. Each instance would be a different utterance. The 
objective of pragmatics is to describe the way that utterances arrive at these differences in 
a systematic way – without allowing an open-ended proliferation of lexical meanings. 
As Recanati (1991: 99) describes it, “We have three levels of meaning: sentence meaning, 
what is said and what is communicated. What is communicated includes not only what is 
said but also the conversational implicatures of the utterance.” Conversational 
implicatures is the name given to the information that is conveyed by an utterance that 
cannot be directly read from the meanings of its components. In Recanati’s words 
(1991:97): “Conversational implicatures are part of what the utterance communicates, but 
they are not conventionally determined by the meaning of the sentence; they are 
pragmatically rather than semantically determined.” 
The central questions for pragmatics are, firstly, how are individual conversational 
implicatures encoded and understood (or generated)? And, secondly, how can we 
systematically describe this process in order to explain and predict what will be implicated 
by a particular utterance on a particular occasion – given that the variety of utterances and 
                                                
99 In contrast to semantics, which is concerned with the relations between signs and the entities that they signify and syntax 
which is concerned with the legitimate and systematic ways that signs relate to each other and can be combined. 
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occasions is potentially limitless, and assuming that some kind of system must be in play 
that allows speakers to control implicatures and hearers to understand them? 
In an attempt to eliminate this apparent gap between language in use and the rules of logic, 
Grice (1991: 26) proposed that we can describe the “nature and importance of the conditions 
governing conversation” by reference to a number of maxims of conversation underpinned 
by a co-operative principle. This latter principle suggests that since language usually 
entails the joint efforts of speakers and hearers, language users usually endeavour to observe 
this rule: 
Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which 
it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which 
you are engaged. 
(Grice 1991: 26) 
In addition to the cooperative principle, Grice proposed nine maxims of conversation, 
organised into four categories: 
Maxims of Quantity: 
1) Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes 
of the exchange). 
2) Do not make your contribution more informative than is required. 
Maxims of Quality: 
Supermaxim: Try to make your contribution one that is true. 
1) Do not say what you believe to be false. 
2) Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence. 
Maxim of Relation (or Relevance) 
Make your contribution relevant and timely. 
Maxim of Manner 
Be Perspicuous 
Submaxims: 
1) Avoid obscurity of expression. 
2) Avoid ambiguity. 
3) Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity). 
4) Be orderly. 
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(Grice 1991; 26-28)  
Grice recognised that there might be a need for additional maxims (Ibid: 27) if we are to 
provide a comprehensive account of the generation of conversational implicatures. Despite 
their formulation as imperatives, Grice did not intend his maxims as normative constraints 
on how conversations ought to be conducted. They are to be regarded, Levinson (1983: 101) 
suggests, as “a set of over-arching assumptions guiding the conduct of conversation.” When 
a hearer notices that one of the maxims is being violated, or when a speaker deliberately 
flouts one or more of the maxims, each is aware that conversational implicatures are in play. 
Grice suggests a further regulative dimension for the generation of conversational 
implicatures; the modified Occam’s razor. Intended to ensure that the senses or definitions 
of a word or sentence to not proliferate beyond the bounds of usefulness, this rule is 
expressed as “senses are not to be multiplied without necessity,” (Grice 1991: 47). Without 
this rule, each time that a word, phrase or sentence is used in a novel situation by a different 
speaker and generates a new implicature we would simultaneously generate a new 
ambiguity to its meaning, a new line in the dictionary. For this reason, Grice suggests, when 
two meanings of an utterance are possible, a literal one and a pragmatic one, we should give 
preference to the pragmatic, situation specific one, rather than expecting words to encode 
seemingly infinite literal meanings. 
Armed with the co-operative principle, the maxims of conversation and the modified 
Occam’s razor, we can systematically describe the ways in which conversational 
implicatures are generated by paying attention to which maxims of conversation are being 
accidentally violated or deliberately flouted on a particular occasion.  
Grice’s formulation has been immensely influential and has been developed by a number 
of theorists. One such “neo-Gricean” model is that suggested by Levinson (2001), as a 
system of generalised conversational implicatures. He writes: 
There must be powerful heuristics that give us preferred interpretations without 
too much calculation of such matters as speakers’ intentions, encyclopaedic 
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knowledge of the domain being talked about, or calculations of others’ mental 
processes100. 
(Levinson 2001: 4) 
This is the contrast between Levinson and Grice. Although Grice’s maxims of conversation 
form the foundation on which Levinson’s heuristics of implicature are built, Grice 
regarded inference to a speaker’s intentions – including their mental processes – as essential 
to communicative success (Grice 1991: 86-116). Levinson holds that his implicatures are 
generalised and presumed, such that the series of heuristics that he proposes unlock default 
interpretations. Thus they generate generalised conversational implicatures independently 
of any inference of a speaker’s intentions. 
Levinson proposes three principles: 
1. If the utterance is constructed using simple, brief, unmarked forms, this signals 
business as usual, that the described situation has all the expected, stereotypical 
properties; 
2. If, in contrast, the utterance is constructed using marked, prolix or unusual forms, 
this signals that the described situation is itself unusual or unexpected or has special 
properties; 
3. Where an utterance contains an expression drawn from a set of contrasting 
expressions, assume that the chosen expressions describe a world that itself contrasts 
with those rival worlds that would have been described by the contrasting 
expressions. 
(Levinson 2001: 6) 
From these principles, Levinson develops a typology of general conversational implicature 
based on three heuristics of pragmatic inference. 
Under the Q-heuristic (from quantity) “what isn’t said isn’t the case” (Levinson 2001: 35).  
Levinson notes that this heuristic is straightforwardly derived from Grice’s first maxim of 
quantity: “make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of 
                                                
100 Transpose this observation from the field of linguistics to the area of action explanation and philosophy of mind and 
psychology and it could be a manifesto for this thesis! 
A Therapeutic Elimination… 
Mark Curtis, UEA June, 2016  224 
the exchange)”. This heuristic, in common with the maxim, generates scalar implicatures. 
For example: 
Michael and Mary have three children. 
+> (conversationally implicates) Exactly three children, not four, five or more. 
Levinson’s second heuristic is the I-heuristic (informativeness): “what is expressed simply 
is stereotypically exemplified”. This relates to Grice’s second maxim of quantity: “Do not 
make your contribution more informative than is required. Levinson argues that this 
heuristic allows us to differentiate between: 
fruit bat/cricket bat/aluminium bat. 
Although these three locutions are syntactically similar they generate distinct implicatures 
in simple usage thanks to their stereotypical associations. If we wanted “fruit bat” to 
designate either “a piece of sporting equipment made of fruit” (cf. “aluminium bat”) then 
more complex utterances would be required to generate the non-stereotypical interpretation. 
Levinson (2001: 37) also suggests that this allows the derivation of a bi-conditional 
implicature from a simple conditional: 
If you mow the lawn, I’ll give you five pounds. 
+> If, and only if, you mow the lawn I will give you five pounds. 
The third heuristic suggested by Levinson is the M-Heuristic (from manner); “what’s said 
in an abnormal way isn’t normal”. This derives from Grice’s maxim of manner: “be 
perspicuous” – and particularly from from the first (“avoid obscurity of expression”) and 
third (“be brief; avoid unnecessary prolixity”) submaxims. It is the converse of the I-
Heuristic; it suggests that non-simple usages – for example, those laden with additional 
words or unusual formulations – are to be interpreted non-stereotypically. Levinson (2001: 
39) offers the example of the deliberate use of a double negative, such as: 
It’s not impossible that the plane will be late. 
Which implicates that the plane is less likely to be late than would be suggested by: 
It’s possible that the plane will be late. 
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This is an illustration of how conversational implicature allows a speaker to make fine 
distinctions and for those distinctions to be understood. Similarly, if we describe someone 
as being: 
Not entirely uninterested in football. 
The implicature is that this person is something of a football obsessive. Another example 
of a prolix or obscure usage generating a non-typical implicature, offered by Levinson 
(2001: 37): 
The corners of Sue’s lips turned slightly upward. 
+> Sue didn’t exactly smile. 
To reiterate Levinson’s three heuristics: 
Q-Heuristic: What isn’t said, isn’t [the case]. 
I-Heuristic: What’s expressed simply is stereotypically exemplified. 
M-Heuristic: What’s said in an abnormal way isn’t normal. 
As with any heuristic, the application of these generates non-entailed inferences. Errors of 
commission and interpretation are still possible, even when the heuristic rules are followed. 
Levinson argues only that the implicatures generated by these heuristics have “the status of 
preferred interpretations, because the heuristics will be understood to be generally in force 
– it is that which gives them their communicational efficiency.” (Levinson 2001: 39). 
Complex implicatures emerge from interactions between Levinson’s heuristics. To deal 
with this, Levinson proposes a hierarchy or “ordered set of priorities” through which 
inconsistencies can be resolved. Where there is a conflict between potential inferences we 
should, he argues, assume that inferences from the Q-heuristic defeat those derived from 
the M-heuristic which in turn defeat those generated by the I-heuristic (Levinson 2001: 39) 
6.5 Implicatures of “I believe that…” Hedges 
Statements that begin with “I believe that” or that include a parenthetical “I believe” are 
hedges if they modify the speaker’s degree of commitment to the propositions they contain. 
Determination of their function – differentiation between, for example, approximator, 
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shield and politeness functions – requires the generation of further implicatures as can be 
seen if we apply Levinson’s heuristics to such utterances.  
Under the approximator function, the purpose of the hedging-phrase is to render the hedged 
statement more vague and thus more acceptable if it is in the mid-range of certainty and less 
acceptable if it is at the upper end of the scale. For example, the proposition: 
There are more than seven billion people on earth. 
Stating this proposition (a well-attested fact) suggests, by application of Levinson’s Q-
heuristic suggests the following scalar implicature: 
+> There are more than seven billion people on earth and this is the closest round 
number. 
“More than seven billion” includes, literally, eight, nine or twenty billion. However, by the 
lights of the Q-Heuristic it would be perverse to claim of a world with a population of twenty 
billion, that there are “more than seven billion” – unless there was an express reason for 
using that number – even though the statement would be true. Compare the statement: 
I believe that there are more than seven billion people on earth. 
Immediately the speaker is indicating some uncertainty about the number, signalling that it 
is a hedge. This is clear because, pace the traditional propositional attitude reading of a 
statement beginning “I believe that”, by Levinson’s I-Heuristic (what’s expressed simply is 
stereotypically exemplified) the statement “There are more than seven billion people on 
earth” conversationally implicates “I believe that there are more than seven billion people 
on earth”. When the speaker adds the unnecessary additional “I believe that” they are, by 
the application of the M–Heuristic (“What’s said in an abnormal way isn’t normal”) 
signalling something else. What, precisely, will depend on the context and on the function 
that the hedge is deployed to perform? The speaker may simply be recording that the 
number is imprecise – although the implicature generated by the Q-Heuristic is unaffected 
by the addition of “I believe that”. The number being spoken of is still seven billion and not 
twenty billion. The speaker might be seeking to shield themselves from the possibility that 
this dynamic number has passed eight billion since the last time they heard of it and so 
avoided censure or loss of face associated with a genuine mistake. Alternatively, in a formal 
group the speaker will avoid appearing brash, overconfident or rude by asserting this 
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knowledge if they ameliorate it with “I believe that” – even if they are quite certain of the 
knowledge. 
The function will affect the full implicature and the function is given by the context and to 
occasion. 
To illustrate this, take a more developed scenario. A caterer has been commissioned to 
provide canapés for a reception. Their delicious prawn vol-au-vents are disappearing more 
rapidly than expected. The nervous host asks the caterer whether there will be enough for 
all of the guests. The caterer might answer: 
I made enough for the expected number of guests. 
Which is a simple assertion and, again, by the I-Heuristic, implicates that the caterer 
believes what is being asserted. In the event the answer given is a hedged one: 
I believe that I made enough for the expected number of guests. 
We could understand this hedged statement as a straightforward statement of uncertainty 
about the number (approximator function) although it is unlikely that a responsible caterer 
would not know how many of a particular item they had provided. It could also be read as 
an instance of politeness: the host is the caterer’s employer, after all. Much more likely, 
however, is that this hedge is being offered as a shield. The implicature is something like: 
+>I know that I have provided enough of this item for all of your guests to have 
some. It is not my fault if some of them have taken more than their fair share. 
This implicature is generated both by the situation and by Levinson’s M-Heuristic (what’s 
said in an abnormal way isn’t normal). Adding those three words indicates not only that the 
caterer is defensive about having done their job professionally but also that any shortages 
are the fault of the host’s voracious guests. 
For a third example, consider a situation in which an esteemed professor of mathematics is 
expounding on a detailed proof in front of a class of junior undergraduates. He marks up an 
example on the blackboard but, unwittingly, makes an obvious error in the demonstration. 
One or two students raise a nervous hand, the professor barks at one of them, demanding 
an explanation for this unwelcome interruption. Two ways are available for the student to 
express their concern: 
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The professor has made a mistake there. 
I believe that the professor has made a mistake there. 
Again, by the I-Heuristic, the first statement implicates the second, so the second form is a 
non-stereotypical formulation and, by the M-Heuristic must carry an additional implicature. 
I contend that in this scenario, the second formulation is much more likely to be the 
student’s choice of words. This is not because they need to express uncertainty: the 
professor’s error is a glaring one, plain for the even freshest undergraduate to spot.  
This is a clear example of the politeness function of hedging. In saying “I believe that the 
professor has made a mistake” rather than merely stating the proposition, the student is 
respecting the authority of the professor and the power distance between them. Had a 
student made a mistake, then the professor would be much more likely to assert the non-
hedged form “You have made a mistake there” – although the polite, hedged form would 
be equally acceptable and the implicature of the hedge would still be clear as an instance of 
politeness – of not wanting to undermine the student in front of their classmates. 
This kind of social function is also an example of the I-Heuristic at work. In the absence of 
the stereotypical interpretations of the hedge as either an approximation or a shield, we read 
the hedge as a social emollient. It is, however, by the I-Heuristic, a stereotypical way for a 
student to address a professor and generates the following implicature: 
I believe that the professor has made a mistake there. 
+> I am respectfully pointing out an error without, in any way, seeking to challenge 
the professor’s authority. 
The uses of hedging in this social or politeness function are not restricted to occasions of 
disparity of authority or power. Such usages are almost ubiquitous on academic writing – 
including in the sciences where one might expect fidelity and precision to be at a premium. 
Hedges occur so frequently in this domain that Myers (1989) is prompted to write that “the 
hedging of claims is so common that the sentence that looks like a claim but contains no 
hedging is probably not a statement of new knowledge". 
Consider these two sentences: 
We believe that this shows that the addition of reagent x increases the speed of the 
reaction. 
A Therapeutic Elimination… 
Mark Curtis, UEA June, 2016  229 
This shows that the addition of reagent x increases the speed of the reaction. 
The first is the hedged statement, but the hedge does not express the author’s lack of 
commitment to the conclusion. One expects that any scientific paper published in a 
reputable peer-reviewed journal represents the best available data and the most secure 
inferences available to its authors. The implicature of the hedged statement is thus: 
+> We respectfully commend to our peers and to the wider scientific community this 
novel conclusion – that the addition of reagent x increases the speed of the reaction. 
This implicature is, once again, generated by the I-Heuristic; politeness in scientific and 
other academic research articles is the usual mode of expression (Crompton 1997; Hyland 
1995b, 1995a, 1996, 1998; Myers 1989; Salager-Meyer 1994) so that it becomes the 
stereotypical mode of expression. So important is the politeness function that Leech (2003) 
has proposed adding a “principal of politeness” to the Gricean maxims. Huang (2007: 37n) 
rejects this on the grounds that it invites an unnecessary proliferation of maxims and that 
politeness is a social, cultural phenomenon rather than a linguistic one. Levinson has gone 
on record as acknowledging the importance of politeness phenomena to pragmatic 
understanding but suggests that this can be dealt with under his heuristic schema (Levinson 
2001). 
6.6 “I believe that…” Hedges and Assertion 
All of the examples in the previous section shared one feature; the hedges modified an 
assertive statement. Indeed, the hedged form could also be taken as a form of assertion, 
even though the content of the assertion was modified by the hedge and by the resultant 
conversational implicatures. Another way to examine the phenomenon and its particular 
implications for uses of the phrase “I believe that” is by reference to contemporary work on 
the linguistic phenomenon of assertion. 
Superficially, a bare assertion of a proposition, p, and a hedged utterance of the form “I 
believe that p” are both assertions. We have seen that, by the application of Levinson’s I-
Heuristic, the bare assertion will generate the implicature that the utterer believes the 
content of the proposition. Given this, we should examine whether an utterance where “I 
believe that” is made explicit asserts anything different or additional to a statement of the 
bare proposition. Either it asserts additional information – for example that the speaker’s 
attitude to the proposition is one of belief (which, according to Levinson’s I-Heuristic would 
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be redundant), or it changes the conversational implicature of the overall, hedged utterance 
– how we should understand what is being asserted. This latter possibility raises the question 
of whether hedged utterances can ever qualify as assertions. To answer this, we will need 
to look at the way assertion is currently understood and the norms that some theorists have 
proposed to govern this speech act. 
In the introduction to a recent collection of papers on philosophical approaches to assertion 
Jessica Brown and Herman Cappelen suggest that “the notion of assertion has played an 
important role in the philosophy of language for the last 100 years”. Despite this heritage, 
they note, providing a definitive account of the features that differentiate assertions from 
other speech acts remains a matter of heated debate. They list five possibilities: 
(i) Assertions are governed by certain norms – the norms of assertion. 
(ii) Assertions are those sayings that have certain effects. 
(iii) Assertions are those sayings that have certain causes. 
(iv) Assertions are those sayings that are accompanied by certain commitments. 
(v) There is no one set of sayings (of declaratives) that is correctly characterized as 
the set of assertions. Sayings are governed by variable norms, come with 
variable commitments and have variable causes and effects. There can be no 
substantive debate about which of these subsets are the assertions. 
(Brown and Cappelen 2014: 3) 
As an illustration of what is at stake in these distinctions, consider the case of telling a lie. 
In ordinary terms this might be described as “asserting a proposition while knowing it to be 
untrue”. According to norm-based accounts (i), lying is a violation of the norms and so 
should be disqualified from being regarded as an instance of assertion at all – lying, on that 
reading, is an altogether different speech act from asserting. According to the effect-based 
account, however, if the effect of an assertion is taken to be to cause a hearer to accept the 
asserted proposition as true, then lying is a species of assertion after all.101   
As Brown and Cappelen point out, the fifth class of assertion theories (v) “rejects the 
assumption that there is a unique, correct way of picking out assertions from sayings” 
                                                
101 This is not to say that all norm-based accounts would disqualify lying as a kind of assertion nor that all effect-based 
accounts would include it. My intention is only to illustrate the significant differences that can arise from these different 
accounts.  
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(Ibid.). “Assertion is largely a philosopher’s term, and we can, for different purposes, use it 
to pick out different subsets of sayings.” (Ibid.: 4) 
However, they also insist that “one common core in theories of both implicature and 
presupposition is that they contrast with assertion. What is asserted is not presupposed and 
it is not implicated.” This would entail that any utterance that contains both asserted 
propositional content and content that derives from an implicature cannot be regarded as 
asserting both sets of content. Only the matter that qualifies as an assertion (under whatever 
characterisation one chooses) is asserted content. The content of the implicature is distinct 
from this. In cases where “I believe that” serves as a hedging phrase and so gives rise to 
hedge-based implicatures – both to modify the commitment of the speaker to the proposition 
and other implicatures dependent on the function of the hedge 
(approximation/shield/politeness) – the contents of the implicatures are not asserted. 
For the sake of simplicity – and because the argument that I want to make does not directly 
depend on which kind of distinction one wants to make – I will consider the impact of 
hedging in the light of theories of the norms of assertion (i).  
According to Williamson (1996) and others, the speech act of assertion is governed by 
certain norms. Even before we attend to the business of defining what the specific norms of 
assertion are, there is controversy over their character. Norms of assertion might be alethic, 
which is to say dependent on the truth of the proposition being asserted, or they might be 
epistemic – dependent on the knowledge of the person who makes the assertion (Maitra 
2014: 277). Norms can also be distinguished as to whether they are regulative or 
constitutive. Violation of a regulative norm would imply that the speaker asserts defectively; 
violation of a constitutive norm entails that they fail to assert at all (ibid.). 
Candidates for the norms of assertion include: 
Truth Rule: One must assert p only if p is true 
Warrant Rule: One must assert p only if one has warrant to assert p 
Knowledge Rule: One must assert p only if one knows p 
Belief rule: One must assert p only if one believes that p   
(Brown and Cappelen 2014) 
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Of these, the Truth and Warrant rules are alethic norms while the Knowledge and Belief 
rules are epistemic norms (although “knowledge” entails an alethic component). As written, 
they are ambiguous as to whether they are regulative or constitutive although this status 
could easily be made more explicit: for example, the truth rule could be reformulated as 
“one asserts P only if P is true” (constitutive) or the belief rule might be rendered “one 
should assert P only if one believes that P”. Brown and Cappelen (2014: 3) admit that 
“Those who endorse such views vary in how they think about the nature of the norms and 
what it means to say that we follow these rules.” 
There are other candidates. For example, purposive norms, which are norms that relate to 
the idea that assertions are distinguished by norm and by effect, a hybrid of theories in 
categories (i) and (ii). A speaker asserts (or asserts well) only if they speak with a suitable 
assertive purpose – such as persuading a hearer of the truth of a proposition. Maitra (2014: 
282) endorses this view, claiming that “neither the knowledge nor the truth norm tells us 
what it is to assert something. Rather, they each assume that there is something that counts 
as asserting, and tell us at what an asserter ought to be aiming when performing the speech 
act.” She also insists that the content of an assertion must be propositional and so truth 
conditional because “a speaker who does not aim to say anything truth-conditional does not 
count as asserting at all,” (Ibid: 292). This would entail that the truth-conditional nature of 
the asserted proposition (as distinct from its truth) is a constitutive norm of assertion. This 
is, of all the candidates for norms of assertion, relatively uncontroversial. Assertion is, if 
nothing else, about communicating information that is either true or false. 
For the purposes of this discussion I will assume these minimal features of assertion 
a) Assertion is a speech act governed by certain norms. 
b) Any utterance that violates those norms either fails to assert altogether (in the case 
of constitutive norms) or asserts defectively (in the case of regulative norms). 
c) The minimal constitutive norm of assertion is that any assertion must communicate 
truth conditional (propositional) information. 
Accepting c) as a minimal constitutive norm does not commit one to norms of truth, warrant, 
knowledge or belief nor to any constitutive norm. It can be admitted that c) might be 
necessary but not sufficient for an act of assertion – there are other speech acts that convey 
truth-conditional information, such as promising, commanding or even justifying.  If the 
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information contained in the statement is not either true or false, however, one is not 
asserting but doing something else.   
In a statement of the form “I believe that p”, the content of “p” is a truth-conditional 
statement. The questions at issue are whether saying “I believe that p” is the same speech 
act as asserting p, and whether it is still an assertion – even if in being spoken it asserts 
both p and something else. 
Take the case of a group of friends out for a hike in unfamiliar country. They come to a fork 
in the path. After several minutes of debate and much fumbling with maps one of them 
asserts that: 
The path to the left will take us where we are heading. 
Note that under the knowledge norm of assertion this qualifies as an assertion only if the 
speaker knows this to be the case (if constitutive) or is asserting defectively (if regulative) 
if they do not know. By the belief norm the test of asserting or asserting well is only that the 
speaker believes what they say (that is, it doesn’t have to be true). Under both of these norms 
the speaker is taken to be holding the content of the assertion to be true, the difference is in 
whether it has to be true. This is also true of the truth-norm, and is guaranteed by Levinson’s 
I-Heuristic since we take all assertions to be a statement of whatever the speaker holds as 
true. Grice’s Maxims of Quality also warrant the notion that a speaker will usually be trying 
to make their contribution one that is true, not say something that they know to be false nor 
offer anything for which they lack evidence (c.f. the warrant norm). This latter constraint 
suggests that if challenged they would be able to offer some justification for the view 
asserted: 
The path to the left will take us where we are heading. 
Why do you say that? 
I can see from the map that it’s the shortest route. 
However constituted, the assertion generates the implicature that: 
+> I hold it to be true that the path to the left will take us where we are heading. 
The implicature is not an additional assertion. It is a component of the speech act of 
assertion. On the other hand, the speaker might choose to hedge their statement with the 
addition of: 
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I believe that the path to the left will take us where we are heading. 
Superficially, this addition of three words makes the implicature of the bare assertion 
explicit. However, taken as a hedged-statement, the possible overall implicatures are quite 
different: 
I believe that the path to the left will take us where we are heading. 
+> I am not totally sure (I don’t know) but we should probably take the left path. 
(hedging as modification of commitment) 
+> Don’t blame or condemn me if I am wrong but we should take the left path. 
(hedging under the shield function) 
+> I know that everyone else here can read a map as well or better than me and I 
don’t want to impose my will, but in the interests of moving on we should take the 
left path. 
(hedging under the politeness function) 
 
Which hedging function is being performed will be clear to the hearers on the basis of other 
cues, including the speaker’s tone of voice and aspects of their personality traits (different 
for a dictatorial type from someone who is more of a team-player, for example).  
This raises an issue as to whether the hedged statement, in order to function as a hedge, 
needs to be taken as asserting a further truth about the mental states of the speaker. To do 
so would imply the following implicature: 
I believe that the path to the left will take us where we are heading. 
+> I hold it to be true that I hold it to be true that the path to the left will take us 
where we are heading. 
The speaker might, conceivably, be drawing attention to the fact that they are in possession 
of this specific mental state: however, in doing so, they would be drawing attention to the 
fact that they have a reduced level of certainty or, in the case of the politeness function of 
hedging, that they are giving the impression of a reduced level of epistemic commitment in 
order to avoid seeming arrogant.  
At this point the proponent of the belief-desire view of action, of the belief-desire law or 
philosophical folk psychology more generally might be tempted to take issue. Surely, they 
might argue, if “I believe that” serves to indicate (or even to mimic) a reduced degree of 
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certainty compared either to a bare assertion or to a statement beginning “I know that”, does 
this not entail that “believe” refers to a particular epistemic mental state? Does this not 
vindicate the view that “belief” and, by extension, “desire” refer to precisely those 
functional mental states demanded by philosophical folk psychology? 
I have never denied that “belief” might, on occasion, refer to a particular epistemic attitude 
an equivalent of holding a proposition to be true. Neither does my modest eliminativism rest 
on the contention that such states do not exist. However, in all of the hedging-functions 
described in this chapter, the use of “I believe that” as a hedging phrase tells us nothing 
new, about the causes, real, supposed or potential, of the speaker’s actions. Our 
understanding of the causes of a person’s actions always rest with aspects of the situation, 
their personal traits, the meanings that they associate with their understanding of the 
situation and the emotional impact of these meanings. None of these things is impenetrable 
which is why we are usually successful at interpersonal understanding.  
The addition of “I believe that” as a hedging-phrase to the statement (or assertion) of a 
proposition provides additional information in the form of modifying their genuine or 
simulated commitment to a proposition. It reduces their liability to be blamed or establishes 
their sensitivity to the social situation. Hedging with “I believe that p” adds nothing to our 
expectation or explanation of their future or past actions compared to the same individual, 
in the same situation, asserting that p. It has not picked out a cause. 
6.7 Chapter Summary 
Hedging describes the strategy in language use of deploying additional words or phrases to 
make a concept or statement more or less fuzzy (Section 6.1). Typical hedging-words or 
hedging-phrases include “probably”, “sort of”,” like”, “in a way”, “to some extent” or 
“actually”. Although all hedges have in common that they either modify or appear to modify 
a speaker’s commitment to a proposition, claim or assertion, in practice, hedges can fulfil a 
number of functions, among them approximation, shielding and making an utterance more 
polite (6.2). 
Certain cognitive verbs can serve as hedging-phrases. Among these are “I think”, “I mean” 
and, importantly “I believe” (6.3). The modification of an otherwise constative phrase by 
the addition of a hedging-word or hedging-phrase alters the conversational implicature of 
the overall phrase compared with the bare constative or assertion (6.4). The precise content 
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of the implicature depends, to some extent, on the function that the hedge is performing: the 
generated implicature will be different, for example, if the hedge is used to shield the 
speaker, compared to the implicature of a hedge deployed to fulfil the politeness function 
(6.5). Nevertheless, the same rules for the detection of conversational implicature apply to 
hedges in all their functions. This is true whether the rule set is based on Grice’s Maxims 
of Conversation or the Neo-Gricean schema of heuristics proposed by Levinson. 
Using the latter schema makes it clear that reference to the beliefs of the speaker is 
conversationally implicated in any constative or assertion of a proposition. This is why the 
addition of an initial or parenthetic “I believe that” or “I believe” can be understood as a 
non-typical formulation and interpreted as a hedge. 
Understanding that hedge-phrases that apparently refer to the beliefs of the speaker do not 
make a claim further to the proposition being modified is underlined by an appreciation of 
the speech act of assertion (6.6-7). In particular, if assertion is governed by norms (6.7), 
then the addition of an explicit statement of what the speaker believes is disqualified from 
being an assertion further to the bare proposition. Whether or not hedged sentences are 
altogether disqualified from being satisfactory assertions or from being assertions at all will 
depend on the precise set of norms of assertion with which one chooses to work. In any 
case, and to reinforce the point made by discussion of conversational implicatures, altering 
the speaker’s commitment to the truth of an asserted proposition is a distinct speech act 
from the making of an assertion. Regarding hedged phrases beginning “I believe that” as 
asserting something already implicated by the bare proposition leads to the absurdity of 
repeated reference to what the speaker holds as true. 
Despite the fact that using “cognitive verbs” as hedging phrases suggests that they refer to 
specific mental states, this does not entail that they refer to the causes of an action – as is 
demanded by philosophical folk psychology. Thus the elimination of “belief” from causal 
accounts of action remains a live possibility, even if beginning a sentence with “I believe 
that” is understood as modifying the speaker’s epistemic commitment to what follows. 
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7 Chapter Seven: 
Conclusions and Implications 
Abstract: In this concluding chapter, I review the objectives and the material 
presented throughout this thesis, present the arguments suggested by this 
material and suggest some future directions of research arising. 
Know then thyself, presume not god to scan; 
The proper study of mankind is man. 
Alexander Pope, 18th Century. 
7.1 Objectives Reviewed 
Why do people choose to act as they do? How do most people, most of the time find the 
actions of other people – and their own actions – explicable and predictable? And when we 
give a reason for an action, what relation does the reason bear to the causes of our action 
choice? 
This thesis seeks to address these and other questions related to human action-choice, 
interpersonal understanding and reason-giving. It takes inspiration from Gordon Baker’s 
understanding of Wittgenstein’s injunction in the Philosophical Investigations (PI §116) 
that we seek to clarify philosophical problems by bringing “words back from their 
metaphysical to their everyday use” (Baker 2004). Specifically, my contention is that a 
clarification of the implicit commitments in the way that “belief” and “desire” are used in 
philosophical folk psychology can help to avoid various philosophical problems that arise 
from that picture. This clarification can be facilitated by:  
a) Paying attention how the phenomena that are the subjects of philosophical folk 
psychology are dealt with in cognitive and social psychology 
b) taking clearer and more inclusive view – what Wittgenstein at PI §I22 describes as 
a “perspicuous representation” (Baker 2004: 22) – of the everyday uses of “belief” 
and “desire” and the application of related concepts. 
This goal yields the two guiding questions of the thesis: 
A Therapeutic Elimination… 
Mark Curtis, UEA June, 2016  238 
 GC1: How does scientific psychology account for action choice and interpersonal 
understanding and do these accounts employ “belief” and “desire” in the causal 
functional roles suggested by philosophical folk psychology? 
GC2: How are “belief” and “desire” used in everyday discourse other than referring 
to specific causal-functional mental states as suggested by philosophical folk 
psychology?  
A motivator of the approach is the sense that some philosophical problems, reviewed in the 
introduction, arise directly from the picture entailed by philosophical folk psychology. A 
philosophical picture, in the sense that I use it, is an inflexible, fixed view of a phenomenon 
which persuades the philosopher in its sway to commit to a number of unwarranted, perhaps 
tacit and unacknowledged assumptions which arise from the metaphysical appropriation of 
everyday terms like “belief” and “desire”. A philosopher can be led to question the picture 
by being shown how some uses of the terms and concepts from which the picture is 
constructed do not necessitate the same metaphysical uses. After Morris (2007), I take it 
that the acceptance of a philosophical picture risks tying philosophers to a dogma or 
prejudice. Dogmas and prejudices are unwarranted because they have not engaged with 
scientific or everyday uses of the terms and concepts. After Williams (2001), where a 
particular “default” view (in this case, belief-desire psychology) is held without warrant, it 
can be subject to challenge by the presentation of contrary evidence. Although holding the 
default view without warrant might be justified, additional warrant is required if the 
challenge is to be resisted. 
The objective is not to refute the positions inherent in the picture, but to loosen their grip 
by challenging their certainties.  
In the following review I outline how I have sought to challenge these commitments by 
presenting alternative pictures of the target phenomena drawn from cognitive and social 
psychology and from specific applications of “belief” and “desire” in everyday discourse. I 
also set out the key arguments of each chapter and how these relate to these assumptions. 
7.2 Review 
Part One of this thesis takes examples from two disciplines within contemporary scientific 
psychology to see how they address the three phenomena (actions, interpersonal 
understanding and reason giving) that the belief-desire law sets out to explain.  
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Chapter One sets out to describe the causal-explanatory goals and methods of psychology. 
Of particular interest were the observations that psychology seeks genuine explanations 
that describe nodes in causal networks by means of functional analysis. There is little room 
for law-like regularities and if these did feature it would be as the explananda of the 
discipline. Two examples of functional analysis are offered: firstly, the investigation of the 
human visual system in Marr (2010), a paradigmatic example of functional analysis from 
the psychological through computational modelling to the neurological level. Secondly the 
historical development of the concept of spreading activation in semantic memory 
demonstrates how personal-level psychological phenomena can be analysed into sub-
personal functions in the development and refinement of an explanatory model. 
The principal arguments presented in Chapter One are: 
1) Psychology seeks genuine causal explanations of phenomena rather than “as if” 
speculations based on regularities. 
2) Psychological explanations do not rely on the formulation of laws. Law-like 
regularities are the explananda of psychological investigations. 
3) Genuine explanations entail functional analysis whereby complex functions are 
described in terms of the more simple (sub-personal) functions that produce them. 
4) Simple functions related in systematic ways bring about complex functions – and so 
are the causes of those complex functions. 
These arguments yield the two conditionals which motivate Chapter Two of the thesis, and 
a third that motivates Chapter Three: 
If the possession of specific beliefs and desires are the causes of specific actions 
(metaphysical commitment 1) then we would expect them to feature in causal 
explanations offered by cognitive psychology (in the case of judgement and 
decision making leading to action choice). 
This would mean that at some level of functional analysis, causal beliefs and causal desires 
would feature. 
Also: 
If the belief-desire law holds, then we would expect the relationship between the 
possession of specific beliefs and desires and consequent actions to be just the sort 
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of law-like regularity, or explanandum, that psychologists would seek to 
functionally analyse. 
In Chapter Two, the idealised picture of reasoning outlined by the belief-desire law or by 
its close relative expected utility decision theory seems to describe neither real-life 
decision making nor the prevalent understanding of judgement and decision making in 
contemporary cognitive psychology. Many of our judgements and decisions appear to be 
based on the deployment of a number of adaptive tools, including heuristics which are rules 
of thumb that deliver reasonably accurate judgements in the contexts in which they are 
made. This contrasts with normative rules that determine or constrain what is right or 
reasonable. The occasional errors and biases where heuristic judgements conflict with 
normative rules are not failures of our reason, they are a feature of the way that our decisions 
are ecologically suited to real-world conditions (Gigerenzer and Brighton 2011). 
Cognitive psychologists also now believe that a great many of our judgements – perhaps 
the overwhelming majority – are arrived at automatically, outside of conscious awareness 
or control. When we ask an individual to describe the thought processes – the specific 
beliefs and desires, for example – that led them to a particular choice we are inviting them 
to rationalise ex post facto. Work on automaticity and heuristic reasoning have shown 
that, in contrast to the view that beliefs and desires are, in principle, consciously accessible, 
many actions, judgements and decisions take place without the actor being aware of the 
influences that bring them about.  
The arguments developed in Chapter Two: 
1) Belief-desire psychology and Expected Utility Decision theory amount to much the 
same thing. 
2) Both of these might be normative prescriptions of idealised rationality but they are 
not descriptive of what actually happens. 
3) Competing accounts of the way that people reach decisions, including the use of 
heuristics and automatic judgements are more descriptively accurate.  
4) Given that people live in the real world and that their judgements and decisions have 
real-world consequences, perhaps a normative model based on ecological 
rationality would lead to better decision strategies.  
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The conditional of interpersonal understanding that motivates Chapter Three can be 
rendered as: 
If the prediction and explanation of action rested principally on the ascription of 
specific beliefs and desires to an actor, as suggested by the belief-desire law, then 
attribution theory in social psychology, which is concerned with how individuals 
(the ‘folk’ of folk-psychology) understand and describe the causes of action, would 
principally be concerned with investigating the capacity to infer and to ascribe 
beliefs and desires.  
A central contention of philosophical “folk psychology” is that it is the way that ordinary 
people explain and predict each other’s actions. Contemporary social psychology covers 
much the same territory under the heading of attribution theory. This field is directly 
concerned with the strategies that people use to attribute causes to behaviour in order to 
understand why people act as they do.  
Attribution theorists investigate two kinds of attribution (Heider 1958). Situational 
attributions assume that the cause of an individual’s behaviour or choice of action is 
located in the features of the situation under which they act. Personal attributions locate 
the cause of a particular behaviour in features of the agent. If the agent is known to the 
person who makes the attribution, they will advert to “what the person is like” or other 
stable personal traits in preference to all other causal explanations. However, this is also 
where significant biases – such as stereotype activation (“people like that always act that 
way”) can override other causal attributions. People exhibit a bias favouring personal over 
situational attributions even when the situational constraints over personal choice are made 
explicit. This is known as the fundamental attribution error or correspondence bias.  
Heuristics and automatic judgements have also been shown to play a significant part in 
interpersonal understanding. Heuristic reasoning has been suggested to account, in part, for 
another bias in interpersonal understanding – the actor-observer difference. Put simply, 
this bias suggests that people are more likely to attribute their own actions to situational 
causes and more likely to attribute other people’s actions to personal or dispositional causes. 
Part of the reason for this might be what is salient to the person depending on whether they 
are an actor or an observer. The actor is grappling with the question “what kind of situation 
is this?” while the observer is able to ask “what kind of person is that?”. This is significant 
because under the belief-desire model people are thought to understand their own and other 
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people’s actions in the same way – by ascribing specific propositional attitudes. This is also 
challenged by work in social psychology on the unreliability of introspection. 
The principal arguments of Chapter Three are: 
1) People are prone to attribute agency even in situations where no agent is present 
(Heider and Simmel 1944). 
2) Attribution theory suggests that when attributing causes to agents, people default to 
features of the situation or of the agent rather than considering an agent’s beliefs and 
desires. 
3) Certain systematic biases in attribution strategies indicate that individuals do not 
adhere to normative rules when explaining or predicting actions, but use heuristic 
rules including recognition, similarity and fluency. Specifically: 
a. The Fundamental Attribution Error/Correspondence Bias suggests that 
people are prone to seek features of the actor that explain their behaviour 
even when situational factors are both sufficient and most salient. 
b. Actor-observer asymmetry suggests that people are prone to attribute 
situational factors as the causes of their own action whereas the actions of 
others are usually put down to stable traits of that person.  
Overall, Part One of this thesis lays out the contention that although cognitive and social 
psychology are committed to genuine, causal explanations, the models most in use in 
contemporary approaches to both judgement and decision making (and so action choice) 
and causal attributions (and so interpersonal understanding) do so largely without recourse 
to belief-desire ascriptions. These alternative ways to understand action and action 
explanation do not share the commitments of the philosophical folk psychology picture. 
Part Two of the thesis discusses some surprising ways that the terms “belief” and “desire” 
feature in everyday use without referring to the presumed causes of action. 
Chapter Four opens Part Two with a discussion of the ways that actions are described and 
explained within narratives. I suggest that the construction of narratives is critically 
important to our understanding of time, events and action. Examining narrative 
psychology and narrative therapy highlights the fact that both make use of narratives – 
including narratives in which beliefs and desires might feature – without ascribing causes 
to specific beliefs and desires. Fictional narratives in which the specific beliefs and desires 
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of a character are made explicit are weaker thanks to the fact that they are unlike real life. 
We do not encounter people in our everyday lives attached to cloud-like bubbles from which 
we can read their thoughts. We expect our fictional narratives to relay information in much 
the same way – revealing the character through their action choices rather than vice-versa. 
We are also sensitive to a contrast between narrative truth and causal, historical truth. 
The former plays a crucial role in the way that we construct meaning around events and 
occurrences. The latter is essential to a causal account such as that demanded by the 
scientific approach. 
That the kind of narrative proposed by the belief-desire picture might be culturally 
dependent is supported, firstly, by an exposition of action-description in the Homeric epics. 
These foundational texts of western European literature make no use of propositional 
attitude ascriptions but describe people’s actions in terms of their hearing voices or having 
bodily sensations that compel them to act. Another largely non-literate contemporary 
culture, the Junin Quechua of South America, speak a language devoid of mental-state 
terms and yet have a rich narrative tradition. When retelling Junin Quechua folk tales in 
their own words, Western people seem compelled to insert terms denoting specific mental 
states where there were none in the original. Also, Junin Quechua children, despite having 
no native word for “belief” perform as well as their western counterparts on so-called false 
belief tasks. 
Hutto’s Narrative Practice Hypothesis (Hutto 2008b, 2008a) proposes that a facility with 
narratives is the key to the abilities usually incorporated in folk psychology. I suggest that 
although the correlation is interesting an alternative explanation is that facility with 
narratives underpins belief-desire psychology as the dominant narrative of action within 
our culture.  
I speculate that many of the features of the way that we process narratives and the tendency 
of dominant narratives to produce systematic biases suggest that we might employ a 
narrative heuristic: this would require further empirical work to confirm. 
The principal arguments of Chapter Four are: 
1) People tend to describe the actions of agents – or apparent agents – by means of 
narratives. 
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2) Narrative is an essential component of the way that people structure their experience 
of the world. 
3) Narrative psychology shows that constructing a narrative can have significant 
effects on the way we process experience. The predominant stories that we construct 
shape our understanding of events including our own actions. 
4) Belief-desire psychology is one particular way to describe action but it is not 
essential: the same action can be described without them. 
5) Belief-desire psychology is a cultural artefact – other cultures describe action 
without the use of similar terms. 
6) The way that we assess the acceptability of a narrative shares features with heuristic 
judgements: it is conceivable that we judge the meaningfulness of narratives 
heuristically rather than against historical correspondences or future probabilities. 
Chapter Five developed an area in which claims of specific beliefs and desires feature more 
prominently – the offering of excuses. Since the giving of a justification for an anomalous, 
morally suspect or illegal action depends on establishing some feature of the act that justifies 
it, rather than a feature of the actor, any time an individual claims a particular belief and or 
desire in an attempt to explain their behaviour or to avoid moral opprobrium or legal 
censure they are, in fact, offering an excuse. In developing this distinction, I examine the 
epistemology of testimony as applied to justifications and excuses and ask whether the 
belief-desire component of those excuses that feature such terms is intended to be assessed 
or evaluated as are ordinary cases of giving testimony.  I conclude that excuse-givers and 
their audiences are sensitive to the distinction that the objective of an excuse is not testimony 
as to an individual’s beliefs and desires, nor to establish the causal link between specific 
states and the subsequent behaviour. The objective of an excuse is to persuade that the 
behaviour under examination was reasonable under the circumstances. 
This contention was made more specific by an examination of the legal concept of mens 
rea (guilty mind) – a component of many legal prohibitions (or requirements). Mens rea 
demands that the intentions of the accused form part of the definition of those offences of 
which it is a component. I point out that the main purpose of the inclusion of a mens rea 
component in the formulation of a law is to allow defences based on the absence of a guilty 
mind, where the prosecution fails to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
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acted intentionally.102 Once again the standard is one of reasonableness – and 
reasonableness depends much more on what is at stake, on the degree of risk, than on the 
specific propositional attitudes of the alleged miscreant. 
Two case histories illustrate this point and the importance of overall circumstances to an 
understanding of reasonableness. The first, R v Morgan et al, led to a change to the law 
when it was realised that the offence of rape, as previously formulated, allowed a defence 
based on what the defendant “genuinely believed” at the time of the offence. There was, in 
short, no room for the jury to decide whether the belief or the subsequent actions were 
reasonable. In its place, most recent formulation of the law specifies the defendant in a rape 
trial who relies on a mens rea defence that they thought the act was consensual must show 
that they had taken all reasonable steps to secure consent. The second case was a notorious 
shooting of a policeman in London in the 1950s. The older accomplice of the shooter was 
hanged: the shooter himself, although convicted, was too young to suffer the death penalty. 
The guilt of the accomplice rested on two questions pertinent to his knowledge and his 
intentions – did he know that the younger man had a gun and was he party to the decision 
to use it? Forty-six years later, the conviction was posthumously quashed because the jury 
had not been directed to base their estimation of his intentions on all the salient facts about 
his behaviour at the time of the shooting. The law thus recognised that the attribution of 
intention depends on a holistic view of the circumstances under which the action is 
performed and a judgement of the reasonableness of the action under those circumstances. 
The principal arguments of Chapter Five are, therefore: 
1) That excuses couched in terms of beliefs and desires are judged on the basis of 
what is reasonable under the circumstances. 
2) When laws are formulated with a mens rea (guilty mind) component, the objective 
is to exclude unintentional actions from liability under the law rather than to 
specify which mental states imply guilt. 
3) Bad laws and unintended legal consequences result when metaphysical 
commitments similar to those of belief-desire psychology creep into the 
courtroom. Steps have been taken specifically to exclude mental-state ascriptions 
                                                
102 As distinct from “unintentionally” – no ascription of specific mental states is entailed in this definition. 
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from the exercise of justice without due regard to the circumstances under which 
the accused acted.  
In Chapter 6 I describe another occasion on which we might offer a statement that, 
superficially at least, makes direct reference to the possession of a specific belief. Hedging 
is the name given to the phenomenon whereby we seek to modify a statement in order to 
make it more or less “fuzzy”. There are a number of reasons why we might want to do so. 
In this chapter I draw attention to three possible functions of hedging a statement: 
approximation, shielding (avoiding censure if the claim should prove to be incorrect) and 
politeness (in order to avoid a charge of arrogance or disrespect).  In all three cases, hedging 
is a category of speech act in which we either modify or appear to modify our degree of 
epistemic commitment to a proposition. Preceding the statement of a proposition with “I 
believe that” or inserting a parenthetic “I believe” into an otherwise constative (Austin 
1962) utterance serves the purpose of giving the impression that one cannot claim to know 
that it is true: it is less definitive than the assertion of the proposition.  
I discuss the conversational implicatures (Grice 1991; Levinson 2001) of hedges and 
specifically of “I believe that” as a hedging phrase. I suggest that this suggests a further 
divergence from the metaphysical commitments of the belief-desire picture. 
I highlight the way that we understand “I believe that”, used as a hedge, to be modifying 
the speaker’s epistemic commitment to the attached proposition, in this usage the phrase is 
being used to refer to an epistemic state – the less committed “believe” rather than “know”. 
However, in the case of “I believe that”, used as a hedging statement, need not be regarded 
as the assertion of an additional causal fact in order to be understood as picking out an 
epistemic state of the speaker. Its elimination from accounts of the causes of action would 
not preclude its performance of this linguistic function even if the word “believe”, in this 
context, retains a very ordinary meaning. 
Arguments from Chapter 6: 
1) Hedges serve to make an asserted statement more or less fuzzy. 
2) Hedges also perform a number of communicative functions, including 
approximation, shielding the speaker and rendering a statement more polite. 
3) “I believe that…” can serve as a hedging phrase and can perform any of these 
functions. 
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4) In all cases, the addition of “I believe that” either modifies or appears to modify the 
speaker’s epistemic commitment to the attached proposition. 
5) Despite “I believe that”, used as a hedging phrase, retaining the meaning of 
designating a particular category of mental state, its elimination from causal 
accounts of action modest (eliminativism) would not affect its ability to perform this 
role and so remains a live possibility. 
7.3 Further Investigations 
In conclusion I would like to suggest some further avenues for philosophical and 
psychological research suggested by the discussions in this thesis. 
In Chapter 4 I suggest that, given the ubiquity and apparent psychological significance of 
narratives, it is possible that some of our evaluations rest not on the truth of what is said or 
written but on our evaluation of its merits as a story. Such evaluations might rest on how 
good a story we think it is, a judgement which itself might depend on a comparison with 
the content and structure of story archetypes that prevail in our culture. Is there, I asked, a 
narrative heuristic? I suggest that such a tool might depend on simple facilities like 
recognition and fluency yet might combine these in ways that are uniquely suited to the 
evaluation of stories. I also suggested the kinds of rules that might make up a narrative 
heuristic. 
It would be an interesting research project to take up the investigation of this speculation 
and to uncover whether such a heuristic exists and, if it does, in what circumstances and 
with what consequences it is employed. The evaluation of a heuristic depends on two 
factors: 
i) Establishing the features of a heuristic - its cues, search rule, stopping rule and 
decision rule, for example, which might be investigated by computer simulation 
(Gigerenzer and Todd 1999a; Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011). 
ii) Determining whether the heuristic is actually used in the real world, which can 
only be determined by empirical investigation of real people (Gigerenzer and 
Brighton 2011). 
Applying these and the techniques for modelling, testing and investigating heuristics “in the 
wild” should be used to establish both how a narrative heuristic might work and whether it 
is a decision strategy that people use. 
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7.4 Embodied and Enactive Cognition. 
Beginning in the 1990s, some psychologists and philosophers alike started to express 
dissatisfaction with the reductive ambitions of some computational models of mind. 
Varela et al. (1993) suggested that there must be a point of contact between the scientific 
model of the mind and the way that individuals experience and engage with their world. 
Lakoff and Johnson (1999) develop the idea of an embodied cognition from the idea that so 
many of our abstract concepts are developed by means of metaphorical extension from 
our physical engagement with the world – “grasping an idea,” for example. Their wide-
ranging treatment considers the implications of an embodied approach for all kinds of 
traditional philosophical concerns, from the metaphysics of causation to morality, from 
conceptions of self to notions of truth and reality. 
E. Thompson (2007) seeks to take enactive cognition further and to reconcile its 
consequences with both phenomenological philosophy and the biology of neuronal systems. 
However, this ambitious project makes clear that one does not have to embrace all of the 
methods or conclusions of phenomenology to find this way of proceeding valuable. All that 
he proposes is the re-integration of the notion of experience into the models of the mind that 
we construct. As he writes: 
The computer model or computational theory of mind, once considered ‘the 
only game in town,’ is now called classical cognitive science and coexists, 
separately and in various hybrid forms, with connectionism and embodied 
dynamicism. Consciousness, once dismissed as marginal to the scientific 
understanding of the mind, is now a subject of great interest.  
(Ibid.: 267) 
This suggests that we might reduce the processes of thought, decision making or 
interpersonal understanding to symbol manipulations but should treat meaning as 
significant in and of itself. Seeing all of these processes as depending on the manipulation 
of symbols that stand for “beliefs” and “desires” abstracts away from such direct 
considerations. 
In a collection edited by Zlatev et al. (2008) several authors suggest that the paradigmatic 
way that humans come to develop their cognition of the world and their specific 
conceptualisations is by engagement with other people (Gallagher and Hutto 2008; Hobson 
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and Hobson 2008; Susswein and Racine 2008). These intersubjective approaches take it 
as fundamental to our “mental” life not only that we must negotiate the world of experience 
but also that, through communication and interaction with others, that much of what we 
process is shared (cf. Butterfill 2013). Susswein and Racine (2008) draw on the concept of 
speech acts from Austin (1962) to explain the source of confusion that “psychological 
predicates … are used in a variety of relatively unrelated ways. When subsuming mental 
state concepts under the superordinate category of ‘the mind’ it is easy not to notice this 
feature” (Susswein and Racine 2008: 150). It has been the contention of the present thesis 
– particularly in Part Two –  that philosophers must be sensitive to these differences and to 
the fact that “a single mental state term can be manifestly used to perform very different 
social acts” (Ibid.: 151).  
Subtitled “Basic Minds without Concepts”, Hutto and Myin (2013) present a radical 
conception of the role of enactive engagement with the world to the development of what 
was formerly regarded as a distinct realm of “the mental”. They criticise the 
“intellectualists” for whom “nothing qualifies as an action proper unless it is produced by 
or otherwise connected to contentful states of mind of some sort” (Ibid.: 14). In place of this 
model (of which belief-desire psychology is a subspecies) they propose an embodiment 
thesis that “equates basic cognition with concrete spatio-temporally extended patterns of 
dynamic interaction between organisms and their environments” (Ibid.: 5). Such 
embodiment “is not defined with reference to an intuitive, everyday understanding of bodies 
and their boundaries, but in terms of wide-reaching sensorimotor interactions that are 
contextually embedded” (Ibid.: 6). A consequence is that “not all mentality requires 
individuals to construct representations of their worlds” (Ibid.: 5). The proponent of a 
traditional belief-desire psychology would have to reject such a position out of hand.   
The rejection of the default idea that cognition consists in computational operations carried 
out over abstract symbols removed from the experiences that they stand for is a common 
feature of many enactive, intersubjective and embodied approaches. In its place, these 
accounts suggest that experiences are themselves the currency of cognition. Their 
manipulation takes place in the imagination, which is not a separate space from the space 
of direct perceptual experience.  
Shapiro (2011) divides the embodied approach to three areas of concern: 
conceptualisation, which posits that the embodied nature of the human constrain how we 
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conceive the world; replacement, under which the traditional investigations of cognitive 
science can be rejected wholesale in favour of an embodied approach and finally theories 
of constitution, which suggests that embodiment and the organism’s engagement with the 
world should be regarded as constituting its mental life, and so abandons the “inner-outer” 
dichotomy altogether. He suggests that conceptualisation competes unsuccessfully with 
standard cognitive science, replacement directly competes with more success and 
constitution approaches do not compete, instead treating the explanatory task in an 
altogether different way (Ibid.: 210). 
Embodied and enactive approaches offer an alternative way to view the mind. It eschews 
the notion of mental functions as something computationally distinct from an organism’s 
engagement with its environment in favour of taking into account all of the factors which 
make it – an agent or a person – able to operate in the world. It offers the opportunity to 
develop holistic approaches which are more able to encompass complexity and nuance than 
computationally reductive schemata. 
7.5 A Different “Rationality” 
Philosophers have developed normative prescriptions for judgement and decision making. 
The result has been the formulation of a number of idealised accounts of rationality. We 
are expected to judge a person as rational according to how closely their decision-making 
process resembles the ideal. We appraise a particular judgement or decision, similarly, 
according to whether the process used to arrive at it. 
A move to more ecological accounts of rationality suggests that we should, instead, judge 
people and their decisions according to the appropriateness of the outcomes of judgements 
and decisions. This entails taking into account the environmental, situational and embodied 
and enactive features of humans. This is ecological rationality, the model for which Simon 
(1991) illustrated with the metaphor of a pair of scissors, in which one blade of the decision 
is provided by the cognitive processes of the decider and the other by the environmental, 
situational and consequential constraints and requirements under which the decision takes 
place (see Chapter 2, Section 2.5 for more on ecological rationality). 
Researchers have developed sophisticated models of the heuristic rules that people use to 
solve complex reasoning and social problems in the real world. The collections edited by 
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Gigerenzer and Todd (1999b) and by Gigerenzer, Hertwig and Pachur (2011) provide an 
overview of the scope of this field. 
The adoption of ecological rationality does not imply modifying the normative in order to 
encompass the descriptive, “deriving an ought from an is”, so to speak. It does suggest that 
our normative model of something as important as rationality should be sensitive to human 
and environmental constraints. The normative ideal should be feasible, regardless of 
whether or not it is actual. 
Two strategies are available, but we should ask which is used to solve the problems in real-
world situations. Even people at the socially impaired end of the autistic spectrum can be 
taught to apply belief-desire reasoning to pass false-belief tasks and can use this to negotiate 
the social world (Begeer et al. 2011). This does not mean that this is how neurotypical 
people work most of the time. 
It is just this pairing of strategies that has prompted the development of dual-process or 
dual-system models of judgement and decision making, although some – for example Keren 
and Schul (2009) – question whether we need to posit separate systems or to regard the 
strategies that people use as on a continuum (see section 2.10). Wherever the next step in 
the empirical investigation of judgement, decision making and the psychological 
antecedents of action leads, the central contentions of this thesis remain:  
a) Belief-desire psychology does not explain the causal origins of actions. 
b) Belief-desire psychology does not capture the way that people usually account for 
their own or other people’s actions. 
c) On those limited occasions that the terms “belief” and “desire” are deployed they 
should not necessarily be understood as causal explanations of actions. 
Philosophers interested in human rationality and interpersonal understanding should be 
prepared to embrace this growing weight of empirical evidence that the strategies used in 
these fields owe more to heuristics and to automatic processes than is allowed for by the 
traditional view of rationality. The belief-desire model is an attempt to shoehorn the 
computational, information-processing model of the mind and of thought into a traditional 
framework. New models are required. 
This final chapter begins with a quotation from Alexander Pope that prefigures that from 
Wittgenstein that headed the first. If we want to know why people do what they do, to 
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contemplate other minds, and to know ourselves, we need to pay attention to people, in 
their entirety. Philosophers are well placed to draw on the empirical findings from a variety 
of disciplines – psychology, anthropology, sociology, anatomy, linguistics and others – to 
elucidate how meaning emerges from the totality of human experience. This synthesis is a 
fruitful potential area for philosophical investigation. Science cannot answer essentially 
philosophical questions. An engagement with science can, however, inform philosophical 
consideration and send the enquiring philosopher off into exciting new directions. 
Rationality has been a central concern of Western philosophy at least since the Classical 
Greek period. Not only in the sense that we must regard ourselves as rational beings if 
normative ethical theories are to have any weight (Scanlon 2014), but also because if we 
are to judge our own behaviour and the behaviour of other intentional agents (human and 
non-human), then we must have an idea of what it means to be “rational”.  
My appeal is that philosophers shake off the shackles of the belief-desire law and embrace 
new models of rationality. In some measure these are heuristic, to be sure, automatic, 
certainly, possibly embodied and potentially without the conundrum of “mental 
representation” at its centre. None of this can occur unless we free ourselves from the 
unwarranted picture that causal explanations of action ought to advert to the specific 
referents of “belief” and “desire” or similar propositional attitudes. 
7.6 Experimental Philosophy 
Philosophers need not leave all of the empirical work on these new concepts of human 
rationality to psychologists. In recent years, some philosophers have started to apply the 
techniques and tools of social science and psychology to shed new light on philosophical 
questions. This approach is especially apt in fields where the traditional answer has rested 
on a particular, presumably general, intuition.  
Describing intentional action has been a subject for experimental philosophy since its 
beginning. Perhaps the most famous and oft-replicated philosophical experiment is that in 
which the “Knobe effect” first appeared. Joshua Knobe investigated subjects’ response to 
the following vignette.  
The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board and said, 
‘We are thinking of starting a new program. It will help us increase profits, but 
it will also harm the environment.’ 
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The chairman of the board answered, ‘I don’t care at all about harming the 
environment. I just want to make as much profit as I can. Let’s start the new 
program.’ 
(Knobe 2003, 2006) 
Subjects were asked whether or not the chairman of the board intentionally harmed the 
environment. Most people (82%) asked answered that they thought that he did (Knobe 2003, 
2006). Other subjects were offered this different scenario. 
The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board and said, 
‘We are thinking of starting a new program. It will help us increase profits, and 
it will also help the environment.’ 
The chairman of the board answered, ‘I don’t care at all about helping the 
environment. I just want to make as much profit as I can. Let’s start the new 
program.’ 
(Ibid.) 
When asked whether the chairman of the board intentionally helped the environment, most 
people (77%) who considered this scenario said that he did not (Knobe 2003, 2006). Yet in 
both versions the chairman’s declared intention is exactly the same – to make as much 
profit as he can. Knobe’s finding, that our moral evaluation of the chairman’s action seems 
to affect our estimate of the degree to which he intended to harm/help the environment is 
the effect that now bears his name. One might speculate that we are unwilling to give credit 
(responsibility) to somebody who does the right thing incidentally to the pursuit of their 
overriding goals. It is also consistent with the idea that our sense of 
culpability/responsibility is dependent (at least in part) on our assessment of what is at stake 
(see Chapter 5, section 5.3). 
Knobe’s overall conclusion is that despite the appeal of the folk-psychology picture of our 
understanding of intentional action, there is something “not quite right” about it (Knobe 
2006: 204).  
For some, of course, the idea that philosophers might embark on their own empirical 
investigations is anathema. In my own, modest view, it is a source of data which provides 
philosophical reflection with a perspicuous representation of its target phenomena. This is 
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also my justification for philosophical engagement with empirical science. It is also a way 
that intuitions, long a presumed source of philosophical insight, can be tested, 
systematically, by controlling variables (as in the Chairman example) and discovering what 
effect small changes have on our own intuitions and those of others (Fischer 2014; Fischer 
et al. 2015).  
Experimental approaches could provide additional data about the target phenomenon of the 
present thesis – how people understand and describe their own and each other’s actions. 
Matthew Ratcliffe recounts an informal study that he carried out among a group of students 
taking a second-year “philosophy of mind” module. He set them this question: 
What is central to your understanding of others? To put it another way, 
understanding or interacting with another person is very different from 
understanding or interacting with a rock. What does that difference consist of? 
Please state your intuitive or commonsense view rather than stating 
philosophical positions or engaging in philosophical argument. 
Ratcliffe (2007: 46) 
Ratcliffe reports that his students “mentioned a diverse range of factors”. Of the 25 students 
polled, “The term ‘belief’ appeared twice in total and ‘desire’ only appeared once, as did 
‘prediction’. ‘Explanation’ was not mentioned at all” (Ibid.: 48). Instead, the kinds of 
strategy that the students listed included such items as “Can detect their emotions through 
facial expressions and body language,” “Empathy,” and “They act similarly to us,”. 
Ratcliffe reports repeating the exercise two years later (2005) and receiving similar 
responses. 
Data from a larger and more diverse sample group, using a more systematic questionnaire 
to test the intuitions that people really have about their sense of other people would help to 
inform the debate. Results from different groups should be compared to see what effect 
philosophical (and psychological) training has on these intuitions. This is only one of a 
variety of experimental approaches that might be valuable in shedding further empirical 
light directly on these issues. 
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7.7 Conclusions 
From the arguments developed in each of these chapters I would suggest that we can draw 
these conclusions: 
I) Many commitments of the belief-desire psychology picture are unwarranted by 
the lights of the scientific understanding of the phenomena (action, 
interpersonal, understanding and reason-giving) and by the way that their terms 
(“belief” and “desire”) are used in everyday discourse. 
II) Many of the philosophical problems generated by the belief-desire picture are 
artefacts of that fixed way of looking at things, and of metaphysical uses of 
“belief” and “desire”.  
III) We can loosen the grip of the assumptions of philosophical folk psychology by 
taking a more inclusive overview of the phenomena, embracing cognitive and 
social psychology, and allowing for a wider understanding of the way that these 
terms are used in everyday situations. This is what Wittgenstein describes at 
Philosophical Investigations §122 as a perspicuous representation 
(übersichtliche darstellung) of the phenomena: such a view allows us to take 
account of the network of connections and the significance of intermediate 
cases.  
IV) Liberation from the assumptions of the belief-desire picture is facilitated by the 
elimination of “belief” and “desire” from philosophically rigorous accounts of 
the causes of action.  
V) If the terms “belief” and “desire” are eliminated from generalised causal 
accounts of action, philosophical problems generated by that picture dissolve. 
I have described my contention that “belief” and “desire” might be eliminated from causal 
accounts of human action as modest eliminativism. This differs from the eliminative 
materialism of Churchland (1981) and others. It entails only that “belief” and “desire” 
should be eliminated from causal accounts of action. 
Paradoxically, a causal account of action is both more complicated and more simple than 
the belief-desire picture suggests. More simple if we want a satisfactory answer to the 
question “why did you act as you did?” More complicated if we demand a scientifically 
satisfactory causal-explanatory account of the factors that led to any individual carrying 
out any particular action. 
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A robust philosophical account of action should both respect the scientific evidence of the 
causes of action and be able to accommodate individual and cultural differences in 
sensitivity to influences, decision strategy, choice and behaviour. Generalisations such as 
the belief-desire law might not even serve as a normative account – since even ideals should, 
in principle, be within the range of what is possible for a human being. 
Subsuming the gamut of causally efficacious conditions under “belief” and “desire” gives 
rise to philosophical problems: philosophers then expend valuable time and intellectual 
energy in pursuit of solutions. This behaviour is, I contend, an indication for application of 
a diagnostic-therapeutic philosophy. 
Applying such an approach suggests that a modest elimination is called for. 
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